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Abstract 
Between 1977 and 1984, a group of policymakers inside the United States government 
attempted to harness the growing unrest among the Soviet Union’s ethnic nationalities, with 
the objective of undermining their geopolitical rival and serving America’s Cold War 
interests.  These officials were motivated by long-standing beliefs about the nature of the 
Soviet system and the latent power of nationalism as a crucial vulnerability within the USSR. 
As the relative stability of the détente era passed, a more confrontational relationship 
emerged between the United States and the USSR.  The growth of the global human rights 
movement and deep structural changes within the international system during the 1970s 
had opened up new opportunities for American policymakers to attack the internal 
legitimacy of the Soviet Union.   
During the Carter administration, and with the blessing of the president, national security 
adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and a small cadre of hard-line officials began to focus on the 
internal nature of the Soviet regime and the domestic drivers of Soviet foreign policy. 
Through increased research and regular seminars, these officials hoped to improve 
awareness and knowledge of Soviet nationality issues inside the US government and explore 
ways to reach the ethnic groups inside the USSR.  Radio broadcasting and covert book 
publication programs were a central part of this strategy, although these policies were never 
fully accepted as a central part of the administration’s Soviet strategy.  In 1981, the 
incoming Reagan administration contained many individuals, such as Soviet expert Richard 
Pipes, who were highly sympathetic to these ideas.  Reagan officials were eager to explore 
ways of assaulting the internal cohesion of the Soviet Union as an official objective of US 
foreign policy, in order to promote greater democratisation and pluralism within the USSR.  
As such, serious attempts were made to craft concrete policies which would exploit ethnic 
tensions inside the Soviet Union, before these concepts finally fell from favour in 1984. 
This thesis explores these themes, offering an in-depth study of the Carter and Reagan 
administrations’ efforts to exploit the weaknesses of the USSR by manipulating the growing 
ethnic resentments within the Soviet system. These policies were driven by hard-line 
individuals in both administrations, figures who held long-standing beliefs that the US 
government should be doing more to undermine the USSR by embracing policies designed to 
stir up the Soviet nationalities.   
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Between 1977 and 1984 a group of American policymakers set out to undermine the internal 
political legitimacy of the Soviet Union by exploiting the growing ethnic and nationality 
tensions within the USSR.  The late 1970s witnessed the end of the détente era, as the Cold 
War entered a new period of confrontation and hostility, and for certain US foreign policy 
practitioners this tumult offered an opening for new ideas to enter into US Cold War 
strategy.  Hawkish policymakers in both the Carter and the Reagan administrations began 
to increasingly focus on the internal nature of the Soviet regime, believing the inner 
dynamics of the USSR were important drivers of Soviet foreign policy as well as a source of 
potential vulnerability in the seemingly unassailable Soviet citadel.  One such vulnerability 
was the latent restlessness of the Soviet nationalities, the long-repressed and almost 
countless non-Russian ethnic and linguistic groups which lay scattered across the vast 
territory of the USSR.  This was a subject which had largely been ignored by the American 
foreign policy establishment since the early days of the Cold War, but an area which certain 
hard-line individuals within the US government were keen to see given a more prominent 
position in America’s strategy towards the USSR.  The true nature of détente and the relative 
US and Soviet interpretations of what it meant remain points of contention among 
historians, but by the end of the 1970s it was becoming clear that a change in the dynamics 
of the US-Soviet relationship was emerging.  In this climate, and driven by the forceful 
personalities and ideas of officials within the US government, the concept of using the Soviet 
nationalities to destabilise and promote pluralistic reform within the Soviet Union began to 
gain currency at a time when Cold War tensions were once again reaching fever pitch.  
 
For hard-line individuals inside the Carter administration, the changing nature of 
competition with the Soviet Union opened up the possibility for new directions in US policy, 
directions which would be far more attuned to the internal nature of the Soviet system and 
probing for any weaknesses which could be exploited.  For the US and the USSR, détente 
had marked a period of non-interference in the internal affairs of each other’s systems, 
with relations firmly rooted in areas of mutual interest, arms reduction talks, and other 
matters of great power diplomacy.  The upheavals of the 1970s, which saw the signing of 
the Helsinki accords and the growth in transnational human rights activism, the struggle for 
self-determination in many parts of the developing world, and technological and economic 
innovation, all led to both a greater propensity and ability to monitor the internal workings 
of the Soviet regime.  At the same time, certain US policymakers began to move away from 
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the secure familiarity of détente high politics and train their focus on renewing a 
competitive edge in America’s relations with the Soviets.  
 
Individuals such as Carter’s national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski held long-standing, 
forceful beliefs about the nature and weaknesses of the Soviet system and was determined 
to take a more muscular approach to the USSR during his time at the helm of American 
foreign policy.  Brzezinski became the driving force for a new direction in US Soviet strategy, 
one which was dogged in its determination to make life difficult for the Soviet authorities 
in a myriad of ways, eager to exploit the internal contradictions of the Soviet empire.  
Brzezinski’s action-packed portfolio meant this task was often taken up by like-minded hard-
liners within the administration, who took their cue from the national security adviser and 
set about rattling the Soviets from the inside.  Of particular interest to Brzezinski and his 
cadre were the Soviet nationalities within the USSR.  A nation of diverse linguistic and 
cultural dimensions, with over 100 ethnic groups, the Soviet Union had found it difficult to 
squeeze centuries old traditions into the communist vision of an egalitarian and Sovietised 
society.  These minorities were on the receiving end of repression and domination under 
Moscow’s rule, much as they had been during the tsarist period, and resentment bubbled 
under the surface.  US officials began to wonder how they could make use of this situation. 
 
These developments didn’t just signal a change in strategy, they also marked the return of 
ideology and ideas to American Cold War statecraft1.  The ideological dimensions of the 
early Cold War years had been downplayed during the period of détente, as the focus fell 
on the material and military aspects of superpower competition, while at the same time the 
US government pursued arms limitation talks and remained largely non-critical towards the 
internal oppression of Soviet dissidents and national groups.  Brzezinski understood and 
appreciated the hard power aspects of competition with the Soviets very well, but he also 
understood the Cold War was a battle of ideas and competing visions of world order.  The 
American commitment to national self-determination and human rights were weapons which 
could, and should, be wielded more effectively toward the USSR in his view.  Brzezinski saw 
the Soviet system as an unnatural attempt to suppress the deeply tribal character of human 
nature, a tribalism expressed through devotion to language, to customs, and to place.  He 
also viewed it as a latent and potentially very destructive weakness inside the body politic 
of the Soviet Union, and one which American foreign policy should be paying infinitely more 
                                                        
1 For background reading on the role of ideas in shaping foreign policy, see Judith Goldstein and 
Robert Keohane’s edited collection of essays, Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and 
Political Change (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1993) and Andrew Bacevich’s fine 
compendium, Ideas and American Foreign Policy: A Reader (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018). 
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attention to.  Brzezinski dominated the shaping of US foreign policy during the late 1970s, 
and he used his position to introduce new concepts and mould strategy to engage 
competitively with the Soviets across multiple spheres.  His long-standing interest in the 
Soviet nationalities and their potential for unrest were now applied to US foreign policy, 
from the earliest days of his time in the White House he instructed members of the NSC such 
as Paul Henze to devise a coherent strategy for exploiting these internal weaknesses.  Henze 
was also responsible for the creation of the Nationalities Working Group, which was the 
main forum aimed at generating policies towards the Soviet nationalities within the US 
government. 
 
Nevertheless, the American foreign policy establishment remained committed to the 
détente process, and the president himself had signalled an eagerness to move past the 
bipolarity of the Cold War.  Brzezinski and Henze faced strong pushback from the State 
Department, who, while accepting the need for a greater understanding of ethnic issues 
inside the USSR, saw little value in stirring up trouble for Moscow using the Soviet 
nationalities.  Alongside this institutional opposition, efforts to reach the Soviet 
nationalities through radio broadcasting and covert means were often held up by budgetary 
concerns and bureaucratic infighting.  These factors meant that US efforts to target the 
Soviet nationalities during the Carter presidency always remained somewhat outside of the 
mainstream, viewed with suspicion by career foreign service officers and Washington 
policymakers alike.  There was a lingering sense that these interests were merely the pet 
project of eccentrics and hard-line anti-communist hawks, despite having the backing of 
the president’s national security adviser.  
 
That being said, these officials clearly opened a door which had largely remained closed 
since the early days of the Cold War.  They peered behind the Iron Curtain and saw resentful 
nationality groups labouring under Moscow’s rule, and they saw opportunity.  They also 
brought an ideological dimension to US statecraft that had largely been missing, one built 
around the ideas of freedom and national self-determination, once again envisioning the 
Cold War as a moral struggle between two utterly incompatible worldviews.  As the 1970s 
drew to a close, the Carter administration’s position towards the Soviet Union hardened 
further, US-USSR relations were at their lowest ebb for decades, and there was a feeling 
that Soviet overseas adventurism must be halted in its tracks.  But after Carter passed from 
the scene, a new administration took control of US Cold War strategy, one which was more 
agreeable to waging ideological warfare on the Soviet Union, and far more amenable to 
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using Soviet internal weaknesses, such as its ethnic nationalities, as a weapon in the 
America’s arsenal.  
 
Ronald Reagan swept into the White House with an entirely different approach to that of 
his predecessor.  He fundamentally believed communism to be utterly evil, and he was not 
shy about declaring this publicly.  Furthermore, in the early days of his administration the 
White House was stacked with anti-communist hard-liners.  These officials were not the 
establishment foreign policy types of previous administrations, these individuals were 
zealous, and they were keen to take the fight to the Soviet Union.  They were also far more 
attuned to the importance of regime types and the internal dynamics of states as drivers of 
foreign policy, believing it was vital to take this into account when crafting the 
administration’s new strategy toward the Soviet Union.  Not only was it important to 
understand the internal nature of the Soviet Union, and the factors which propelled its 
foreign policy, it was also crucial to gain a better knowledge of its internal weaknesses and 
craft policies which could exploit them.  Again, the focus soon fell on the Soviet nationalities 
and there was a growing belief within the administration, and across various agencies of the 
US government more generally, that the US could harness these forces and direct them in 
ways which may lead to greater pluralism and decentralisation of the Soviet system, while 
accepting that America had limited leverage at its disposal to do so.  
 
Once more, these policies were driven by hard-line individuals such as Richard Pipes, who 
shared Brzezinski and Henze’s long-standing interest in the Soviet nationalities and was keen 
to draft and implement polices specifically geared towards ethnic issues inside the USSR.  
The Carter administration had already begun the military build-up for which Reagan’s first 
term became synonymous, but the Reagan administration also picked up and developed the 
enterprises towards the Soviet nationalities of hard-liners like Henze, carrying them on and 
developing them further.  Even after Pipes departed from the White House in late 1982, 
there remained an appetite to place greater emphasis on Soviet ethnic issues and carve out 
a space for them within wider US Soviet strategy.  With the Reagan administration’s 
adoption of NSDD-75, its official policy framework for dealing with the Soviets, in early 
1983, US Soviet strategy now openly declared its objective to move the Soviet Union in a 
more democratic direction, and the Soviet nationalities were viewed as an important part 
of this scheme.  However, while late 1983 saw tensions between the superpowers reach 
fever pitch, it would also mark the beginning of a de-escalation which would continue over 




Within the administration itself, the hard-line stance of the first two years of Reagan’s 
presidency began to give way, and a greater appreciation for the need for dialogue with the 
Soviets emerged.  Spurred by the departure of several hard-liners and the assent of more 
moderate voices like George Shultz and Jack Matlock, the desire to bring down the Soviet 
empire from within became an increasingly marginal view, despite being enshrined in 
official US policy documents.  And as a result, policies towards stirring up the Soviet 
nationalities now found themselves subsumed by the greater weight placed on engagement 
with the Soviet leadership.  From 1984, the administration’s interest in the Soviet 
nationalities merely formed part of the general overarching emphasis placed on human 
rights inside the USSR within the context of broader US-Soviet negotiations, rather than as 
a weapon to use against Moscow.  The changing nature of US-Soviet competition and the 
transcendence of détente into a sharper period of Cold War confrontation during the late 
1970s had opened the way for fresh ideas to gain currency within the US government.  
Pushed by hard-line individuals like Brzezinski, Henze and Pipes, these ideas found 
expression in the form of covert actions and regular informal gatherings of scholars and 
practitioners, but ultimately fizzled out as US-Soviet relations stabilised in the mid-1980s 
and the Cold War drew to a close. 
 
This thesis will explore the attempts made by factions within the US government, across the 
Carter and Reagan administrations, to exploit the ethnic tensions of the Soviet Union as part 
of American Cold War strategy between 1977 and 1984.  These policymakers hoped to 
achieve a better understanding of the Soviet nationality problem, to exploit these tensions, 
and to move the USSR in a more reformist and decentralised direction.  There was a 
recognition that there was a lack of expertise of these issues within the US government, a 
situation which needed to be addressed through research and a greater emphasis on 
linguistic training.  There was also a view that greater effort needed to be made to reach 
the Soviet nationalities through radio broadcasts and the covert distribution of literature.  
These activities were driven by the beliefs of hard-line anti-communists, who believed that 
the Soviet Union was riven with internal contradictions and weaknesses, and the US 
government should be doing more to exploit them.  These ideas were promoted inside the 
Carter administration by Brzezinski and taken up by ideologues such as Paul Henze and 
officials at various agencies, although they never formed an integral part of US Soviet 
strategy, always somewhat outside of the mainstream.  
 
After the transition to the Reagan administration in 1981, these ideas found a home in a 
sympathetic White House which wished to seriously ramp up attempts to exploit weaknesses 
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within the USSR and promote pluralistic reform inside the Soviet system.  But by 1984, with 
the passing of the earlier hard-line posture of the Reagan administration, these ideas fell 
out of favour.  There has been remarkably little attention paid by historians of American 
foreign relations to US policies towards the Soviet nationalities during the later years of the 
Cold War, indeed this dissertation is the first in-depth study to explore this topic.  This 
thesis will examine the efforts of US policymakers to craft policies aimed at both 
understanding and exploiting the Soviet nationalities problem in order to serve American 
Cold War interests.  It reveals that these policies were driven by powerful ideas and powerful 
personalities inside the Carter and Reagan administrations, and were the result of a greater 
inclusion of ideology in US foreign policy than had been the case during the period of détente 
and the relaxation in Cold War tensions, before ultimately fizzling out in the mid 1980s. 
 
This dissertation will engage with the period 1977-1984, when the era of détente came 
shuddering to a halt, and a new era of superpower confrontation emerged.  This was a 
period of upheaval and change within the international system, with both the US and the 
USSR re-orientating their foreign policies accordingly.  Within this context, this project will 
explore the evolution of America’s Soviet strategy and how an increased focus on the 
internal nature of the USSR led to a growing desire to create policies geared toward the 
Soviet nationalities, grafting them into US strategy.  This thesis is the first work to explore 
this development in-depth, utilising underused archival documents from the period, many 
of which historians have thus far failed to engage with.  Work on US policy towards the 
Soviet nationalities has been hampered by a lack of declassification of all the relevant 
documents, but by piecing together available documents from across multiple sources, this 
dissertation allows a clearer picture to emerge of the individuals, goals, and tools involved 
in developing these policies.  That the US government was interested in exploiting Soviet 
weaknesses specifically through their ethnic groups is often remarked upon in passing by 
historians, but by deeply exploring this topic this dissertation will add considerably to our 
knowledge of both the period and the strategic thinking which was taking place inside the 
Carter and Reagan administrations.  Quite simply, no historian has conducted an in-depth 
research project on US policy towards the Soviet nationalities in the later Cold War years, 
this dissertation is the first of its kind using the available documentary evidence, and thus 
fills an important gap in the literature.  
 
The primary documents for this project have been underutilised by scholars, mainly because 
they were declassified in stages, and because they are scattered across various collections.  
Gathering together the evidence for this dissertation involved combining deep research at 
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the Carter and Reagan presidential libraries with painstaking research of CIA and State 
Department documents released by FOIA over the last few years.  Despite many of the 
documents on Soviet nationalities policy remaining classified and under review, we now 
have enough material available to begin the process of truly understanding American 
objectives in this area, and how the Soviet nationalities tied into wider US strategy towards 
the USSR during the late Cold War.  As more documents become available over the next few 
years this area of research should open up further, but this dissertation offers an opening 
salvo aimed at truly exploring these events and the individuals involved for the first time. 
 
One difficulty in carrying out this project was the lack of secondary material available on 
US policy towards the Soviet nationalities, for the simple reason that there has been very 
little scholarship produced on this topic.  In order to create a picture of these events, this 
dissertation builds on the existing literature on US-Soviet relations during the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, Carter’s foreign policy, and the early years of the Reagan administration. As 
such, it contributes to our understanding of the period in multiple ways; it offers the first 
full-length study of US policy towards the Soviet nationalities during the late Cold War years, 
it allows a fuller understanding of the Carter administration’s Soviet policy and some of the 
internal debates which were taking place within the American foreign policy establishment 
during these transcendent years of the Cold War, it adds to the growing work on the 
consistencies between the Carter and Reagan administration’s policies towards the USSR, it 
fleshes out the Reagan administration’s early attempts to undermine the internal legitimacy 
of the Soviet Union and promote pluralism within the USSR, and it explores how the beliefs 
and ideas of certain foreign policy officials could have direct policy implications for US Cold 
War strategy.  This thesis explores US strategic thinking during a crucial part of the Cold 
War timeline.  It investigates the attempts of American officials to promote change from 
within the USSR using its own national minority groups, it studies the individuals involved, 
their policy prescriptions, and the outcomes.  Yet more broadly speaking the dissertation is 
about the role of ideas in foreign policy and the power of personality in driving policy 
initiatives.  This dissertation will detail and examine a previously unexplored US foreign 
policy endeavour and the individuals involved in the enterprise, and in doing so adds to our 
knowledge of this critical phase of the Cold War struggle. 
 
Within academia and some policymaking circles, the very act of studying the Soviet 
nationalities and their relationship to the Soviet state was deemed undesirable, 
unnecessary, and an outdated fixation of ideologues.  The strange and tightly self-policed 
world of Sovietology had little time for the continuing power of nationalism and religion and 
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viewed those that did with suspicion bordering on hostility.  The nationalities issue was 
understood to have long been resolved by Moscow, and this feeling permeated both elite 
universities and the foreign policy establishment in the US.  As Alexander Motyl quipped, 
“most Sovietologists were uninterested in the non-Russians; Washington DC’s collective 
knowledge was pretty much confined to one State Department analyst, Paul Goble; 
journalists had no clue about where the “Stans” were, and the public was almost completely 
ignorant about half the USSR’s population. One European diplomat who was about to be 
posted to Ukraine asked me to brief him about a country he knew nothing about. His 
colleagues felt sorry that he was being demoted in so rude a fashion”2.  
Throughout the Cold War there was always a small number of academics who viewed 
nationalism as a real threat to the future of the Soviet empire, but these ideas never entered 
the mainstream of the profession3.  
 
Likewise, within the US government, after initially showing some interest in exploiting 
ethnic tensions during the early Cold War, the concept had largely fallen out of favour by 
the 1960s.  The United States had never recognised the annexation of the Baltic states into 
the USSR and would occasionally address the plight of other nationality groups inside the 
Soviet empire as well.  President Eisenhower was responsible for introducing Captive Nations 
Week, an annual event which highlighted the plight of repressed peoples behind the Iron 
Curtain and would become something of a yearly ritual, waxing and waning in profile over 
the course of the Cold War4.  Pressed by East European ethnic interest groups, the 
                                                        
2 Alexander J. Motyl, “The Non-Russians are Coming! The Non-Russians are Coming!: Field Notes 
from the Front Lines of Soviet Nationality Studies” (Harriman, p30-31) 
3 For examples see, Alexandre Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, Muslim National Communism in 
the Soviet Union (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1979); Hugh Seton Watson, 
Nationalism and Communism: Essays 1946-1963 (Westport: Praeger, 1964); Teresa Rakowska-
Harmstone, “The Dialectics of Nationalism in the USSR”, Problems of Communism 22, No.3, (May-
June 1974): 18-19 and Russia and Nationalism in Central Asia: The Case of Tadzhikistan 
(Washington DC:Johns Hopkins Press, 1970); Alexander J. Motyl, Sovietology, Rationality, 
Nationality: Coming to Grips with Nationalism in the USSR (New York: Columbia Press, 1990); 
Bohdan Nahaylo, Dohdan Nahaylo and Victor Swoboda, Soviet Disunion: A History of the 
Nationalities Problem in the USSR (New York: The Free Press, 1990).  
4 For a discussion on ethnic émigré groups, domestic politics and US foreign policy see, Stephen A. 
Garrett, “Eastern European Ethnic Groups and American Foreign Policy”, Political Science 
Quarterly 93, No.2, )1978); Tony Smith, Foreign Attachments: The Power of Ethnic Groups in the 
Making of American Foreign Policy (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2000); Thomas 
Ambrosio, Ethnic Identity Groups and US Foreign Policy (Westport: Praeger, 2002); Trevor Rubenzer 
and Steven B. Redd, ‘Ethnic Minority Groups and US Foreign Policy: Examining Congressional 
Decision Making and Economic Sanctions’, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 54, No. 3 
(September 2010), pp. 755-777; The Cold War at Home and Abroad: Domestic Politics and U.S. 
Foreign Policy since 1945, edited by Andrew L. Johns and Mitchell B. Lerner (Lexington: University 
Press of Kentucky, 2018). For an excellent overview of the US government’s flirtations with ethnic 
lobby groups and the role of Captive Nations Week in Cold War thinking see, Susan D. Fink, “From 
“Chicken Kiev” to Ukrainian Recognition: Domestic Politics in US Foreign Policy toward Ukraine”, 
Harvard Ukrainian Studies, Volume XXI, Number 1/2, June 1997. 
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Eisenhower administration had looked into the prospect of harnessing Soviet nationality 
problems to US foreign policy goals during the 1950s, before deciding the enterprise was 
fraught with difficulty, mainly due to the internal bickering of the émigré groups in the 
United States.  A 1958 National Security Council report summed up the general feeling on 
these issues within the US foreign policy establishment when its stated, “with the passage 
of years during which Soviet domination of the Eastern European nations has continued, 
emigre national committees have proved less productive.  This situation has been 
aggravated by internal factional strife and lack of unified purpose. There is no evidence 
that emigre politicians have any significant following in their homelands or that in the 
foreseeable future they will be able to return there to assume a role of political 
leadership”5.   
 
By the period of détente efforts to exploit the ethnic tensions of the Soviet bloc no longer 
held much interest inside the US government, and these ideas were no longer given much 
serious consideration by policymakers.  There is no doubt at all that Brzezinski and Pipes 
felt like outsiders in the world of Ivy League academia and the East Coast foreign policy 
establishment, both because of their ethnic backgrounds and their insistence on straying 
into areas of research which were deemed rather uncouth by their peers.  And there is also 
no doubt that government officials such as Henze and his like-minded compatriots on the 
Nationalities Working Group were seen as outsiders among the foreign policy elite, who 
were still pursuing détente and dialogue with the Soviet Union.  Even within the hawkish 
Reagan White House, these ideas were never fully accepted as mainstream within the 
administration, and eventually shut down by 1984.  
 
This thesis is not intended to be an in-depth study of the growing ethnic and nationality 
problems which afflicted the Soviet Union throughout the 1980s, and which ultimately 
culminated in the break-up and disintegration of the USSR itself in 1991.  The reasons for 
the collapse of the Soviet Union have been debated ad nauseum by historians and will 
continue to be debated long into the future.  The extent to which nationalism played a role 
in the demise of the USSR has also been endlessly discussed, and this thesis does not take a 
position on that question6.  This dissertation explores how these growing trends within the 
                                                        
5 “Statement of US Policy Toward the Soviet-Dominated Nations in Eastern Europe, National 
Security Council Report, May 24, 1958, Volume X, Part 1, Eastern Europe Region; Soviet Union; 
Cyprus, Foreign Relations of United States, 1958-1960 
6 For the best of scholarly debates on Soviet nationality policy and the role of the nationalism in 
the collapse of the Soviet empire see, Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, “Chickens Coming Home to 
Roost: A Perspective on Soviet Ethnic Relations, Journal of International Affairs Vol. 45, No. 2, 
Rethinking Nationalism and Sovereignty (Winter 1992), pp. 519-548; Mark Beissinger, Nationalist 
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Soviet empire were viewed from the vantage point of Washington DC, and the ways in which 
US policymakers thought about them and talked about them during the late 1970s and early 
1980s.  Furthermore, it is extremely difficult to gauge the success of US efforts to penetrate 
the Soviet republics and reach the nation minorities there during this period.  While it is 
clear that the Soviets were greatly irked by the radio broadcasts of Radio Free Europe and 
Radio Liberty, leading them to attempt to jam the transmissions, it remains difficult to 
assess how successful these broadcasts actually were in reaching their desired audience and 
determining if they played any role at all in prodding the national consciousness of the 
Soviet ethnic groups7.  Likewise, for assessing the CIA’s covert book and publication 
programs inside the USSR we only have the distribution reports of the intelligence 
community to study, with the obvious pitfalls involved in this.  Elements within the US 
government hoped to spark the Soviet nationalities and push them towards calls for greater 
decentralisation and autonomy, but as to whether these attempts were successful at ground 
level it is difficult to say.   
 
Furthermore, while acknowledging the importance of American political issues and interest 
groups as drivers of US foreign policy, this thesis is not intended to be an exploration of the 
domestic influences on the policymakers who wished to increase the US government’s focus 
on the Soviet nationalities and internal weaknesses of the USSR during this period.  There 
can be no doubt that émigré organisations and lobbies representing ethnic groups such as 
Ukrainians, Balts and Armenians within the United States, were vocal proponents of the 
American government doing more to highlight the plight of their compatriots within the 
Soviet Union.  These ethnic groups often formed important swing voting constituencies in 
battleground states, particularly in the Rust Belt, which granted them leverage to influence 
presidential administrations in important ways.  Likewise, the growing importance of human 
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Soviet Experiment: Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
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7 For literature on Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty see, Arch Puddington, Broadcasting 
Freedom: The Cold War Triumph of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty (Lexington: University 
Press of Kentucky, 2000); Richard H. Cummings, Radio Free Europe’s “Crusade for Freedom”: 
Rallying Americans Behind Cold War Broadcasting, 1950-1960 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2010); A 
Ross. Johnson, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty: The CIA Years and Beyond (Washington DC: 
Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2010) 
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rights issues and national self-determination during the period led Congress to play a more 
active role in garnering support for oppressed nationality groups behind the Iron Curtain8.  
Congressional activity often provoked a response from high-ranking White House officials, 
and undoubtedly US policymakers were aware of these pressures when crafting strategy.  
These factors were significant during the final years of the Cold War, and for the purposes 
of this study it is important to acknowledge their influence, while also highlighting that this 
thesis is not intended to be a comprehensive study of the entire spectrum of influences on 
the US-Soviet relationship during this period9.   
 
Rather, this dissertation will provide an in-depth exploration of a particular group of officials 
within the US government who, motivated by powerful and long-held beliefs about the 
ideological nature of the Cold War conflict, were eager to enact policies which would exploit 
the ethnic tensions within the Soviet Union in order to serve American interests.  
Furthermore, as will become apparent, these officials were not particularly mindful of 
domestic political pressures as they crafted their policies towards the Soviet nationalities.  
Their actions were driven by the power of their own long-standing ideas regarding internal 
forces within Soviet society, and the latent power of nationalism as a potential Soviet 
weakness which the US government should exploit as an explicit part of its Cold War 
strategy.  As with any new work there will always be limitations and areas which cannot be 
fully examined, but what this dissertation does is delve into the ideas, the beliefs, the 
motivations, the strategic thinking, and the activities of the individuals who promoted 
efforts within the US government to exploit Soviet ethnic problems in the period 1977 to 
1984.  It traces their story across two administrations during a crucial period of the Cold 
War in a way which will hopefully be instructive and interesting, while adding to our 
knowledge of the era. 
 
Part one of this dissertation takes place between the years of 1977 and 1980, Jimmy Carter 
was president and both the international system, and the US-Soviet relationship were going 
through tumultuous change.  While previously viewed as a fairly moribund decade, the 1970s 
are now recognised by historians as a period of tremendous transformation, with innovative 
                                                        
8 See Rasmus Sinding Sondergaard, Reagan, Congress and Human Rights: Contesting Morality in US 
Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020) for a fresh exploration of these 
themes. 
9 Domestic politics are essential in understanding the influences which shape a nation’s foreign 
policy.  For a recent, and controversial, call for scholars of US foreign policy to return domestic 
politics to the heart of research on American foreign relations see, Daniel Bessner and Frederik 
Logevall, “Recentering the United States in the Historiography of American Foreign Relations”, 
Texas National Security Review, Volume 3, Issue 2, (Spring 2020). 
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economic and technological advancements, the emergence of a global human rights 
network, and Third World de-colonisation combining to alter the nature of world order in 
profound ways.  As such, much of the literature on the Carter administration and US foreign 
policy at this time has become enmeshed with the exciting new scholarly work being 
produced on the 1970s10.  Carter arrived in the White House promising a new values-laden 
American foreign policy, and a break with both the atrophy of the Vietnam years and the 
cynicism of Nixon and Kissinger’s détente. Moving forward, the championing of human rights 
would lie at the heart of US activity in the world, and Carter wanted to sincerely move past 
the entrenched bipolarity of superpower rivalry with the Soviet Union.  As Samuel Moyn has 
pointed out, much of this newly energised Western focus on human rights and efforts to 
transcend the Cold War resulted from a desire to find a new universal mission to replace 
the failed ideologies of the 20th century, and the 1970s birthed many of the transnational 
movements for global equality we see today11.  The signing of the Helsinki accords in 1975 
galvanised the human rights movement and allowed both Western activists and governments 
to scrutinise the internal nature of the Soviet system in ways which had previously been 
impossible12.  This also opened new paths for US Cold War strategy. 
 
The Carter administration embodied these impulses in many ways, and they would lead to 
friction in the US-Soviet relationship as the two very different visions of détente collided. 
This situation was one which the administration found difficult to navigate, with the 
                                                        
10 Leading the way in the historiography and reassessment of the 1970’s and America’s role in the 
global system were Niall Ferguson, Charles S. Maier, Erez Manela, Daniel J. Sargent (eds), The 
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events of the 1970s see, Barbara Zanchetta, The Transformation of American International Power 
in the 1970’s (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014) and Daniel J. Sargent, A Superpower 
Transformed: The Remaking of American Foreign Relations in the 1970’s (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2015). 
11 Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History. (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2010).  
12 The literature on human rights during the Cold War and the Helsinki accords has exploded over 
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conflicting concepts of détente often curtailing effective US policymaking.  The Berkeley 
historian Daniel J Sargent has convincingly argued that after Carter’s ascension to the White 
House, the president pursued a post-Cold War foreign policy, which he calls ‘world order 
politics’, despite the realities of the Cold War still remaining firmly in place. Nevertheless, 
the Carter administration pushed the Soviets hard on human rights, which put the internal 
nature of the Soviet regime under the spotlight.  Sargent believes these contradictions can 
be explained by the concept of a “historically optimistic” détente which prevailed inside 
the Carter White House.  He states, “the Carter administration thus deprioritized the Cold 
War… optimistic about the future, the Carter administration assumed that the Soviet Union 
was on the wrong side of history and that Soviet leaders would have to choose between 
obsolescence and interdependence”.   
 
Sargent believes Carter and Brzezinski wished to assimilate East-West relations into a 
broader framework of co-operation which would reduce the dominance of the US-Soviet 
relationship in American foreign policy planning, meaning “the Carter administration 
thereby presumed that it could push the Soviet Union harder on issues like human rights 
while preserving détente’s gain”13.  However, by 1978, these optimistic ambitions had given 
way to the hard realities of superpower competition, and Sargent states, “in 1978, the 
Carter administration abandoned its preoccupation with world order politics and focused US 
foreign policy on the containment of the Soviet Union.  This strategic reorientation turned 
not on singular events so much as on the frustration of Carter’s attempts to implement his 
initial world order concept in the face of rising Soviet-American tensions”14.  Sargent shows 
that throughout the 1970s, US policymakers across three successive administrations 
struggled to adapt to the upheaval in the international system, often playing catch up as 
deep structural forces forged a new world. 
 
The literature on the Carter administration’s foreign policy is growing with the release of 
new documents from the period.  The Carter presidential library is somewhat behind other 
presidential libraries in its declassification program in certain areas, and much of the 
material on the Soviet Union remains classified.  Nevertheless, some excellent works have 
been produced in recent years, both on Carter’s foreign policy generally, and his 
administration’s approach to the USSR.  This dissertation does not take a position on the 
overall success of the Carter administration’s foreign policy, being more narrowly focused 
                                                        
13 Daniel J. Sargent, A Superpower Transformed: The Remaking of American Foreign Relations in 
the 1970’s (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), p263 
14 Ibid p261 
14 
 
on its efforts to direct attention onto the Soviet nationalities as part of US Cold War strategy.  
Nevertheless, it is important to understand the thrust of scholarship on Carter’s foreign 
policy legacy, which has been much maligned by historians yet is currently undergoing 
something of a revival15.  Most recent scholarship has focused on Carter’s policies towards 
the developing world and his interest in negotiating a peaceful agreement in the Middle 
East, rather than his Soviet policies. This reflects both the Carter administration’s desire 
for increased emphasis on North-South relations and the Third World, and a lack of 
availability of primary documents on the administration’s Soviet strategy, which is now 
beginning to change16. 
 
The conventional literature on Carter’s foreign policy tends to divide his presidency into 
two phases; the first phase focused on transcending the Cold War struggle and emphasising 
human rights, the second phase witnessing a reversion back to a more traditional focus on 
containing the Soviet Union at the behest of national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski.  
This is an important debate for the purposes of this dissertation, which argues that within 
the Carter administration there were hard-line strands focused on undermining the internal 
legitimacy of the Soviet Union from the beginning, although they never fully established 
themselves as the main drivers of Carter’s Soviet policy. Jimmy Carter is looked upon fondly 
as the most active and humanitarian-minded of all the former presidents, still deeply 
involved in charitable causes and teaching Sunday school deep into his 90s.  However, 
historians view his record in government as decidedly mixed, with Scott Kaufman delivering 
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a damning verdict on Carter’s own failings as a foreign policy president in “Plans Unravelled: 
The Foreign Policy of the Carter Administration”17.  
 
Kaufman offered an all-encompassing study of the Carter administration’s foreign policy, 
and despite some successes such as the ratification of the Panama Canal treaties, 
normalising relations with China, the completion of the Camp David accords, and making 
human rights a lasting component of American diplomacy, he believes the Carter was 
ultimately a failure in guiding US foreign relations.  Kaufman acknowledges the ambitious 
scope of Carter’s goals; to re-orientate American foreign policy away from superpower 
confrontation and toward the developing world, while reducing arms and promoting human 
rights.  But he believes Carter failed because he attempted to change too much at once, 
and it was his own leadership style left him unable to deal with internal disputes among his 
advisers or to properly channel his noble impulses into concrete policy. Furthermore, 
Kaufman believes the Carter administration gradually began to adopt the more traditional 
Cold War posture of previous administrations, faced with Soviet aggression and domestic 
pressure from hawkish elements of the Democratic party, they reverted to a more familiar 
policy of containment.   
 
This policy shift is also emphasised by Brian J Auten in ‘Carter’s Conversion: The Hardening 
of American Defense Policy’. Auten subscribes to the international relations school of 
realism and believes the change in direction of Carter’s Soviet policies were merely the 
natural reaction to the relative change in the material power capabilities of the competing 
superpowers.  In contrast to Sargent, Auten believes that the role played by high-level 
policymakers and statesmen are of the most importance in driving the direction of foreign 
policy as they respond to the changing nature of the international system and the material 
power of rival states.  As such, he believes Carter eventually woke up to the hard-power 
challenge of the rising Soviet military threat and adjusted his approach accordingly18.  
                                                        
17 Scott Kaufman offers a highly critical account of Carter’s leadership in, Plans Unravelled: The 
Foreign Policy of the Carter Administration (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2008). For 
other critical assessments of Carter’s foreign policy see, Kenton Clymer, “Jimmy Carter, Human 
Rights and Cambodia”, Diplomatic History 27, no.2, (2003), p245-278; Donna R. Jackson, Jimmy 
Carter and the Horn of Africa: Cold War Policy in Ethiopia and Somalia (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 
2007); Burton Kaufman and Scott Kaufman, The Presidency of James Earl Carter Jr, revised edition 
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006); Melvyn P. Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind: The 
United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007); For a more 
balanced work see Olav Njølstad’s chapter, “The Carter Legacy: Entering the Second Era of 
the Cold War”, The Last Decade of the Cold War: From Conflict Escalation to Conflict 
Resolution, ed. by Olav Njølstad (London: Frankl Cass, 2004). 
18 Brian J. Auten, Carter’s Conversion: The Hardening of American Defense Policy (Columbia and 




Challenging the conventional wisdom that Carter changed directions in 1978 and adopted a 
more orthodox Cold War stance from that point on, Nancy Mitchell believes Carter was 
actually a “Cold Warrior from day one”.  In her truly excellent study, “Jimmy Carter in 
Africa: Race and the Cold War”, Mitchell argues that Carter was a dedicated Cold Warrior 
throughout his presidency, as evidenced by his policies of containment in Africa and his 
“deep Cold War instincts” which he displayed immediately on taking office.  She challenges 
the established scholarship by asserting Carter was able to successfully blend these instincts 
with the promotion of human rights, by pushing back against Soviet adventurism while also 
pursuing racial equality in southern Africa.   
 
In a meticulously researched book, using the lens of Carter’s policies in Africa to explore 
the administration’s attitude towards the USSR, Mitchell pushes back against the perception 
of Carter as a naïve idealist who was forced to change his approach after coming to a better 
understanding of the Soviet threat.  She successfully portrays Carter as a man who viewed 
the world through Cold War glasses, consistently calling for American strength and seeing 
no conflict between the pursuit of moral goals and the national interest.  Mitchell stresses 
that Carter’s persona and his interest in less traditional aspects of foreign policy lured 
people into believing he was not sophisticated in world affairs and somewhat naïve, but that 
this distracted from the fact he retained a traditional and clear-sighted suspicion of 
communism and Soviet adventurism like every other Cold War US president19.   
 
There were missteps to be sure, but Mitchell’s work reveals Carter understood the 
complexity of Cold War rivalry and the recent scholarship is beginning to reveal more of a 
coherent Soviet strategy within the Carter White House than was commonly believed.  Her 
work is important for the direction of this dissertation, which seeks to build on Mitchell’s 
research by stressing Carter’s support for policies which would undermine the internal 
legitimacy of the Soviet Union right from the earliest days of his presidency.  While Carter 
largely left Brzezinski and other hard-liners in the administration to direct these plans, he 
gave his explicit approval for officials to craft policies which would exploit the inner 
weaknesses and ethnic tensions of the USSR and attack the internal legitimacy of the Soviet 
regime.   
 
                                                        





This is further supported by Robert Gates, who’s terrific memoir recounting his service in 
five Cold War administrations discusses at length the covert operations against the Soviets 
which Carter sanctioned, explicitly targeting the ethnic minorities of the USSR.  Gates states 
that Carter and his administration waged, “ideological war on the Soviets with a 
determination and intensity that was very different from its predecessors”20.  Carter was no 
simple-minded naïf, he understood the nature of the Cold War very well, and he showed a 
steel which historians would do well to consider further. While it is true that the downward 
spiral in US-Soviet relations caused the Carter administration to step up their efforts at 
containment of the USSR, and by 1980 the administration’s stance had hardened 
considerably, these policies had been germinating from the time Carter took office in 1977.  
 
Despite the downturn in relations with the Soviets, Carter and his more progressive advisers 
remained genuinely committed to the cause of human rights behind the Iron Curtain.  For 
the more hawkish elements of the administration, human rights provided an opening to 
attack the legitimacy of the Soviet regime itself, and tension among repressed ethnic 
minority groups inside the USSR offered an enticing opportunity which deserved further 
study and attention by the US government.  The proponents of an increased American focus 
on the Soviet nationality problems were more interested in using this enterprise, and human 
rights in general, to undermine the Soviet leadership and provoke internal difficulties for 
the regime.  Thus, Soviet ethnic tensions were merely another weapon in the ongoing war 
on communism, and potentially a very potent one at that. There were certainly 
disagreements within the administration over Soviet strategy, with liberals in the White 
House eager to engage with the developing world, pragmatists such as secretary of state 
Cyrus Vance focused on arms control and maintaining the stability of détente, and hawks 
such as Odom and Huntington remaining engaged in the struggle for geopolitical dominance 
with the USSR.   
 
These contradictions were also somewhat manifest in the person of Brzezinski, who was 
both viscerally hawkish on the Soviet Union and eager to enact policies aimed at exploiting 
its internal weaknesses, yet also keen for US-Soviet relations to be subsumed by a more 
wide-ranging foreign policy agenda.  As with the Carter administration writ large, these 
apparent contradictions can be understood when you appreciate that Brzezinski’s 
interpretation of détente differed greatly from the traditional understanding of the term.  
Brzezinski plays a central role in this dissertation, the national security adviser was the 
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driving force behind schemes aimed at exploiting the internal weaknesses of the Soviet 
Union, especially using the nationalities21.  Patrick Vaughn has detailed how Brzezinski 
wished to enable a more “reciprocal” form of détente, one which engaged the Soviets in 
areas of mutual interest and arms control, which allowed the US to engage more freely with 
the widening world of the 1970s, while also contesting the Soviets in multiple arenas in the 
hope of engineering their eventual downfall22. This dissertation builds on these insights in 
its exploration of Brzezinski’s interest in exploiting Soviet ethnic tension, something he had 
been calling for since his days as a graduate student.  In this way, we can see Brzezinski’s 
long-term support for the promotion of national consciousness among the Soviet 
nationalities as being explicitly linked to the new-found fervour for human rights and the 
self-determination which had taken hold in Western governments, and also in his own 
pursuit of a more activist form of detente which would undermine the very legitimacy of 
the Soviet system.  
 
Part two of this dissertation begins in early 1981, with the incoming Reagan administration 
creating a new strategy for its relations with the Soviet Union and ideas geared toward 
exploiting the Soviet nationalities finding a home within the new administration.  US policy 
towards the Soviet nationalities during the Reagan presidency are framed by the larger 
ambition of promoting internal change inside the USSR, moving the Soviets in more 
democratic and pluralistic directions.  In order to thoroughly understand the policies aimed 
at the Soviet nationality groups and the role these ideas played in the overarching thrust of 
Soviet policy during Reagan’s first term, this dissertation draws on the literature and 
debates surrounding President Reagan and his strategy towards the USSR, his quest to 
fashion a new foreign policy for a new era.  It is important to note that policies created to 
exploit Soviet ethnic tensions were not stand-alone enterprises but were part of a larger 
mission to encourage decentralisation and pluralism within the USSR.  As such, they must 
be considered as one strand of the Reagan administration’s overall Soviet strategy.  The 
main point of contention among scholars is whether Reagan actually had a grand strategy 
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researchers. Their opening in 2022 will surely spark a rush of works on his life. 





for defeating the USSR, and if so what did this strategy entail?  This dissertation engages 
with this scholarship, positioning itself among the historical debates around Reagan’s 
worldview and statecraft, the goals of his administration vis a vis the Soviet Union, and the 
place of the Soviet nationalities within this narrative.   
Much of the academic debate surrounding President Reagan’s role in the end of the Cold 
War have centred on the extent to which he had a grand strategy for dealing with the 
Soviets, while scholarship on Reagan has also long been saturated with popular histories 
which mythologize the 40th president, some bordering on hagiography.  The image of Reagan 
directing a breath-taking grand strategy and military build-up which brought down the 
Soviet Union remains intoxicating to some writers, although this view has now received 
much correction23.  Likewise, attempts by some academics to minimise Reagan’s role in the 
end of the Cold War and underplay it to the point of almost writing him out of the narrative, 
or portraying him as hopelessly out of his depth, now appear outdated in the face of fresh 
scholarship24.  The truth, as always, lies somewhere in the middle.  And that is precisely 
where James Graham Wilson charts his course in his masterful work on the end of the Cold 
War.  In “The Triumph of Improvisation: Gorbachev’s Adaptability, Reagan’s Engagement, 
and the End of the Cold War”, Wilson argues that it was Reagan’s political instincts, his 
adaptability, his negotiation skills, and his willingness to read the historical moment and 
reach out to Gorbachev which were his greatest contributions25.  Arguably all far more 
effective in ending the Cold War than any grand strategy aimed at toppling the Soviet 
empire.  This dissertation draws heavily on Wilson’s scholarship, and argues that Reagan’s 
deep conflicting impulses precluded the creation of any grand strategy in the early days of 
his presidency, least of all the adoption of a well-developed strategy toward the Soviet 
nationalities.  On the one hand Reagan felt genuine revulsion towards communism and the 
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Soviet system, yet on the other hand his abhorrence of nuclear weapons and natural 
inclination to reach out to the Soviet leadership pressed him in the direction of dialogue.  
These conflicting impulses played out during the early years of his presidency and can be 
seen in the apparently haphazard policymaking of 1981-1982, when hard-liners held sway, 
yet nobody was entirely sure of the president’s position.  
Reagan’s eventual engagement with the Soviets was only possible because of the credibility 
he held within the conservative movement, as a long-standing man of the right he was able 
to get away with things that past Republican presidents simply couldn’t have. Melvyn Leffler 
explores this often-overlooked aspect of Reagan’s contribution in the excellent For the Soul 
of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War.  Leffler details how 
both Reagan’s credibility, and his ability to build trust with the Soviet leadership were of 
vital importance26.  This is Reagan’s true legacy, and in the rush to portray him as the slayer 
of the Soviet empire, some writers have obscured Reagan’s actual contribution to ending 
the Cold War conflict, one which is perhaps more praise-worthy.  Alan Dobson believes the 
complexity of Reagan’s character is also overlooked in the analysis of his administration, 
stating, “Reagan emerges as more complex than is often acknowledged and, more 
important, sensitive to the complexities of the geopolitical environment in which he had to 
operate. Seen in this light, it becomes apparent why the lenses of ideology, pragmatism, 
personal loyalty, and management style all demand attention and, when accorded, help to 
dispel the opacity that so often in the past has made it difficult to read accurately the 
strategic and policy decision-making of the Reagan Administration”27.	 
The attempts to undermine Soviet internal cohesion by crafting policies toward the Soviet 
nationalities form part of this overall narrative, with these efforts in line with the hard-line 
agenda being pushed in the early years of Reagan’s presidency, which was ultimately 
discarded as Reagan and his closest advisers changed approach in late 1983 and 1984.  By 
this time George Shultz and Jack Matlock were in the ascendency, ably assisted by Bud 
McFarlane, and the dreams of bringing the Soviet empire down from the inside had been 
surpassed by a new direction in US Soviet policy.  Historians of the Reagan presidency have 
described this period as marking a course correction, from confrontation to engagement, 
often believed to have been sparked by Reagan’s fears of the fast-escalating tensions with 
                                                        
26 See Melvyn Leffler explores this often-overlooked aspect of Reagan’s contribution in, Leffler, 
Melvyn P. For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War. New 
York: Hill & Wang, 2007, p462; and “Ronald Reagan and the Cold War: What Mattered Most”, Texas 
National Security Review, Volume 1, Issue 3 (May 2018). 
27 Alan Dobson, “Ronald Reagan’s Strategies and Policies: Of Ideology, Pragmatism, Loyalties and 
Management Style”, Diplomacy & Statecraft, 27:4, (Dec 2016), p746-765 
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the Soviets and risk of nuclear war.  This view is exemplified by Beth Fisher in “The Reagan 
Reversal: Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War”.  Fisher evaluates Soviet policy 
developments over the course of the Reagan presidency in order to determine whether the 
massive military build-up and hard-line rhetoric of Reagan’s early years in office had a 
causal effect on Moscow’s behaviour and strategy and finds little evidence that they did.  
 
Likewise, in “The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan: A History of the End of the Cold War”, James 
Mann convincingly argues that in order to bring about a negotiated and peaceful end to the 
Cold War, Reagan actually ignored the advice of his more hard-line advisers in favour of 
personal outreach and dialogue, something which the president’s Soviet adviser Jack 
Matlock believes was Reagan’s intention all along 28.  Going much further, Hal Brands 
commends Reagan and his administration for pursuing a consistent and multi-front strategy 
throughout his time in office, and by making deft adjustments along the way they were able 
to bring the Soviets to the negotiating table with America firmly in the driving seat.  Along 
with scholars such as John Lewis Gaddis and William Inboden, Brands believes Reagan did 
pursue a coherent strategy with the goal of winning the Cold War, offering a positive 
appraisal of Reagan’s strategic thinking without the ‘triumphalism’ of earlier works29.  In 
‘Making the Unipolar Moment’, Brands offers a robust defence of US foreign policy during 
the later years of the Cold War, tracing initiatives of the Carter and Reagan administration 
to the eventual arrival of America’s “unipolar moment” in 1991-1992 30. 
 
Nevertheless, this dissertation does not set out to address Reagan’s definitive role in the 
end of the Cold War.  However, questions about whether he actually had a grand strategy 
for defeating the USSR are salient to our understanding of the topic of this work; the Soviet 
nationalities.  Policymaking during the early years of the Reagan presidency was hampered 
                                                        
28 Beth Fisher, The Reagan Reversal: Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War (Columbia, 
University of Missouri Press, 1997); James Mann, The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan: A History of the 
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Security Policy During the Cold War, Revised Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p342-
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by a chaotic atmosphere in the West Wing and challenged by bitter infighting, with even 
fellow hard-liners disagreeing on Soviet policy. It was in this atmosphere that Richard Pipes 
was attempting to dissimulate his ideas, ideas which called for an assault on the internal 
Soviet system, exploiting weaknesses in the body politic, and identifying the restless Soviet 
nationalities as the perfect conduit for this goal. The figure of Pipes is important in 
understanding the ideas discussed in this dissertation, namely the exploitation of Soviet 
ethnic problems to provoke unrest within the Soviet empire.  But it is also crucial not to 
overplay his importance in the overall arc of Reagan’s Soviet policies, as some of the more 
triumphalist narratives tend to do31.  In the first two years of the administration he played 
a significant role as Reagan’s Soviet adviser on the NSC, especially during 1982 when he 
began to brief the president personally, but by the time Pipes left the administration at the 
end of the year Reagan’s own thinking was beginning to evolve in less confrontational ways.  
 
Pipes strongly believed that the Soviet Union was simultaneously more dangerous than in 
earlier periods of the Cold War yet also less stable and less monolithically unified than many 
policymakers in the West believed32.  Pipes was significant in producing NSDD-32, the first 
attempt by the administration to articulate a national security strategy, and his ideas are 
also clearly manifest in NSDD-75 and its focus on promoting internal change within the USSR, 
but he remained somewhat of an outsider and would go on to lament the apparent softening 
of the administration’s stance toward the USSR after he returned to Harvard33.  
Nevertheless, for the focus of this dissertation, and the crafting of a workable policy 
program toward the Soviet nationalities during 1981 and 1982, Pipes was very much a central 
figure, despite this endeavour ultimately falling by the wayside by 1984.  
 
The continuing activities of the Nationalities Working Group in the early Reagan years also 
suggest a desire to force internal change in the Soviet Union through the exploitation of 
ethnic tensions in continuity with the Carter administration, and a hunger to have this 
approach adopted as official US policy practice.  Ideological framing of American policy 
towards the Soviet Union was encapsulated in NSDD-75, which called for efforts to move the 
USSR in a more pluralistic dimension.  But as pointed out by Wilson, by spring 1983 the 
moderating influence of secretary of state George Shultz was beginning to become dominant 
                                                        
31 See especially Kengor, The Crusader. 
32 Pipes, Vixi, p193 
33 Pipes wrote expansively on the weaknesses of the Soviet Union while bemoaning the Reagan 
administration’s apparent softening in its relations with the USSR. With the collapse of the Soviet 
empire under the weight of economic breakdown, failed reforms, and rampant nationalism, Pipes 
felt his hard-line approach had been totally vindicated. See, Richard Pipes, “Misinterpreting the 
Cold War: The Hard-Liners Had It Right”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, Issue 1, (Jan 1, 1995): 154. 
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within the administration, which in turn led to a more practical framework for guiding 
Reagan’s approach to the Soviets to emerge, one that did not include the targeting of Soviet 
society and which appealed to the president’s growing and long-held desire for dialogue.  
Shultz was pragmatic, practicing a form of realism which remained attuned to human rights 
yet mindful of the need for productive negotiations.  This dissertation goes further by 
highlighting that this new direction in both Reagan’s attitude and in US-Soviet relations were 
major factors in the diminishing interest in exploiting the Soviet nationalities within the 
administration.  The recent scholarship, which has emphasised Reagan’s deftly changing 
direction and the growing influence of Schultz and Matlock within the administration, has 
been influential on the trajectory of this thesis as it helps explain why policies toward the 
Soviet nationalities fizzled out around 1984.  
 
The policies crafted towards the Soviet nationalities in the early years of the Reagan 
presidency were geared towards destabilising the Soviet Union from within, applying 
considerations of regime type to American strategy, and making democracy promotion a key 
part of US foreign policy.  By encouraging the national consciousness of the Soviet ethnic 
groups, US policymakers hoped this would lead to calls for increased decentralisation of 
Soviet governance, with more power being extended to the regions and republics in a wave 
of democratisation.  These ideas were not an aberration but sat squarely in the mainstream 
of an American foreign policy tradition which saw the expansion of liberty across the world 
as the defining mission of the nation’s statecraft, with Thomas Jefferson calling for an 
“Empire of Liberty” as far back as 178034.  
 
This impulse was acutely felt in the post-World War II years, but far from merely being an 
idealist dream which sprang from concepts of American moralism and exceptionalism, 
democracy promotion is actually rooted in prudent and pragmatic concerns about the 
creation and maintenance of a stable word order, one which reduces the threat to US 
interests or security at home and abroad.  As G. John Ikenberry remarks, “the American 
promotion of democracy abroad in the broadest sense…reflects a pragmatic, evolving and 
sophisticated understanding of how to create a stable international political order and a 
congenial security environment: what might be called an American “liberal” grand 
strategy”35.  Simply put, democracy promotion was not an altruistic endeavour, but a sober 
                                                        
34 Thomas Jefferson to George Rogers Clark, 25 December 1780, Founders Online, National 
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35 G. John Ikenberry, “America’s Liberal Grand Strategy: Democracy and National Security in the 
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Eds., American Democracy Promotion: Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000), p103 
24 
 
realisation that in an anarchic and dangerous world the more democracies there were in the 
international system the better it was for American interests.  Or as the political scientist 
Paul D. Miller puts it, “liberal democracy is the outer perimeter of American security”36.  
 
Scholars have long grappled with the waxing and waning of the American mission to 
democratise the world, but a growing literature has emerged around the subject of 
democracy promotion during the Cold War, with Robert Pee’s work on the Reagan 
administration’s policies of democracy promotion most instructive.  In “Democracy 
Promotion, National Security and Strategy: Foreign Policy under the Reagan 
Administration”, Pee argues that democracy promotion became a fundamental pillar of US 
foreign policy during the 1980s under the influence of anti-communist hard-liners and 
neoconservatives inside the Reagan administration, and this would have profound 
consequences for American statecraft in the post-Cold War years.  Pee argues “the concept 
of democracy promotion put forward under Reagan differed from previous attempts to 
intervene in and shape the political development of foreign countries…Whereas these 
previous programmes had focused on the projection of democratic ideology or attempts to 
reform foreign societies by working through sitting governments, the new concept of 
democracy promotion operationalised under Reagan was focussed on supporting sub-state 
democratic political forces…in order to create functioning democratic systems from the 
bottom up”37.  
 
While Pee does an excellent job of assessing how democracy promoting policies became a 
central plank of US foreign policy under Reagan, he mainly focuses on the support for 
political parties, trade unions and business groups using American government supported 
non-state organisations such as the National Endowment for Democracy, and remains silent 
on the support for ethnic and nationality groups inside the Soviet Union as a way of moving 
the USSR in a decentralising direction.  These policies were very much part of the hard-line 
agenda of the very early years of the Reagan administration designed to promote greater 
pluralism within the USSR, as this dissertation will show.  While much ink has been spilled 
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determining Reagan’s strategy and democracy promotion, none of these works specifically 
address the subject of US policy towards the Soviet nationalities, and this dissertation will 
fill this gap.  
 
There has been very little research explicitly on US policy toward the Soviet nationalities 
during the late Cold War period.  Perhaps the only article length work on this topic is Artem 
Kalinovsky’s “Encouraging resistance: Paul Henze, the Bennigsen school, and the Crisis of 
Détente”, in which he offers an exploration of the ideas of the academic Alexandre 
Bennigsen and their impact on US foreign policy, ideas which were geared towards exploiting 
tensions among Soviet Muslims38.  Kalinovsky’s excellent work details the influence of 
Bennigsen on Paul Henze in the Carter administration and explains that these concepts 
carried through to the Reagan administration.  This thesis will build on Kalinovsky’s research 
and expand it greatly, offering a detailed exploration of US policies towards the Soviet 
nationalities and the individuals who crafted them.  Kalinovsky focuses largely on the role 
of Bennigsen and Henze, whereas this dissertation places Brzezinski at the heart of the story 
and goes much further in developing the topic.  His article offers a brief and very useful 
foray into this subject, and this thesis will build a much fuller and in-depth study of both 
the Carter and Reagan administrations and their approaches to the Soviet nationalities.   
 
Taras Kuzio’s article, “US Support for Ukraine’s Liberation during the Cold War: A Study of 
Prolog Research and Publishing Corporation” also offers an interesting discussion on these 
themes39.  Now a university professor and Ukraine expert, during the Cold War Kuzio was an 
Ukrainian émigré activist who was actively involved in covert book smuggling programs and 
promoting the cause of Ukrainian freedom.  As such, his recollections are quite fascinating, 
and in this article Kuzio briefly describes the steps which the US government took toward 
the Soviet nationalities over the course of the Cold War.  Kuzio’s insights regarding Jimmy 
Carter’s support for covert activities toward the Soviet nationalities were most illuminating, 
and this thesis has taken this theme and explored it further.  Like Kalinovsky, Kuzio doesn’t 
offer many comments on the role of Brzezinski and Pipes in these endeavours.  This thesis 
has thus explored their roles in more detail, revealing them to be the main protagonists in 
calling for an increased focus on the Soviet nationalities as a potential weakness inside the 
USSR which the US should exploit.  There has been very little else written specifically 
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addressing this topic, which as a historian can be a both a blessing and a curse.  As such, 
with the increased availability of primary sources and growing literature on the period, this 
thesis fills an important gap in the scholarship and allows a fuller picture of US strategic 
thinking toward the USSR to emerge. 
 
This dissertation will be divided into two parts, the first exploring the Carter years, and the 
second a study of the Reagan administration.  The recent upsurge in excellent scholarship 
on the upheavals and changes in the international system of the 1970s has improved our 
understanding of this period immensely, opening up bountiful new vistas for research.  The 
first part of this dissertation takes place during the Carter presidency, when the effects of 
these systemic convulsions were beginning to ripple through US foreign policy.  President 
Carter arrived in Washington promising a new approach to American foreign relations, one 
less focused on the bipolar superpower competition of the Cold War and more focused on 
integrating human rights and North-South relations into US foreign policy.  Along with these 
idealistic hopes for a transcendent foreign policy there also stood the figure of Zbigniew 
Brzezinski; intellectual, anti-Soviet hawk, and a Cold Warrior to his marrow.  
 
Despite playing an outsized role in American foreign relations discourse for many decades, 
Brzezinski has only recently become the focus of historical study himself.  This dissertation 
describes the attempts by US policymakers to create workable policies toward the Soviet 
nationalities, with the goal of undermining internal Soviet legitimacy and stifling Soviet 
foreign policy activism, and Brzezinski was very much the driving force behind this 
endeavour within the Carter administration.  This dissertation will build on this growing 
Brzezinski research by placing the national security adviser at the heart of this enterprise.  
It was Brzezinski’s long-standing ideas and the force of his personality which dragged this 
issue from the periphery of US policy to somewhere closer to the centre, at least for a while.  
The US foreign policy establishment stood largely against this development, for all manner 
of reasons, but Brzezinski set the course for exploring Soviet weaknesses and desired to see 
the US take more of an active interest in the ethnic and minority groups of the USSR.  He 
returned ideology to the American approach to the Soviet Union in forceful ways, with ideas 
about the nature of the Soviet regime and the latent power of nationalism animating his 
vision of the US-Soviet relationship.   
 
This cause was taken up by similarly minded individuals inside the administration, such as 
Sam Huntington and William Odom, but most notably NSC staffer Paul Henze, who’s zeal 
and personal commitment to this project were really quite remarkable.  Henze drew 
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inspiration from Brzezinski’s early promptings and shouldered the responsibility of 
transferring these ideas into concrete policy proposals, overseeing the day-to-day 
application of these policies.  Henze gathered a core group of policymakers into the newly 
formed Nationalities Working Group which provided a regular forum for discussion, 
presenting research, and drafting policy proposals on the Soviet nationalities.  Nevertheless, 
he found it increasingly difficult to navigate the budgetary, institutional and bureaucratic 
hurdles thrown up in opposition to his plans, and by the time Carter’s presidency came to 
an end he was left to lament the administration’s inability to do more. This thesis follows 
the delineations of Brzezinski and Henze’s attempts to integrate the Soviet nationalities 
into wider US Cold War strategy, attempts which were stimulated by the closing stages of 
the détente era and a shift in the dynamics of the US-Soviet relationship.  This led to an 
increased focus on the internal workings of the Soviet Union by American policymakers and 
a renewed desire to exploit the weaknesses of their adversary.  By exploring these aspects 
of the Carter administration’s Soviet policy, this dissertation will add to our knowledge of 
US foreign policy during a pivotal period of the Cold War. 
 
Part two of this dissertation mirrors part one, in that it centres on both the formidable 
individuals who desired to see the US government pay more attention to the Soviet 
nationalities, and the wider groups within the foreign policy establishment which convened 
in order to craft concrete policy proposals to this end.  Part two covers the period 1981 to 
1984 and reveals the continuities between hard-liners in the Carter administration and the 
incoming Reagan administration, and outlines the steps taken within the Reagan 
administration to include consideration of the Soviet nationalities problem when crafting a 
new policy towards the Soviet Union, and how this ultimately played out. The first section 
of part two is largely centred on the figure of Richard Pipes, the Harvard academic and 
Russian history professor who was on secondment to the White House for the first two years 
of Reagan’s presidency, and who held a desire to fundamentally attack the internal 
legitimacy of the USSR, not only continuing the nascent US policies towards the nationalities 
first developed during the Carter administration, but pushing for them to be expanded and 
enshrined at the heart of the Reagan administration’s Soviet strategy. Pipes was an anti-
communist par excellence, who viewed the ethnic divisions of the Soviet empire as an 
inherent weakness, and who shared Brzezinski and Henze’s enthusiasm for reaching and 
agitating the Soviet nationalities with the express aim of disrupting social cohesion inside 




These beliefs meshed perfectly with the overall aims of the Reagan administration, which 
took a far closer interest in the internal dynamics of their Soviet enemy and set about 
crafting a new approach to US-Soviet relations which explicitly aimed to move the USSR in 
a more pluralistic and decentralised direction, within the limited leverage available to US 
strategists.  Officials in the early Reagan administration, taking their lead from the 
president, placed far more emphasis on the role of ideology in statecraft, and gleefully 
proclaimed the superiority of American values over the communism of the Soviet bloc. From 
his position as Soviet expert on the NSC, Pipes pushed for efforts to be made to exploit the 
restlessness of the Soviet nationalities as part of Reagan’s foreign policy, and he wasn’t the 
only official doing so.  The early Reagan White House was full of anti-communist hard-liners, 
sympathetic to the concept of assaulting the internal legitimacy of the USSR, and eager to 
exploit the Soviet nationalities to that end.  This attitude found support across various 
agencies, with Henze’s interagency Nationalities Working Group revived for the Reagan era, 
where ideas began to formulate which would shape serious policy proposals specifically 
aimed at the nationality groups of the Soviet empire. However, this project wasn’t merely 
about exploiting Soviet weaknesses.  There was a lack of understanding and expertise in this 
field prevalent throughout the US government, and even moderates such as Jack Matlock 
supported the goals of the NWG in raising awareness and research of Soviet nationality issues 
within the American foreign policy establishment.   
 
In the frenzied and cut-throat atmosphere of the early Reagan White House it was difficult 
to craft a coherent strategy toward the Soviet Union, with backstabbing and staff turnover 
the norm, a president who was often less than equivocal in his decision-making and torn 
between conflicting impulses, while the tensions prevalent in US-Soviet relationship were 
escalating at an alarming rate.  Reagan was also torn between conflicting impulses which 
stifled the early development of a coherent grand strategy.  And even once the adoption of 
NSDD-75 appeared to provide a roadmap for such a strategy and to facilitate a determined 
and deliberate set of policies toward the Soviet nationalities, these notions were already 
being quietly side-lined by Shultz and his own agenda for engagement with the Soviet Union, 
which would come to unofficially supersede the more hawkish NSDD-75 by 1984.  This 
development, along with the departure of hard-liners such as Pipes and Clark and fears over 
the president’s image ahead of the 1984 election, left those pushing a harder line toward 
the Soviet nationalities on the side-lines, destined never to play more than a peripheral role 




This dissertation hopes to contribute to the literature on the later years of the Cold War 
and the transitional period between Carter and Reagan.  It will also contribute to a re-
assessment of Carter’s foreign policy, specifically toward the Soviet Union.  This thesis will 
reveal that the strategy of the Carter administration was more nuanced and hard-line than 
has been previously recognised, and the Soviet nationalities were an important aspect of 
this approach.  Likewise, there has been much scholarship on Reagan’s desire to promote 
pluralism and change within the Soviet Union, yet there has been little attention given to 
policies designed to encourage nationalism within the Soviet system, and thus this 
dissertation specifically addresses that gap.   
 
This thesis explores US strategic thinking during a crucial part of the Cold War timeline, it 
dives into American attempts to promote change from within the USSR by exploiting Soviet 
ethnic tensions, and yet more broadly speaking this dissertation is about the role of ideas 
and ideology in foreign policy and the power of personality in driving policy initiatives.  
These ideas had specific objectives in mind, they were designed to halt Soviet adventurism 
abroad through the manipulation of the Soviet nationalities, perhaps leading the Soviet 
authorities to turn inward and less likely to pursue an activist policy in the Third World and 
elsewhere.  US officials hoped to promote greater pluralism, decentralisation, and 
democratisation within the Soviet system, with the Soviet minority groups becoming the 
vanguard of internal change.  Ultimately, these concepts never entirely found a secure 
foothold within the American foreign policymaking establishment, and despite the Soviet 
Union’s eventual disintegration amidst the nationalist fury of 1991, US efforts played no 
part in this at all.  Ideas matter and individual worldviews matter, but as this dissertation 


















The Stirring of the Nationalities 
 
 
The 1970s were not a kind decade to the United States; détente was beginning to fray, the 
Soviet Union grew bolder, and the perception of America as a declining power permeated 
many capital cities across the world, particularly Moscow.  The economy was wobbling, the 
government appeared rudderless, and the tides of history no longer seemed to be rolling 
America’s way.  Rocked by the futile brutality of the Vietnam War, the radicalism of the 
1960s, and a political scandal which had brought down a president, American society exuded 
a palpable sense of disquiet, and a period of national soul searching began in earnest.  
Nowhere was this malaise more evident than in US foreign policy, as policymakers struggled 
to adjust to a changing world, and the old Soviet adversary across the Iron Curtain appeared 
utterly ascendant.   
 
In 1976 the people of the United States decided Georgia governor Jimmy Carter was the 
man to step into this milieu and bring a fresh sense of morality, direction, and purpose to 
America, both home and abroad.  Idealistic, smart, and full of energy, Carter arrived in 
Washington and immediately set about the task.  He promised American foreign policy would 
shine a new light on human rights, while also pledging to transcend stale Cold War mindsets 
and allow America to focus on issues other than superpower confrontation.  However, it 
wouldn’t be so easy.  Far from being over, the Cold War was entering a new and more 
confrontational phase, and hawks within his administration were already plotting ways to 
undermine their old communist foe.  The fortunes of the USSR appeared to be soaring, but 
a little over 14 years later the Soviet empire would no longer even exist, brought down by 
economic rot, failed political reforms, and the ferocious force of nationalism.  And it was 
this latter issue which had caught the eye of certain US policymakers, as Carter took office. 
 
US-Soviet relations in 1977 
 
In the immediate post-war years, the United States stood as the world’s sole superpower, 
the great institution-builders of the Truman era had reshaped the international system 
through the creation of a series of overlapping multilateral economic, political and security 
organisations such as NATO, the World Bank and the UN.  These arrangements were 
buttressed by American military strength and allowed the United States to project power 
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across much of the globe in ways which were previously unthinkable40.  By underwriting 
these institutions, the United States had firmly anchored itself to the European continent 
and assumed a hegemonic leadership role the likes of which the world had never seen 
before.  This system also provided the framework for the US policy of ‘containment’, 
designed to inhibit the Soviet Union’s ability to enact its own vision of world order based on 
communist ideology and backed up by Soviet hard power.  This was a massive undertaking 
which relied upon the ongoing and long-term superiority of American economic and military 
power over its Soviet rival.  This preponderance of US power laid the foundations for what 
has come to be known as the liberal international order, yet in the 1970s this order looked 
increasingly precarious.  The world of the 1970’s was very different to that of the 1940s.   
 
When Jimmy Carter took office in 1977, the balance of power in the Cold War appeared to 
have shifted in the USSR’s favour.  The aftershocks of Vietnam continued to reverberate 
throughout American society, provoking a moral crisis and period of national self-reflection.  
Washington’s primacy was no longer being taken for granted by its allies, with serious doubts 
emerging among NATO members as to the reliability of American leadership.  The once 
formidable US economy, the source of America’s ability to act as global hegemon, was 
becoming increasingly vulnerable, crippled by the oil shocks of the early 70’s and rampant 
stagflation.  American financial supremacy was not just being challenged by the powerhouse 
economies of Western Europe, but also across the developing world.  Not only was the Third 
World becoming increasingly restive and resistant to US authority, it was also becoming 
more open to Soviet overtures.  As waves of Marxist revolutions washed over these regions, 
the Kremlin ably supported many of the communist insurgencies with arms, supplies, and 
even troops41.  There was a feeling within the Kremlin’s walls that history was finally moving 
their way.  As American influence shrank, Soviet assertiveness grew. The USSR had engaged 
in a prolonged military build-up over the course of the decade, its economy had grown in 
size largely due to its oil output, and under Leonid Brezhnev it was enjoying arguably the 
first period of real political stability in Soviet history.  However, on closer inspection, things 
were not so clear-cut. 
 
Regardless of the bullishness of the Soviet leadership, by the late 1970’s the Soviet Union 
had entered the downward spiral which would only end with its complete dissolution a little 
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over a decade later.  Despite closing the gap on the United States, the USSR’s economy still 
lagged behind its superpower rival, and the rot had already set in.  As political scientists 
William Wohlforth and Stephen Brooks have demonstrated, relative to the United States the 
GDP of the Soviet Union had already peaked around 1970, declining ever since42.  Economic 
growth had slowed enormously over the course of the 1970s and showed no sign of abating43.  
Furthermore, the Soviet leadership class, beginning with Brezhnev himself, was aging and 
widely perceived as corrupt and utterly stagnant.  Internally the Soviet system was listless, 
dysfunctional, and uncreative. This lethargy was also evident across the Soviet client states 
of Eastern Europe, who found themselves almost completely reliant on Western loans and 
drowning in insurmountable debt.  Population unrest was intensifying, workers strikes 
becoming more frequent, and dissidence growing.  Party bosses in the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe felt compelled to resort to repressive measures to quell these disturbances, 
only deepening the resentment of the populace.  Thus, despite displaying self-assuredness 
on the world stage and prosecuting an activist foreign policy around the globe, the Soviet 
Union had already begun to decay.  
 
For all the United States’ problems, and they were real problems, it remained the world’s 
preeminent power, with an open political system which secured the rights of its citizens, a 
robust military, intact alliances, and the capacity for technological innovation which could 
jumpstart the economy.  By contrast, the Soviet Union was sustained by a repressive and 
authoritarian political system, a stagnating economy and leadership, supporting the debt-
ridden baggage of its East European client states44.  By the time the Carter administration 
took the reins in Washington, the cracks were beginning to show in the Soviet façade.  One 
such crack, which would eventually become a chasm, was the long-simmering nationalities 
problem within the non-Russian republics of the USSR.  This nationalism, often tied to 
religious sentiment, had plagued the Soviet empire, waxing and waning, for the duration of 
its existence. The Soviet economy and leadership may have been moribund, but there was 
energy growing outside the structures of power.  The Soviet system was inert, but as Hal 
Brands describes, “what dynamism existed was increasingly orientated against the state, as 
a diverse group of dissidents – religious believers, political activists, nationalists who sought 
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greater autonomy for their respective republics, and others – became more assertive in 
critiquing the regime”45.  And officials in Washington were beginning to take notice. 
 
The purpose of part one of this dissertation is to examine the elements within the United 
States government which were tentatively beginning to monitor the long-standing Soviet 
nationalities problem during the early part of Jimmy Carter’s term in office and assessing 
ways in which they could potentially exploit or harness this unrest to serve US Cold War 
interests.  It will demonstrate that this issue, long ignored or dismissed by American 
policymakers in previous administrations during the 1960’s and 1970’s, gained some traction 
among more hawkish members of Carter’s administration and the US intelligence 
community, centred around national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski who was the 
driving force behind these ideas.  Indeed, the section of the thesis will focus largely on 
Brzezinski, his ideas, and his attempts to transmit this vision into policies which would help 
reshape US foreign policy towards the USSR.  Many members of the foreign policy 
establishment, including more moderate members of Carter’s cabinet such as secretary of 
state Cyrus Vance, were content to keep the framework of détente in place in order to keep 
a lid on any simmering Cold War tensions and create the space needed for Carter to pursue 
transformative foreign policy goals such as arms reduction, and global human rights and 
democracy promotion.  Yet there remained ardent anti-communist hard-liners within the 
administration, no less than the president’s national security advisor himself, who wished 
to take full advantage of any of the Soviet Union’s internal weaknesses for the purpose of 
heightening those tensions and promoting systemic change from within.  
 
This section of the thesis will begin by briefly outlining the vision Jimmy Carter had for 
American foreign policy, the massive disruptions in the international system he faced during 
the late 1970s, and his desire to move away from a solely traditional view of US-Soviet Cold 
War rivalry.  It will then begin to focus on Brzezinski, the intellectual, strategist and Soviet 
specialist, who stood tall over the administration’s foreign policy for the duration of Carter’s 
time in office.  This work will explore his ideas on the Soviet nationalities, and the 
transformative vision he had of détente, which differed starkly from more dovish elements 
in the US government.  This section will look at the early attempts to include the Soviet 
nationalities in US Cold War strategic planning, in the context of the overall US-Soviet 
relationship. In order to do this, Brzezinski and other members of the National Security 
Council first had to gather reliable intelligence on the current nature of the problems facing 
the Soviet leadership within the non-Russian republics, before considering how that 
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information could best be utilised.  This part of the dissertation will reveal that hard-line 
individuals on the NSC were eager to turn Brzezinski’s ideas on the Soviet nationalities into 
coherent policy options, with some, such as Paul Henze, making it an almost single-minded 
obsession.  Henze was the focal point of a group of officials inside the administration who 
were keen to exploit Soviet internal weaknesses, and who began to seriously think about 
ways in which this could be done.  Ultimately, these endeavours were never entirely 
accepted as part of mainstream American foreign policy thinking, but they did demonstrate 
the more ideological thrust which entered US Cold War strategy as the 1970s drew to a 
close, laying the groundwork for an increased focus on the internal nature of the Soviet 
regime which would continue into the Reagan years. 
 
 
Jimmy Carter, human rights, and the 1970s 
When Jimmy Carter was elected 39th president of the United States in 1976, he was eager 
to effect a change of dynamics in US-Soviet relations.  The former peanut farmer from 
Georgia arrived in Washington as the consummate outsider, promising to return a sense of 
morality and direction to the American body politic after the pain of Vietnam and the 
scandals of Watergate46.  Carter was a devout born-again Christian, and alongside his strong 
religious faith and political idealism, he had internalised the struggle for human rights in 
the crucible of the civil rights-era Deep South, making it one of the guiding principles of his 
life47.  And he was determined to infuse American foreign policy with the values he himself 
held so dear, values which he believed the rest of the world to be highly susceptible to.  In 
his Inaugural Address, Carter declared, “The passion for freedom is on the rise. Tapping this 
new spirit, there can be no nobler nor more ambitious task for America to undertake on this 
day of a new beginning than to help shape a just and peaceful world that is truly humane… 
We are a purely idealistic nation, but let no one confuse our idealism with weakness.  
Because we are free we can never be indifferent to the fate of freedom elsewhere.  Our 
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moral sense dictates a clear-cut preference for these societies which share with us an 
abiding respect for individual human rights”48.   
Such visionary rhetoric had been missing from American foreign policy in recent years but 
sat squarely in the tradition of American Wilsonianism, an idealism and commitment to 
universal freedom which was at the very core of America’s national identity.  Speaking in 
May 1977 at the University of Notre Dame, Jimmy Carter laid out his vision for a new 
American approach to foreign policy that would transcend Cold War bipolarity and place 
human rights and dignity at the centre of his administration’s strategy. “I want to speak 
today about the strands that connect our actions overseas with our essential character as a 
nation. I believe we can have a foreign policy that is democratic, that is based on our 
fundamental values and that uses power and influence for humane purposes. We can also 
have a foreign policy that the American people both support and understand”49.  It was this 
sense of unbridled idealism and ambition which animated Carter and bound him to shaping 
American statecraft in ways which would serve not just the American national interest, but 
the entire world.   
Nevertheless, as Nancy Mitchell’s work has shown, despite his true commitment to human 
rights and fostering a better world, Carter remained a “Cold Warrior from day one”.  His 
worldview may have been infused with idealism, but he was under no illusions as to the 
nature of the Soviet threat, or the complexities of the Cold War.  Mitchell believes that 
most observers misunderstood Carter’s deep Cold War instincts, his demeanour and choice 
of language leading them to be believe he was solely focused on morality over interests.  
She believes Carter’s religiosity contributed to the misconception, saying, “he was a 
profoundly religious man…His Christian faith was at the core of his being.  This religiosity 
coalesced with his interest in human rights and created a powerful, distorting filter: Carter 
would mention a dozen times in a speech that the United States needed to maintain its 
strength, and, as an aside, that it should also promote human rights, but what people heard 
and what the press reported was that Carter had mounted a spirited defence of human 
rights.  Whenever Carter referred to morality, values, or human rights, it was heard at full 
volume, while his comments about strength and national interest were heard as whispers 
and forgotten”.  
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 For Carter, his idealism was not incompatible with the realism of power politics, and 
America needed to be good if it were to remain powerful.  There is no doubt that Carter 
wished to see America pursue a different kind of foreign policy, one infused with morality 
and the promotion of human rights.  Yet he never lost sight of the true nature of superpower 
competition with the Soviet Union, a reality which left him open to the ideas of Brzezinski 
and others who wished to exploit the internal contradictions of the USSR.  As Mitchell says, 
“the logic of Carter’s Cold War policy could be counterintuitive: he would fight communism 
more effectively by not being so obsessed with fighting communism.  Instead of turning 
away from the Cold War, however, Carter was waging a more complex, pre-emptive, and 
diffuse Cold War”50. 
On assuming the presidency, Carter had little experience in foreign policy.  The experience 
he did have was gained through his involvement in the Trilateral Commission, an elitist think 
tank founded by David Rockefeller which brought together private citizens, businesspeople 
and politicians from North America, Europe and Japan to discuss global events.  Carter was 
invited to join in 1973, and immediately threw himself into reading policy papers on 
economics and the world’s energy sector. Hamilton Jordan, Carter’s future White House 
Chief of Staff, recalled Carter describing his experiences thus, “those Trilateral Commission 
meetings for me were like classes in foreign policy – reading papers produced on every 
conceivable subject, hearing experienced leaders debate international issues and 
problems”51.  The Commission included bipartisan membership, with both Democrats and 
Republicans involved, and drew on experts from a wide array of fields.  The exposure was 
vital to Carter’s understanding of foreign policy and how the world worked, allowing him to 
rub shoulders with figures such as Zbigniew Brzezinski, Cyrus Vance and Harold Brown, who 
would enter government service and fill key roles in the Carter White House.  Indeed, over 
twenty members of the Commission went onto to serve in Carter’s administration52.  Despite 
his limited exposure to international affairs, Carter came to the presidency with an 
ambitious desire to reshape the US role in the world, recalibrate America’s relationship with 
the Soviet Union, and implement a foreign policy which placed a high emphasis on human 
rights promotion while also tackling the emerging problems of a globalising world53. 
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Despite being critical of the Soviet Union from the earliest days of his presidency and 
understanding the true nature of superpower contest, Carter no longer believed that the 
Cold War was the only lens through which to view the problems facing the world and so 
American foreign policy should adjust accordingly54.  Carter’s presidency, wedged between 
the détente years of the high Cold War and the final decade of the Soviet Union’s existence, 
came during a tumultuous period of upheaval in the international system.  On assuming 
office in January 1977, Carter had to contend with a series of unique challenges unlike any 
faced by a previous incoming president.  America was perceived to be in decline, domestic 
pressure to revive the stuttering American economy was immense, the new commander-in-
chief looked out from his vantage point in Washington and saw a world in ferment.  New 
forces of globalisation and de-colonisation were sweeping the planet, and an assertive 
Soviet Union appeared to be on the march in the Third World.   
 
In his first letter to the Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, Carter declared his hopes for an 
improved working relationship, “I want to confirm that my aim is to improve relations with 
the Soviet Union on the basis of reciprocity, mutual respect and advantage.  I will pay close 
personal attention to this goal, as will Secretary of State Vance.  I read your public 
statements with great interest and they make me believe that we share a common aspiration 
for strengthening and preserving the perspectives for stable peace”55.  In his reply the Soviet 
leader also expressed his wishes for a productive relationship but took the opportunity to 
remind Carter of the Soviet Union’s antipathy towards attempts to interfere in their internal 
affairs.  Brezhnev was emphatic, “with this, and only this approach from both sides… can a 
stable, progressive development of relations between the USSR and the USA”56.  Carter’s 
commitment to highlighting human rights violations deeply troubled the Soviet leadership.  
Throughout his time in office, the USSR would continue to probe for weaknesses in the 
West’s resolve, testing Carter by actively pursuing Soviet interests around the world and 
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continuing to violate human rights at home, while SALT-II negotiations rumbled on.  
Washington policymakers perceived an aggressive and unchained Soviet Union on the march 
across the developing world, an image which endured and finally culminated in the 1979 
invasion of Afghanistan, which sent shockwaves through Western capitals. Nevertheless, the 
Soviet Union was not the behemoth it appeared. 
 
The 1970’s marked a period of profound change in the nature of the international system; 
shifting economic forces leading to increased globalisation, technological innovation, rising 
nationalism and demands for self-determination across the Third World, the growth of the 
dissident movement in the Soviet bloc, and an emerging Western focus on global human 
rights.  Long portrayed as a mere scene-setter for the Cold War’s dramatic climax, recent 
historiography has brought the 1970’s to life, with historians now depicting the decade as 
one of deep transformation in the international system with far-reaching implications for 
American foreign policy and US-Soviet relations57.  Indeed, some historians of US foreign 
relations have argued that the deep structural changes rocking the international system 
during the 1970s, and the strategies enacted by US policymakers to take advantage of those 
forces over the following years, led directly to the post-Cold War ‘unipolar moment’ when 
America stood at the apex of its power58.  Nevertheless, US policymakers throughout the 
1970s had struggled to come to grips with the new forces buffeting American power and 
prestige at the time, with former Secretary of State and National Security Advisor describing 
the period in his memoirs as “years of upheaval”59.   
 
One such force was the nationalism which began to emerge across the developing world, as 
people threw off the shackles of their colonial oppressors and asserted their right to self-
determination. Alongside this Third World nationalism similar sentiments were rising among 
the peoples of both the Soviet bloc nations of Eastern Europe and within the republics of 
the Soviet Union itself.  Over the next decade this growing nationalism, often accompanied 
by religious fervency, would continue to smoulder until eventually it would engulf the USSR 
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entirely60.  Increasingly, Western-based human rights NGO’s, churches and émigré groups 
highlighted the plight of their compatriots and co-religionists in the Soviet bloc, riding a 
wave of human rights activism which emerged in the mid 1970s on the back of the Helsinki 
accords61.  The signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 had prised open the Soviet system, 
allowing Western activists and governments to peer inside for the first time.  The Soviet 
sphere had long been out of bounds to human rights organisations, who had focused their 
attention on violations in the developing world.  But with Helsinki all this had changed, and 
the West was now able to gain a better knowledge and understanding of the repression 
taking place within Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union itself62.  And the Soviets did not 
enjoy the exposure.   
 
Despite preserving policies of containment, the president himself also wished to see the US-
Soviet relationship somewhat downgraded as the primary focus of US foreign policy, with an 
expanding emphasis placed on the challenges facing an increasingly globalised and 
connected world.  Daniel Sargent argues that Carter was prescient in understanding the new 
currents in international politics and the challenges which would face policymakers in the 
future, but he was premature in his desire to implement a post-Cold War foreign policy 
before the Cold War was actually over63.  The world was most certainly moving in new 
directions, with a plethora of non-state actors and transnational networks emerging, a self-
assurance taking hold in the Global South and decolonisation continuing apace, and 
therefore Carter was right to highlight the importance of North-South relations and human 
rights.  But the Cold War was far from over, and the looming presence of the Soviet Union 
still cast its shadow over American foreign policy. 
 
Indeed, the Soviet leadership had reacted with dismay to Carter’s rhetoric on human rights 
and his vocal support for high profile dissidents across the Soviet bloc such as Aleksandr 
Ginzburg and Andrei Sakharov.  US embassy officials in Moscow were clearly unnerved by 
what they were seeing inside the Soviet Union with regards to the Soviet response to Carter’s 
change of tact, as authorities there began a renewed crackdown on dissidents.  A February 
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1977 cable from the Moscow embassy to the State Department in Washington counselled, 
“rightly or wrongly, the Soviets see the human rights movement here as a direct challenge 
to their system and its image abroad, they also regard the USG’s public endorsement of the 
dissidents as blatant, impermissible interference in their internal affairs”.  The embassy 
speculated that this new approach from the president and the resultant Soviet crackdown 
could seriously damage the US-Soviet relationship, believing the hard-line Soviet response 
could, “in turn inflame emotions in the US to the point of setting back the timetable for 
resolving major items on the US-Soviet agenda”64.   
 
With US-Soviet relations becoming strained ahead of upcoming arms talks, Carter’s press 
secretary Jody Powell, one of the Georgia liberals who had stood with Carter from the 
beginning of his presidential campaign, suggested to the president that he should reach out 
informally by phone to the Soviets and try to explain his position.  Powell believed it was 
necessary to build domestic support for arms control talks and that that the American people 
would no longer support a foreign policy bereft of idealism and a commitment to human 
rights, as it had been under Nixon.  Brzezinski dismissed this idea, believing that it “smacks 
too much of cynicism and of weakness”65.  It was noted within the administration that the 
clamp down on dissidents had predated Carter’s election win, connected to both food 
shortages in the USSR and fears among the Soviet leadership that the Basket III provisions 
of the Helsinki accords would serve as a rallying point for Soviet dissidents.  Yet it was also 
accepted that the new public stance of the American government in support of dissidents 
and human rights had “reinforced and intensified” the Soviet crackdown66.  US officials 
continued to monitor the Soviet reaction to Carter’s human rights policies during the first 
year of the administration, noting increased Soviet propaganda which blamed Carter for 
recent international criticism of the Soviet system and denouncing the president’s 
“demagogy” on human rights, and also observing the link between US policies and the 
Soviets “turning the screws” on domestic critics of the regime67. 
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However, for the more hawkish elements inside the administration, Carter’s human rights 
policies were exactly the kind of ideological spear they felt would be effective in piercing 
Soviet armour.   While there is no doubt that Carter and his liberal advisors were genuinely 
dedicated to the cause of human rights promotion, no matter how imperfectly that policy 
was followed, the hard-line anti-communists in the White House were eager to use human 
rights as a moral weapon with which to bludgeon the Soviets68.  Along with Brzezinski were 
fellow hardliners William E. Odom, a three-star military general who has spent his career 
analysing Soviet military capabilities, and the political scientist and intellectual Samuel 
Huntington, who joined the administration on academic leave from Harvard.  On the 
National Security Council was Paul B. Henze, who served on the NSC for the duration of 
Carter’s tenure in office and used his time in the White House to push for a more proactive 
US approach towards the republics and nationalities inside the Soviet Union69.  These 
officials began to explore ways to undermine the internal cohesion of the Soviet Union, with 
human rights and support for national self-determination at the forefront of their minds70.   
 
These men also held a view of the nature of détente and the US-Soviet relationship that was 
fundamentally at odds with the Republican realists of previous administrations and the 
Democrat moderates and liberals with which they now shared the West Wing.  Odom in 
particular, the career military man, was keen to see the US pushback against Soviet 
advances around the world and compete across multiple arenas, employing both hard and 
soft power to do so.  As Artemy Kalinovsky describes, “Huntington and Odom argued that 
the Cold War was entering a new phase that had yet to be defined.  In this new phase, 
containment and détente would no longer be enough.  Instead Washington should pursue 
“competitive engagement” along several fronts, which meant maintaining US military pre-
eminence, and challenging the Soviet Union within its own sphere of influence”71.   
Brzezinski and his fellow hawks did not believe in American decline.  They did not look at 
the United States and see a nation in retreat.  They believed the US was the world’s only 
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superpower and the USSR was riddled with internal weaknesses and contradictions.  As Adam 
Michnik, the famous Polish dissident and intellectual, opined, “Brzezinski understood what 
hardly anybody could understand at that time in America – that an ideological confrontation 
with the Soviet bloc had to be undertaken – and the American slogan in this confrontation 
should be human rights”72. 
  
Brzezinski, the Soviet nationalities, and the return of ideology 
 
Carter may have ascended to the White House vowing to enact a new approach to American 
foreign policy and with a desire to transcend bipolarity, but some elements within his 
administration remained locked into a Cold War mindset.  Standing astride the foreign policy 
of the Carter administration was the mercurial figure of Zbigniew Brzezinski, the Polish 
American intellectual chosen by the new president to be his National Security Advisor73.  
The son of a Polish diplomat and émigré to the United States, ‘Zbig’, as he was known, had 
been a professor at Columbia University before entering the political arena, carving out a 
niche for himself within academia as an expert on Eastern Europe and the dynamics within 
the Soviet bloc74.  Never quite able to shake the feeling that he was viewed as an outsider 
by the American foreign policy establishment, this Polish Catholic strategist brought to the 
White House a carefully considered view of world order and of America’s place within it.  
He was assured and utterly confident in his own abilities, and his clashes with Cyrus Vance, 
Jimmy Carter’s secretary of state, have attained almost mythical status.  Brzezinski may 
have been stubborn and volatile, but he was also a supremely intelligent foreign policy 
practitioner with an in-depth knowledge of the Soviet system who had been at Carter’s side 
from the beginning of his presidential campaign.  Carter had known Brzezinski since their 
time at the Trilateral Commission, and the president both trusted and held him in high 
esteem75.  And while the president had his own deeply-felt worldview and a clear agenda 
which he wished to accomplish while in office, it was Brzezinski who would largely dominate 
the policymaking process in the White House. 
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Deeply read in Russian and East European history, Brzezinski was a fervent Cold Warrior and 
dedicated anti-communist, with a long-standing interest in studying ways to exploit any 
chinks in the Soviet armour76.  He held a particular and enduring interest in the internal 
dynamics of Soviet society and weaknesses in the Soviet system, centred around the 
disruptive power of nationalism.  As a Masters student at McGill University in 1950, 
Brzezinski had written his thesis on Russo-Soviet nationalism, in which he described the 
Soviet nationalities problem as the “Achilles Heel” of the USSR77.  In his thesis, Brzezinski 
highlighted the conundrum facing the Soviet leadership; to suppress the nationalities would 
inevitably lead to rising unrest, but to allow them leeway could potentially lead to greater 
calls for freedom and undermine the unity of the entire USSR.  This was a concept which 
would animate his life, and he advanced these ideas further in a 1960 book on the sources 
of disunity within the Soviet bloc78.  ‘The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict’ was published to 
much acclaim, and the work has held up very well in the light of history.  The book 
specifically identified nationalist sentiment within the Soviet sphere as an inherent 
weakness, one which the Kremlin would find almost impossible to quell and would lead the 
region to become increasingly unstable over time.  And although the book mainly focused 
on nationalism within Eastern Europe, it also contained the seeds of Brzezinski’s thought on 
the Soviet nationalities question as well.   
 
In 1966 he would expand on these thoughts in an article entitled, “The Soviet Political 
System: Transformation or Degeneration”, a contribution to an edited volume on the 
problems facing the Soviet leadership in the coming years79.  This essay argued that the root 
of decay in the Soviet system would eventually stem not merely from economic problems, 
although these were important, but from the oppressive political arrangements which 
institutionalised sterile thinking in leadership and stifled the voices of its citizens.  A key 
development would be the growing assertiveness of the non-Russian nationalities and the 
traditional ties to localised languages, religion and customs which were held by many Soviet 
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citizens living in the autonomous republics which constituted the inner Soviet empire.  In 
the concluding essay of the collection, Brzezinski mused, “we still live in an age of 
nationalism, and my own highly generalized feeling is that it is going to be exceedingly 
difficult for the Soviet Union to avoid having some of its many nationalities go through a 
phase of assertive nationalism”, in which case Brzezinski surmised that if the demands for 
greater autonomy from the various nationality groups were not met then they would become 
“sharper’, and if they were met then they would “grow with the eating”.  “I frankly do not 
see how the central authorities in the Soviet Union will be able to avoid having a prolonged 
period of fairly difficult relations with the non-Russian nationalities”80.  He also felt the 
Soviet nationalities problem had been completely overlooked by Sovietologists in the West.  
As Harvard’s Mark Kramer describes, “few Western analysts at the time ascribed much 
political importance to Soviet nationalities and ethnic groups” whereas Brzezinski 
“criticised ‘the inclination of many Western scholars of Soviet affairs to minimise what I 
fear may be a very explosive issue in the Soviet polity’”81. 
 
By 1977 the period of détente had been in place over the course of three previous US 
administrations, but Brzezinski’s view of détente fell more in the line with the activist 
interpretation taken by the Soviet Union82.  Historian and Brzezinski expert Patrick Vaughan 
explains, “Brzezinski… was determined from the outset to implement a more “reciprocal” 
form of détente.  Few observers at the time knew what he had in mind.  Brzezinski’s version 
of “détente” he would admit in later years, was designed not only to contain the Soviet 
Union but also to engineer its demise.  This involved an increased effort to promote human 
rights, support dissidents, and stir up the nationalities - and contest the Soviet Union 
militarily around the world”.  Interestingly, despite Carter’s vocal desire to transcend the 
bipolarity of the Cold War, Vaughan believes the president was fully on board with 
Brzezinski’s hawkish strategy, saying, “beginning early in the administration, and going 
beyond the human rights campaign, Brzezinski initiated, and Carter approved, an 
unprecedented White House effort to attack the internal legitimacy of the Soviet 
government”83.  Brzezinski’s vision of the Cold War was almost purely ideological.   
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As the 1970’s drew to a close, the European-style balance of power détente favoured by 
Nixon, Kissinger and Ford was giving way, and a new era of ideological confrontation was 
emerging.  For the president’s new national security advisor, the Soviet nationalities were 
to provide merely another front in that war.  While keen on cultivating new aspects of US 
Cold War strategy, in the early days of the administration officials also had to wrestle with 
the contours of the US-Soviet relationship writ large. There were continuing concerns over 
the Soviet arms build-up, which had been taking place over the course of the 1970s, and 
debates over whether the Soviets intended to achieve parity with the United States, or to 
surpass it.  Brzezinski speculated with Carter as to whether the driving force behind this 
build-up was ideological, organisational, or in reaction to American strategy.  And he once 
again gave voice to the ideological and anti-détente component of his thinking stating, 
“strategically the post-war world has been “unipolar”, not “bipolar”, because one power 
has predominated.  There has been no “balance of power” but rather a hierarchy of 
powers”.  He feared the Soviet Union was using arms limitation talks not merely to achieve 
nuclear parity, but to undermine and attack the post-war, US led order.   
 
Furthermore, he placed ideology firmly at the heart of Soviet intentions. “It has become 
popular (if unwise) to dismiss the role of ideology, the political explanation has to rely in 
part on the Soviet ideological view of the world… De-ideologized pragmatism simply cannot 
account for the role of ideas in shaping power”84.  If the Soviet Union’s actions on the world 
stage continued to be driven by ideology, then American statecraft should also draw on 
ideas and ideals to win this conflict, a concept which had been largely scorned by the realists 
Nixon and Kissinger earlier in the decade.  Brzezinski wished to see American foreign policy 
infused with a sense of morality again, something for which he criticised previous 
administrations for neglecting.  He believed Nixon and Kissinger had executed a “foreign 
policy based largely on manoeuvre among the more powerful nation states” and “largely 
devoid of moral concerns”85. Brzezinski’s concept of world order was hard to define, in many 
ways sharing the focus on power and geopolitical rivalry of realism yet placing a greater 
emphasis on the internal nature of states, the importance of civil society, and ideology.   
 
On taking up the position of national security advisor to President Carter, Brzezinski brought 
with him a deeply considered worldview and well-established views on the Soviet 
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nationalities problem, which he had been thinking and writing about over the course of his 
entire career.  His position at the summit of American foreign policy now afforded him the 
platform to explore these ideas and perhaps embed them within US Cold War strategy.  
Brzezinski began to craft strategies towards the Soviet nationalities which would serve US 
interests, and in Paul Henze he found a like-minded point man on the NSC.  Henze knew 
Brzezinski from their earlier joint involvement with Radio Free Europe and shared his boss’s 
interest in the Soviet nationalities question, he was keen to see the US government pay 
more attention to developments in the non-Russian republics of the USSR86.  Henze recalled 
that at the beginning of Carter’s presidency, “Brzezinski took me aside right away… He 
simply said “I want you to see what you can do to really get some attention to the non-
Russian nationalities in the Soviet Union.  They’re important, and they’re going to be more 
important, and we need to have ourselves equipped to do something about them”87.   
 
In May 1977, a few months into Carter’s term in office, the CIA produced a detailed report 
on the wide spectrum of dissent which existed within the Soviet Union. The CIA report 
presented evidence suggesting a “revival of nationalist feelings among the peoples of the 
USSR which, to varying degrees, has affected all the major ethnic minorities, including the 
Great Russians”.  It went on to state, “this nationalist mood is symptomatic of the waning 
Marxist-Leninist ideological clan and has been fostered by the relative relaxation of the 
political atmosphere since Stalin’s death”.  The report offered the US intelligence 
community’s best contemporary insights into the nationalist dissidence slowly fermenting 
across the USSR.  At that stage the CIA didn’t feel it posed an existential threat to the Soviet 
regime, yet the potential was there, describing nationalist dissidence as, “by its nature 
divisive”, and capable of “exacerbating old rivalries”88.  The mention of the ‘Great Russians’ 
as a nationality group of interest is in itself noteworthy, a recognition among the 
intelligence community that the nationalities problems within the Soviet Union went more 
than just one way, and the majority Russian group also harboured festering resentments of 
their own.   
 
Brzezinski was also well aware of this dynamic and, following on from the circulation of the 
CIA report, he explained the issue to the president in a June 1977 memo, including maps 
and statistics for Carter to peruse.  The national security advisor advised Carter that 
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“demographic dynamics increasingly point to the Russians becoming a minority in the total 
population”.  He suggested that Russians were well on their way to becoming a minority, 
for the first time in Russian imperial history. “I believe that this is likely to become an 
increasingly difficult issue in the Soviet Union.  National consciousness is becoming stronger 
among the non-Russians, and this is not surprising since we still live in the age of 
nationalism.  Moreover, national tensions are likely to affect political change within the 
Soviet Union”89.  This interest in the potential clash between ‘Great Russians’ and the non-
Russian nationalities also had its roots in Brzezinski’s earliest work and was a major focus 
of his McGill Masters thesis over two decades previously.  As Brzezinski’s biographer Justin 
Vaisse writes, “on the one hand, the mosaic of nationalities that made up the Soviet Union 
put its own future at risk by its centripetal movement, as Brzezinski had been explaining for 
a long time.  On the other hand, and precisely for that reason, Great Russian nationalism 
(with its militaristic tradition) … would not allow the empire to be destroyed and would not 
accept pluralism among the non-Russians”90.  This paradox intrigued Brzezinski, and he 
wrestled with it.  Nevertheless, it was the non-Russian nationalities which would form the 




At Brzezinski’s behest, a review of US covert activities towards the USSR was conducted in 
May 1977, and the national security advisor was utterly horrified at the paucity of covert 
actions being undertaken by the CIA, most notably the lack of action towards the ethnic 
minority groups of the Soviet empire91.  As a result, Henze began to take practical steps 
towards increasing US government knowledge of nationality issues inside the Soviet Union, 
and crafting proposals geared towards exploiting these issues for America’s gain.  Given his 
background at Radio Free Europe and experience in radio broadcasting to Eastern Europe, 
Henze was keen to see an expansion of broadcasting ability to reach the nationalities of the 
Soviet Union.  This desire tied in closely with the overall goal of the Carter administration, 
among both doves and hawks, to promote human rights within the Soviet sphere of 
influence.   
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In May, Carter had instructed the NSC to conduct a review of US human rights policies in 
order to define what US objectives were in the realm of human rights, identify what courses 
of action the US could take, and generally craft a coherent strategy for the promotion of 
human rights as an integral part of American foreign policy92.  The Special Coordination 
Committee (SCC) conducted this review meeting which eventually led to directive NSC-28, 
which clearly and cogently articulated the administration’s emerging strategy on human 
rights promotion.  The study which informed this directive stated, “RFE and RL have played 
a key role in the rising awareness that has accompanied the expanding human rights 
movement in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.  Human rights activists in Moscow, 
Warsaw and other cities frequently cite RFE/RL’s extensive coverage as a vital source of 
information…The Radios also seek to give increased attention to human rights developments 
affecting the non-Russian nationalities of the Soviet Union”93.  The employment of radio 
broadcasting to reach the nationality groups inside the USSR would form a core component 
of Brzezinski and Henze’s strategy, but one which would not always run smoothly. 
 
By late 1977, a new strategy was emerging within the administration which would see an 
unprecedented and renewed attempt by the US government to boost clandestine activity 
within the USSR.  In order to reach the nationality groups there would be increased book 
and samizdat distribution, renewed funding for book publishing, and improved quality of 
radio broadcasting into the Soviet republics, although these ventures were incredibly slow 
to materialise94.  Brzezinski had been pushing for these developments since the earliest days 
of the administration but had come up against intense resistance from the State Department 
and elements within the CIA, who questioned the viability and necessity of such measures95.  
Carter and his administration also continued to work on crafting guidance for US foreign 
policy, and in August 1977 they issued the official directive on national security which would 
guide US policy over the coming 4 years; Presidential Directive/NSC-18.  And while the 
directive urged US and Soviet co-operation in reducing areas of tension and sought to involve 
the USSR in constructive global activities, the hardliners who were interested in encouraging 
national consciousness within the Soviet Union received encouragement by the inclusion of 
the instruction to “compete politically with the Soviet Union by pursuing the basic American 
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commitment to human rights and national independence”96.  The task then, was to create 
concrete policies in order to achieve this objective.   
 
In late 1977, Henze complained to Brzezinski that other agencies within the US government 
were dragging their feet when it came to increasing the level of covert actions which were 
aimed at the Soviet nationalities, but that finally things appeared to be moving.  “Last 
February, when State expressed reservations about the continuation of CIA’s meagre covert 
operations directed at the USSR and Eastern Europe, you suggested State study overt 
possibilities while, meanwhile, CIA consider modest expansion of selected activities.  State 
did nothing. CIA, suffering from internal confusion, was slow to move but during the course 
of the summer came up with a number of proposals for expansion”97.  Brzezinski had pushed 
the CIA to develop new covert approaches to the USSR, in light of the Carter administration’s 
enlarged view of the Soviet relationship, which would include highlighting the plight of 
dissidents and human rights abuses within the Soviet republics98.   
 
Nevertheless, Henze felt that the State Department still wasn’t on board with the new 
approach, bemoaning their “profound lack of enthusiasm”.  He told Brzezinski, “State…is 
doing a review of what policies towards nationalities should be… I hear that State feels that 
nothing should be done in respect to non-Russian nationalities at all.  But it remains to be 
seen whether they will take this negative a position formally”99.  The State Department had 
long been more supportive of the détente process and reluctant to needlessly antagonise 
the Soviet Union.  The situation wasn’t helped by Brzezinski’s incessant quarrelling with 
Carter’s more pragmatic secretary of state Cyrus Vance.  This internal opposition to 
Brzezinski and Henze’s plots would become increasingly obvious as the administration 
entered its second year, and there were many within the foreign policy establishment who 
did not believe it to be wise to stir up the nationalities inside the Soviet Union.  
Nevertheless, by 1978 the Carter administration was keen to build on the early advances it 
had made in the human rights sphere, and the hardliners pressed on with their plans and 
attempted to build a concrete framework and policy options towards the nationalities inside 
the Soviet Union.  
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The birth of the Nationalities Working Group 
As 1978 began, the Carter administration took stock of their achievements over the previous 
twelve months and charted a course forward for the new year.  It had not all gone to plan 
thus far. Carter had been stung by criticism of his early attempts at integrating human rights 
promotion into US foreign policy; accusations of double standards abound, efforts at 
democracy promotion in places such as Iran and Latin America were producing mixed results, 
and the new approach was causing alarm among both the Soviets and traditional allies 
alike100.  Fashioning foreign policy around human rights, making it a lodestar of American 
activity in the world, was proving more difficult than Carter had hoped, and the president 
was discovering that noble ideals did not always translate easily into coherent strategy.  
Nevertheless, liberal members of his administration were undeterred and determined to 
build on the limited gains they had made thus far.   
 
In early 1978, Anthony Lake, who headed the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff101 
and who would go onto to become Bill Clinton’s national security advisor in 1993, outlined 
a review of the Carter administration’s achievements at the behest of Cyrus Vance.  In his 
review, Lake acknowledged the difficulties they had faced thus far, drawing attention to 
the continued competitiveness of the East-West relationship and unresolved regional issues 
around the globe.  Yet Lake laid out a vision of a post-Cold War world, “for close to three 
decades, the Cold War dominated our view of the world: today we must deal with a 
pluralistic international setting of several major dimensions”.  While stressing the 
importance of the US alliance system, Lake also called for cooperation with communist 
nations, “operating on the assumption that no animosity is so deep that there is not some 
common ground”.  He accepted that compromise would be necessary at times yet urged 
American foreign policy to move “beyond the generalised doctrines of times past”, while 
continuing to highlight human rights, cooperation and arms reduction talks as prime items 
on the agenda for the year ahead.  “Our choices in 1978 will shape the character of 
America’s role in the world for years to come”, Lake stated boldly102.  
The Soviets continued to be baffled by Carter’s approach, this was not the sort of 
relationship they had become accustomed to when Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon were 
on the other side of the negotiations.  At a Politburo meeting in April 1978, Brezhnev had 
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regaled his comrades with details of the tough line he had taken with Vance during recent 
discussions, complaining about the contradictions in Carter’s approach to the Soviet Union.  
The Soviet leader had laid out his expectations for arms reduction talks and also taken the 
opportunity, “to openly express to him our evaluation of the contradictions of Carter’s 
inconsistent foreign policy line… to remind Vance (and through him, Carter) that there are 
things which are more important than the foreign policy manoeuvres of the moment, 
particularly: issues of war and peace”.  Brezhnev revealed Vance had, “accepted with due 
attention the criticism of the foreign policy zigzags of the Carter government, and will, of 
course, pass them on to the President… Overall, I think, the conversation was useful.  It will 
help Carter to see several things in a more realistic light”103.  Carter’s focus on human rights 
was a source of real irritation to the Kremlin and was proving a complication in arms 
reduction talks and in the exploration of other areas of cooperation.  The Soviet crackdown 
on dissidents also continued, with US intelligence observing that harassment of Western 
embassy officials, activists and journalists was being stepped up, and embryonic Helsinki 
groups in the non-Russian Soviet republics of Lithuania, Armenia, Georgia and Ukraine had 
been successfully broken by the authorities104.    
 
Nevertheless, despite these actions, many dissidents within the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe took heart from Carter’s dedication to the cause of human rights, and from the 
president’s deep religious piety.  After a trip to Moscow and Minsk in early 1978, Odom 
reported to Brzezinski on the importance of Carter’s religious beliefs to many anti-
communist party elements inside the USSR.  In meetings with well-placed contacts, Odom 
was able to establish that the “subtle and continuous image of the President’s religiosity 
projected to the Soviet public gives the greatest chance for undercutting public tolerance 
of the party and for provoking internal party debate in the face of what looks like a period 
of growing repression… The combination of President Carter’s religiosity and changing 
conditions in the USSR… creates a unique situation”105.  There were indeed rumblings of 
discontent within Soviet society, and the hawks in the Carter administration were resolute 
in their intention to exploit them. 
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Brzezinski and his allies were eager to press ahead with their ideological crusade against 
the Soviet Union, with plans underway to launch a covert action program which would 
significantly increase both the quality and quantity of Western literature and propaganda 
smuggled into the USSR.  Meanwhile, Paul Henze and Sam Huntington had been pressing 
hard inside the administration for the creation of a Nationalities Working Group (NWG), 
which would allow officials from across various agencies and departments of the US 
government to come together for discussion on the Soviet nationalities106.  Henze intended 
for this group to become a regular forum for sharing ideas, expanding knowledge of the 
Soviet republics, and the dissemination of research which could then be used to support 
covert activity.  The Nationalities Working Group was finally established on 20 January 1978, 
set within the NSC with the East-West Planning Group in oversight, and held its first official 
meeting in June of that year.107 Henze immediately began to arrange seminars, invited 
academics to discuss their research at meetings, and organised conferences and various 
events.   
 
From the early days of this venture, there was a real interest in the Muslim republics of the 
Soviet Union, with both Huntington and Henze convinced that the cocktail of Islamic 
fervency and nationalism would eventually lead to major problems for Soviet authorities in 
the soft underbelly of the USSR108.  There was also a feeling that the national consciousness 
of Muslim troops from the Central Asian republics could undermine cohesion in the Soviet 
Army109.  This question continued to animate the NWG over the course of Carter’s time in 
office as the group explored issues such as the ethnic composition of the Soviet armed 
forces, migration trends across the Central Asian republics, ethnocentrism in the Caucasus, 
and the organisation infrastructure of the nationalist protest movements within the USSR110.   
However, not everyone inside the US government was on board with this aggressive new 
approach. 
 
The CIA had a policy of avoiding direct contact with dissidents for fear of alerting the KGB 
to their activities, favouring the use of intermediary groups to connect with opposition 
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forces within the Soviet bloc111.  The State Department, on the other hand, had long been 
hesitant with regards to any covert measures against the USSR.  Henze found their position 
absolutely exasperating, telling Brzezinski, “I recall Cy Vance at one of the 
earliest SCC reviews of covert activity in February 1977 stating that he did not want anyone 
to think that he was totally against covert activity—but he felt we should engage in it very 
seldom and only in limited fashion and under the most unusual circumstances when 
fundamental U.S. interests were in serious danger.  He went on to say that he felt we should 
maintain some covert capability but we should use it very seldom.  This Vance view was 
readily accepted in State; we hear it all the time. It fits comfortably into a broader State 
approach to foreign policy—the notion that whether action is overt or covert, it should 
always be minimal, (if it cannot be avoided at all) taken only after long deliberation and 
delay and never be very comprehensive or sustained”112.   
 
This reluctance to engage in covert action against the Soviet Union clearly manifested itself 
in the State Department view of the nationalities issues.  There was real discomfort at the 
prospect of stirring up ethnic resentments within the USSR, and fears over what these efforts 
would mean for the stability of the Soviet Union and US-Soviet relations more widely.  
Robert Gates, who served in national security roles across five administrations during the 
Cold War, explains in his memoirs that the State Department was “wary of moving covertly 
(or overtly, for that matter) into the nationalities area… because they felt the United States 
simply was not well enough informed to be able to make appropriate decisions”113.  After 
much delay, a policy paper on the Soviet nationalities was submitted to Brzezinski in June 
1978, in which the State Department poured cold water on his plans for agitating the 
nationalities within the Soviet republics by pointing out that the US simply didn’t know 
enough about the nationality issues within the USSR to be able to craft a coherent strategy, 
and questioning the long term benefit to US foreign policy that agitating these ethnic groups 
may bring.   
 
The State Department also saw a contradiction on the US side, namely that support for 
potentially divisive and violent nationalism was difficult to justify in light of American 
promotion of human rights114.  To the hardliners in the administration this appeared like 
more delaying tactics but beginning in mid-1978 the State Department did launch a long-
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term information-gathering campaign to improve US knowledge of the disparate and diverse 
nationality and ethnic groupings inside the Soviet Union and to analyse how the social and 
demographic changes within the USSR changes may pose problems for the Soviet 
leadership115.  The State Department also instructed its embassies and consulates across 
Eastern Europe, Central Asia and the Mediterranean to pay more attention to dealings with 
any Soviet minority nationalities.   
 
The Soviets were aware of these developments, which they were finding exceedingly 
irksome.  In May 1978, Andrei Gromyko, the grizzled and long-serving Soviet foreign minister 
met with Vance in New York.  Gromyko pressed the secretary of state for an explanation of 
the new-found hostility in the American approach to the Soviet Union, which both perplexed 
and annoyed him.  “I want to ask how the explosion of propaganda hostile to the USSR, 
which we have observed in the USA for some time already, can be explained?” Gromyko 
pushed.  Explaining that the Soviets had always looked for constructive ways to interpret 
US statements and actions, he specifically highlighted the abrasive role of Brzezinski in the 
deterioration of the US-Soviet relationship, lecturing “most recently our attention has been 
more and more attracted to the fact that, beginning with the President (and Brzezinski has 
already surpassed himself in this), American officials are constantly making statements 
which are aimed, or so it seems to us more and more, at nearly bringing us back to the 
period of “cold war”116.   
 
While in America, Gromyko relayed his increasing alarm back to Moscow, and the Soviet 
leadership grew ever more concerned.  The issues raised by the Soviet foreign minister in 
his discussions with Vance were echoed by Brezhnev in a speech to the Politburo in June 
1978, telling his comrades, “it is completely clearly apparent that we are experiencing a 
very complicated period in the development of international relations”.  The Soviet leader 
laid the blame for this setback at the feet of Carter and his relentless national security 
advisor, and Brezhnev went on, “the primary source of this deterioration is the growing 
aggression of the foreign policy of the Carter government, the continually more sharply anti-
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Soviet character of the statements of the President himself and of his closest colleagues - 
in the first instance those of Brzezinski”117.  
 
Facing internal resistance 
 
The remainder of 1978 would see Brzezinski and Henze locked in budgetary battles over 
radio broadcasting funding, a key component in their strategy for reaching the nationalities 
of the Soviet Union.  Through Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, the US had been 
broadcasting into the Soviet world from the earliest days of the Cold War118.  The Carter 
administration saw the benefit of this radio programming and had moved to not merely 
maintain this broadcasting, but to actually strengthen it further119.  However, the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) would routinely question the necessity for radio broadcast 
funding and threaten to cut the budget for this endeavour, putting the entire project at 
risk.  In mid-1978 OMB threatened budget cuts which would severely derail Brzezinski’s 
hopes of reaching the disaffected ethnic groups inside the USSR, dashing his hopes of 
agitating the Soviet nationalities.  In July, Henze anxiously reported to Brzezinski that, 
“OMB was recommending to the President that broadcasts in non-minority languages be 
severely curtailed, that RL as a whole be considered as potential trade-off to Soviets for 
better behaviour and that OMB expects tighter budgets for RFE/RL for future years!”.  Henze 
was dumbfounded, feeling the development was completely out of alignment with the 
overall direction of their approach towards the USSR, especially in light of Brzezinski’s hard-
line and more uncompromising posture which the administration had been adopting 
recently120.   
 
Ralph Walter, the Executive Vice President for Programs and Policy at RFE/RL, shared his 
concerns with Henze, with the NSC man reporting back to Brzezinski that Walter viewed the 
“budget-cutting exercise as completely out of harmony with the positive thrust we have 
built up in the radios during the past 18 months” and raised concerns that it could do 
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“serious, fundamental harm”.  Henze explained that Walter felt cutting the radios’ budget 
to be absurd, “in light of the small amount of money involved, at a time when we are trying 
to make fundamental, long-term improvements in the radios and when the need for them 
is obvious in view of heightening tensions within the Soviet Bloc and heightening tensions in 
our own relations with the Soviets”121.  The threat to cut radio funding would have serious 
implications for Brzezinski’s nationalities strategy because RFE/RL had been re-broadcasting 
dissident literature back into the Soviet Union as well as interviewing Soviet tourists to 
Europe, taking the opportunity to find out their views on the nationalities issue back home 
in the USSR122.  
 
On July 28, Henze had lunch with John Gronouski, the chairman of the Board of International 
Broadcasting, and Glenn Ferguson, the president of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, who 
were both equally concerned about the prospect of their budgets being slashed.  Henze fed 
back details of this meeting to Brzezinski, where the three men had decided “the best 
defence is to go on the offensive”.  Gronouski and Ferguson agreed to work diligently 
towards building more Congressional support for radio broadcasting, the Board for 
International Broadcasting would provide “strong documentation on the policy significance 
of the radios” in order to justify upcoming requests for budgetary increases, and Henze 
suggested that as part of the current Soviet nationalities exercise within the administration, 
that the Special Coordinating Committee (SCC) should give its “strong endorsement for the 
concept of expanding broadcasting to non-Russians, expanding research to back it up, and 
expanding personnel so that all these tasks can be performed effectively and sustained over 
time”.  This last point was absolutely vital for Henze, telling Brzezinski “the idea of cutting 
out nationality broadcasts at the very point when we are working to develop a long-range 
program for increased U.S. Government attention to this field is incongruous”123.   
 
In September 1978, Brzezinski wrote to James McIntrye, the director of OMB, to make the 
case that rather than budget cuts, the administration would actually like to see an increase 
in funding for radio transmissions to the USSR. The national security advisor informed 
McIntyre that, “the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) broadcasting operation… is a 
key instrument for implementing our policies toward the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 
an important element in the President’s human rights program and a symbol of the 
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permanent American commitment to free flow of information and ideas”.  In requesting a 
modest increase of 7-8%, Brzezinski specifically highlighted the role that radio broadcasting 
played in his overall strategy towards the non-Russian Soviet nationalities, writing “one 
special aspect of this effort derives from the fact that the SCC recently approved a broad 
program for increasing U.S. Government knowledge of the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet 
Union whose rapid rate of population increase will soon make them the majority.  RFE/RL 
has a unique capacity to contribute in this area and one of our objectives is to improve both 
research and broadcasting by recruiting more young people of non-Russian nationalities and 
training them well”124.  This initial difficulty passed, but the issue of radio funding would 
crop up time and again during the course the next few years. 
 
As 1978 drew to a close, advisors close to the president evaluated the previous 12 months 
and declared that much progress had been made.  Anthony Lake believed that Carter had 
made substantial progress toward SALT-II agreements with the Soviets, and in NATO and 
Warsaw Pact troops reductions.  Lake felt Carter successfully “sought a pattern of détente 
with the Soviet Union that is both comprehensive and genuinely reciprocal” and that US-
Eastern European relations had likewise improved.  He saw the Carter administration as 
having effectively improved co-operation with Western allies while engaging the newly 
emerging issues in the developing world and moving towards the normalisation of relations 
with China.  Lake also declared the president’s approach to human rights promotion to have 
been a success, “the president’s human rights policy is widely perceived as a reassertion of 
traditional American values… it has contributed to creating a climate of global awareness 
and concern for human rights, which few governments fail to take into account”125.   
 
For hardliners like Henze, Huntington and Brzezinski there had also been much to cheer 
over the course of 1978.  Despite dogged opposition from the State Department and 
budgetary worries, with the formation of the Nationalities Working Group the hawks had 
been able to establish the first dedicated forum for exploring the nationalities issues inside 
the Soviet Union within the US government.  Similarly, covert actions inside the USSR had 
been ramped-up, with smuggling programmes targeting disaffected nationalities with 
dissident literature and American propaganda material, and an increase in radio 
broadcasting specifically aimed at the non-Russian Soviet republics. In December 1978, the 
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CIA had produced a report assessing the results of their stepped-up publishing and 
distribution efforts inside the USSR and Eastern Europe, submitted to Stan Turner, the 
Director of Central Intelligence.  On receiving a copy of the report, Henze shared it with 
Brzezinski declaring, “Stan Turner has sent a good summary report on the results of CIA’s 
effort, which we approved a year ago last summer, to publish and send more indigenous-
language material into Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The results are impressive. 
They are typical of what can be done when long-established, professionally run programs 
are given the opportunity to expand and the best judgment of the people who are running 
them is taken as the basis of judgment for what can be done”126.  As the year drew to a 
close, the president was determined to press on with his expansive human rights agenda, 
while Brzezinski and Henze remained fully focused on making life difficult for the Soviets 
over the coming years.  Unknown to all, 1979 would prove to be one of the worst years for 
American foreign policy in living memory. 
 
The Muslims of Soviet Central Asia 
In early 1979, American intelligence painted a gloomy picture of the dissident scene inside 
the Soviet Union, with Helsinki activists and religious dissidents within the Soviet republics 
in particular facing harsh crackdowns.  The Soviet leadership had taken steps to quash the 
emerging Helsinki movement within its borders, with groups in Armenia, Georgia and 
Ukraine ravaged by a series of arrests and the imprisonment of their leading members.  
Religious believers among the Soviet nationalities were also bearing the brunt of an 
increased wave of repression, in which unregistered Christians in Belorussia and Ukraine 
were subject to imprisonment, and the hopes of Crimean Tartars to return to their ancestral 
homeland in Central Asia were again blocked127.  Henze believed in the importance of 
reaching these groups, and he remained content with the direction of the CIA’s covert book 
and publishing operations in the USSR, which had been ramped up at Brzezinski’s direction 
in the first two years of Carter’s presidency.  There was a feeling that efforts in this area 
had always been more advanced in Eastern Europe than in the USSR itself, but there was 
evidence that this was now changing.  Henze told Brzezinski in January of 1979, “CIA has 
just sent me…an extremely interesting report prepared on the book distribution program 
targeted at the Soviet Union.  It demonstrates that the Soviet program is maturing and 
showing increase of effectiveness in depth”.  Henze went on, crowing that the, “principal 
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theme is the way in which responses from the Soviet Program are beginning to exhibit the 
same patterns as the East European program did at an earlier period in its development.  
The report provides encouraging evidence of the sophistication and refinement of this 
program and demonstrates that we have here an undertaking on which we can build and 
expand almost indefinitely”.   
Nevertheless, he felt there was more budgetary trouble brewing, and he feared that the CIA 
director was beginning to wilt under pressure from OMB, a development which he felt would 
severely undercut the ideological dimension of US Soviet policy. “In the light of this highly 
positive report, it is distressing, as I mentioned to you in a recent Evening Report, to discover 
that Turner has accepted OMB’s unimaginative dictum on this program—ruling out any 
further expansion in 1980 or beyond.  A program such as this contributes as much to our 
national defence as any of our weaponry - besides which its costs are chicken feed”128, 
Henze warned Brzezinski.  Despite Henze’s efforts now beginning to pay off, he remained 
apprehensive that his labours would all be in vain without the requisite funding needed to 
successfully reach the nationality groups of the Soviet Union.  Henze was mistrustful of 
OMB’s intentions and the prospects of the continued level of financing required for his 
schemes beyond 1980, an issue he would continually raise with Brzezinski.  
Meanwhile, the State Department, Henze’s old sparring partner, also continued its 
intelligence-gathering program on the Soviet nationalities, although theirs was geared 
toward gaining a better understanding of ethnic issues within the USSR rather than to 
provoke unrest.  In January 1979, Foggy Bottom reached out to its diplomats stationed in 
the Soviet Union, informing them the “Department wishes to commend the reporting on 
Soviet nationality issues by embassy and constituent posts. At the same time, we wish to 
solicit Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev views in an effort to develop interagency-approved 
guidance for further reporting in this area”.  In particular, the State Department wanted its 
embassy staff to observe the growth of Great Russian nationalism and its impact on the 
other nationalities, any differences in attitude between the inhabitants of a single 
nationality, the impact of the Central Asian people in the Soviet Union, the extent to which 
religion promotes national identity, and the long-term prospects for Soviet leadership 
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control over the Soviet nationality issues129.  Embassy Moscow replied, suggesting further 
areas of study, such as demographic changes, language use and urban/rural nationality 
developments.  The Embassy informed Washington they would be supplementing their usual 
reporting on nationality issues that year with a series of follow-up reports which would take 
a deeper look at the situation “in light of new developments”130.  Regardless of the overall 
objective, there was now a growing interest in nationality issues inside the USSR, a topic 
which had been understudied for so long.  The changing tides of the US-Soviet relationship, 
the waning of détente, and a new-found focus on the abuses inherent in the Soviet system 
were proving opportunities to explore policy areas which had previously lay untouched.  
Over the course of 1979, Henze and the Nationalities Working Group increasingly trained 
their focus on the Muslim republics of Soviet Central Asia, a region they believed to be 
simmering with anger and resentment, perfectly primed to ignite.  The growing potential 
for ethnic unrest and instability in Central Asia was something these hard-liners felt the US 
government should be paying more attention to, and they began working towards that end, 
a project which would form the focal point of the NWG’s efforts throughout Carter’s 
remaining time in office.  With the Soviet Union being drawn toward the escalating situation 
in Afghanistan, and the United States monitoring the situation closely, interest in the nearby 
Central Asian Soviet republics within the US government notably increased.  As part of the 
NWG’s work to promote a greater understanding of the Soviet nationalities inside the US 
government, various academics were invited to take part in its meetings and seminars.  One 
such academic was Alexandre Bennigsen, a Russian-born and Paris-trained sociologist who 
was fascinated with Islam in the Russian empire and the Soviet Union, and who harboured 
long-standing notions that the Muslims of Central Asia would eventually rise up and cast-off 
Soviet imperialism.  Bennigsen taught at several top American universities, and together 
with like-minded scholars such as S Enders Wimbush of the RAND Corporation, Jeremy 
Azrael, and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, formed a cadre of academics who wrote 
prolifically on the Muslims of the Soviet Union, attracting the attention of officials inside 
the US government131.  These scholars were convinced that the Islamic regions of the USSR 
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were on the verge of revolt, and that the potent cocktail of nationalism and Islamic religious 
devotion would pose a very real danger to the unity of the Soviet Union in the near future132.   
 
There was a growing belief among Western observers that the Muslims of Central Asia posed 
a particularly thorny problem for Soviet rule, with the centuries old feelings of religious 
nationalism of the region viewed as fundamentally at odds with long-term communist rule.  
Likewise, there was a sense that Soviet claims of support for national liberation in the Third 
World were undermined by the repressive treatment of their own minorities at home, 
especially in the Islamic regions of the Soviet empire. Henze was a close associate of these 
scholars, and shared their long-standing interest in Central Asian affairs, having first started 
writing on the subject in the 1950s133.  He soon welcomed them into the fold of the 
Nationalities Working Group, where their ideas found a willing audience among certain 
policymakers who believed the relative stability of the détente era was coming to an end, 
and who were now searching for new ways to undermine the internal coherency of their 
Soviet adversary.   
 
The changing dynamics of the 1970s, the increased focus on the internal nature of the Soviet 
system, and a feeling that the Soviet Union was in the ascendency, allowed for more 
creativity in US Cold War strategy.  The ideas of Henze and Bennigsen, long viewed as 
outside of the mainstream, were now given a hearing at the very heart of the United States 
government.  Bennigsen and Azrael first started attending NWG meetings in 1978, and their 
papers on the Central Asian nationalities often formed the core of the discussion among the 
attendees.  Events taking place in Afghanistan merely served to heighten the interest in the 
region among US officials, as turmoil threatened to engulf the Soviet Union’s testy southern 
frontier.  A communist regime had come to power in Kabul in mid-1978 and was now engaged 
in a ferocious guerrilla warfare against local mujahideen forces, with the Soviets monitoring 
the situation intensely, and Washington looking on with interest. 
 
In February 1979, the CIA hosted an NWG dinner and discussion evening in order to explore 
the current status of nationalities issues inside the Soviet Union and to assess their policy 
implications for the US, with Henze, Azrael and Bennigsen all in attendance.  The questions 
for discussion which were issued to the attendees ahead of the meeting offer a note-worthy 
insight into the kind of nationalities questions which were animating US policymakers at the 
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time.  The meeting planned to address questions such as; how will the large disparities 
between the high birth rates and low industrial levels of development in Soviet Central Asia 
and the low birth rates and high levels of industrial development in the “European” republics 
of the Soviet Union affect future Soviet economic policy and performance?  How will Soviet 
military practices and capabilities be affected by the impending rapid increase in the 
proportion of Muslims in the armed forces?  What are the implications for Soviet domestic 
and foreign policy of the simultaneous and associated upsurge of nationalism among the 
Russian and non-Russian peoples of the USSR?  And what are the implications for US policy 
of these changes in the ethnic composition and configuration of the Soviet population?  
Papers circulated ahead of the event also give a glimpse into the potential role the Soviet 
nationalities could play in US strategy towards the USSR.  There was a view that the 
“changes that are occurring in the ethno-demographic and ethno-political orientation of the 
Soviet population could seriously complicate the lives of future Soviet policymakers.  
Although these changes of themselves will almost certainly not lead to a breakdown of the 
Soviet system, they could generate considerable within-system stress and hamper the 
further growth of Soviet power”134.   
 
The NWG believed the composition of the USSR was marked by a large and growing disparity 
between the birth rates of the Slavic and Baltic nationalities, and the nationalities from 
Central Asia and the Caucasus135.  As a result, by the 1980s the only sizable pool of workers 
would be in Central Asia, perhaps prompting the regime to “shift its centre of gravity 
eastwards” in order to maintain economic output, an undertaking that was fraught with 
difficulties and could lead to a dramatic decline in Soviet industrial output136.  This lack of 
manpower may also tempt the Soviets to cut back on their armed forces, or to face the 
prospect of their military overwhelmingly drawing from the Central Asian republics, with 
the potential for language and cultural barriers becoming engrained in the Soviet armed 
forces and a backlash from the Slavic troops.  From America’s point of view, these 
demographic changes could have serious consequences for Soviet power projection in the 
world and the USSR’s ability to prosecute an activist foreign policy in far-flung places, which 
in turn would have implications for US Soviet policy.  The NWG stressed, “although the 
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ethno-demographic and ethno-political pressures that it faces could lead the Kremlin to 
impose harsher restrictions at home and to tighten its grip on Eastern Europe, they could 
also conduce toward greater Soviet willingness to enter into balanced force reduction 
agreements and, more generally, toward a curtailment of Soviet “globalism” and the 
adoption of a lower Soviet profile in international affairs”.   
 
However, for these outcomes to be fully realised, US and Western policymakers may “have 
to apply - or be ready to apply - some of the leverage that it will inevitably acquire by virtue 
of the fact that the ethno-demographic and ethno-political pressures on the Soviet regime 
can to at least some extent be alleviated or exacerbated by Western actions”.137 These 
officials understood the importance of studying the internal nature of a regime and the 
societal forces at play within its system, believing these factors could play a key role in 
determining a state’s foreign policy decisions.  The thinking within the NWG was very much 
centred around the notion that ethnic demographic changes within the Soviet republics were 
going to have second and third order consequences for Soviet power abroad and stability at 
home.  Aside from harbouring any desire to see the US aggravate these tensions further from 
the outside, there was a belief among the NWG that it was important for American 
policymakers to gain an awareness of these internal Soviet developments in order to better 
understand the implications for Soviet foreign policy and US-Soviet relations moving 
forward.  
 
The dinner and discussion evening took place on the 22 February 1979, and the following 
week Stansfield Turner, the Director of Central Intelligence, followed up with some musings 
to the Coordinator of Academic Relations at the National Foreign Assessment Center (NFAC), 
calling the dinner “stimulating and very helpful”.  At the event, Bennigsen discussed the 
need for the US government to engage in the translating and interpreting journals and 
newspapers published in the Muslim areas of the Soviet Union, making the point that it was 
necessary to get local journals rather than republic level ones in order to really get a sense 
of the differing opinions and brewing disputes within the region.  Turner felt this was an 
excellent suggestion and urged further exploration into the role these journals could play 
in “acquiring, translating and disseminating this kind of intelligence”.   
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He shared a further report from the meeting which stated, “the Soviet Muslims enjoy a great 
degree of de facto national and cultural independence and the native languages are used in 
government, educational and business organisations.  A large number of books, magazines, 
journals, and newspapers are published in the minority languages.  These publications 
represent the best open source for understanding Soviet policy, strategy, and tactics toward 
independent Muslim nations.  The topics of Soviet foreign policy toward these countries, 
and the role of Muslim minorities in the “eventual liberation” of related ethnic groups across 
the border are prominently featured in the minority press; much more than the central 
Russian language press ever publishes”.   
 
With tensions rising in Afghanistan, and the Soviet leadership deliberating their strategy, 
there were fears of more Soviet incursions into Muslim areas, perhaps using their own Soviet 
Muslim population as a spearhead for penetration and subversion of further Islamic 
territories.  However, Turner felt, “I almost got the impression from our dinner conversation 
that the Soviets may be wary of annexing more Muslim populations, considering the 
problems they’re having of absorbing those which they currently have”138.  The Muslims of 
Central Asia were seen as a latent force for disruption within the Soviet Union, and certainly 
a group which the US government should continue to gather intelligence on in an attempt 
to understand future Soviet foreign policy activities around the world.  
 
Growing tension with Moscow 
 
By spring 1979, with summit talks on the proposed SALT-II agreement with the Soviets on 
the horizon, the Carter administration became aware of considerable turmoil inside the 
Soviet leadership, as various factions jostled for prime position to replace Brezhnev when 
the time came.  The Soviet leader retained a firm grip on power, despite his increasing 
frailty and diminishing capacity to work, but below the Soviet leader lay growing agitation 
among his fellow Politburo members.  In March, the CIA informed Brzezinski that, 
“Brezhnev’s prestige…is at an all-time high, evidently unaffected by his ebbing capacity for 
sustained work”, yet there also was “the conditions for increased political jockeying among 
the leaders who will be instrumental in determining the outcome of the political 
succession… The stage may be set, therefore, for a drama of major conflict among the 
leading contenders for power and a possible leadership upheaval both before and after 
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Brezhnev’s demise”139.  The administration was eager for a clear picture going into SALT 
negotiations, which were of vital importance to the president and something he wished to 
go smoothly. Nevertheless, despite his eagerness to secure an agreement on arms limitations 
with Soviets, by this time Carter and his administration were holding a very firm line with 
Moscow.  As Barbara Zanchetta says, “by the time of the Vienna summit in mid-1979 the 
Carter administration had definitely taken a different line of action compared to the 
proclaimed when entering office… By Carter’s mid-term there were no more doubts in 
Washington that US-Soviet relations were dominated by geopolitical competition.  At the 
same time, the priority given to the signing of SALT-II confirmed that continued cooperation 
in the limitation of nuclear arms was still a vital necessity.  Once again, competition and 
cooperation characterised America’s complex Soviet policy”140. 
 
As the White House grappled with the Kremlin’s courtyard rivalries, Henze remained fixated 
on the inner workings of the Soviet system and improving American attempts to reach the 
restless nationalities there.  In March, he again informed Brzezinski of the continued 
effectiveness of the CIA’s covert book and periodical program inside the Soviet Union, with 
a new status report “providing striking evidence of the effectiveness of this program”, and 
demonstrating, “that the program has made highly productive use of the extra funds which 
you directed be allocated to it nearly two years ago”.  However, Henze once again believed 
the endeavour was in danger of being severely hampered due to looming budget cuts, telling 
his boss, “the report reveals, however, that the program is being curtailed in FY (financial 
year) 1980, by cancelling an increase of $1.5 million which was originally planned.  Levelling 
off (actually slightly reducing) a program such as this after it has gained momentum from 
expansion is especially unwise and not cost-effective…I do not believe we should let this 
excellent program “plateau off”.  Funds added to it are among the most 
productive CIA spends for covert action.  In fact, this program constitutes a large part of 
what is left of CIA’s covert action program and they constitute most of what we are doing 
against our highest-priority target—Eastern Europe and the USSR”.  Henze guarded his work 
jealously, always fearing the axe was about to fall on his mission to reach the nationalities 
of the Soviet Union.  There is a sense that his entire project was never fully accepted as an 
integral part of the administration’s Soviet strategy and may not even have continued were 
it not for his persistent prodding.  Brzezinski forwarded a memo to Turner at the CIA, 
requesting that funding be found to continue the project, commenting tersely “the Soviet 
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Union and Eastern Europe are our highest-priority targets for sustained covert action impact.  
Money to permit continued expansion of this entire program during FY 1980 should be found 
through reprogramming”.   
 
In his April reply, Turner informed Brzezinski that the CIA would, “remain alert to the 
possibility of reprogramming to provide additional funds”, but as things stood, “Fiscal Year 
1980 is a very austere budget and, at this point in time, we cannot identify funds available 
for such reprogramming”141.  By April, there had been no positive developments in the 
search for increased funding for Henze’s cherished book distribution program targeting the 
nationalities inside the USSR, as he forlornly informed Brzezinski that their efforts to push 
for additional funding had “to be chalked up as a failure” for now.  Henze believed that 
growing personal animosity between Brzezinski and the CIA director was to blame for the 
setback, continuing “my own sources at the Agency indicate that funds are not really this 
tight… but Turner has made this an issue on which he is unwilling to give in to you.  I am 
told that further effort to press him on this now will probably only solidify his position—so 
the advice is to press during the summer for allocation of FY-year-end funds… I see no 
alternative but to content ourselves with this for now—since cuts now contemplated do not 
start until 1 October”142.  However, for Henze the budgetary battle was far from over.  
 
The successful conclusion of the SALT-II treaty in June provided détente with one final fig 
leaf, the Vienna agreement proving the last gasp of an era which was fast nearing an end.  
The administration continued to monitor the level of dissident activity within the USSR over 
the course of the year, growing tensions with the USSR highlighting the need to fully 
understand the internal forces within the Soviet Union.  The proposed opening of a US 
consulate in Kiev would potentially help with this operation, opening a window onto Ukraine 
for the US government.  Yet exhaustive negotiations with the Soviets over a reciprocal 
agreement which would see the USSR open a consulate in New York had dragged on since 
the Nixon presidency.  The previous December, Senator Charles Mathias of Maryland had 
taken an official fact-finding trip to the USSR and visited the site of the proposed consulate 
in Kiev.  In spring 1979, Mathias had informed his friend Odom that there remained a lot of 
work to be done in order to ready the Kiev building, remarking, “legitimate questions can 
be raised about the size of this building and, indeed, about the whole manner in which this 
                                                        
141 Henze to Brzezinski, “CIA’s Book and Periodical Distribution Program for Eastern Europe and 
USSR”, March 15, 1979, National Security Affairs, Volume XX, Eastern Europe 1977-1980, FRUS, 
1977-1980 
142 Memo Henze to Brzezinski, “Soviet/EE Book Programs”, April 24, 1979, National Security Affairs, 
Volume XX, Eastern Europe 1977-1980, FRUS, 1977-1980 
67 
 
enterprise has been handled, although there is no question that a consulate in Kiev is a good 
idea…I do not believe that our government has been as firm with the Soviets as we could 
have been or should have been”143.  
 
These findings merely added to the gloomy image Odom held of the current state of US-
Soviet relations by the summer of 1979, telling Brzezinski he felt the intelligence reports on 
Soviet foreign activity painted a disturbing picture, in which an internally troubled USSR 
would continue to create problems around the world.  Odom felt that the Kremlin was facing 
all manner of problems as the 1970s drew to a conclusion, “the present Soviet political 
system, “Brezhnevism”, is distinguished by domestic policy immobilism, bureaucratic 
entropy, and “resistance” groups”, yet, “Brezhnevism is also distinguished for its foreign 
policy mobilism, tactical agility, and new confidence based on its growing military power”.  
However, “the USSR cannot be a status quo power because the centrifugal forces of 
nationalism besiege the leadership, putting it into a dynamic relationship with its national 
minorities in particular and its neighbours and the world in general144”.   
 
It was these “centrifugal forces of nationalism” which continued to draw the attention of 
hardliners within the Carter administration, who were becoming more and more convinced 
that the Soviet house of cards was built on a very weak foundation, and that the age-old 
forces of nationalism were waiting to break through the cracks.  Ominously, there was also 
a growing feeling within the US intelligence community that the Soviets may intervene in 
Afghanistan on the side of the embryonic communist regime in Kabul. The regime was 
besieged by insurgents, but at that time the CIA felt it did “not yet face a security situation 
that might prompt a request to Moscow for the direct intervention of Soviet forces, but such 
an appeal is conceivable over the next 12 months.  The Soviets have an important stake in 
Afghanistan”.  Nevertheless, the CIA believed, “the USSR might consider other options short 
of dispatching combat units to protect its interests in specific contingencies…If serious 
fighting broke out in areas adjoining the Soviet border, Soviet leaders might decide to 
provide increased numbers of tactical ground support aircraft, helicopter gunships, pilots, 
and advisers on the ground to assist Kabul”, but, “Soviet leaders also would have to weigh 
the regional and international political costs of direct intervention”145.  With the growing 
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conflict on the Soviet Union’s doorstep, US officials became even more convinced that 
Central Asia would play a pivotal role in the future of the Soviet empire. 
 
Henze longed to see US radio broadcasting to the Soviet Union diversify its content to include 
more languages from Soviet Central Asia, and his focus soon fell on Azeri, the language of 
the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic, which he felt lay at a strategic crossroads in Central 
Asia vital to US interests.  In March, the head of the International Communication Agency 
John Reinhardt had written to Brzezinski outlining a host of new plans to increase Voice of 
America transmissions to the Soviet regions and introduce new languages such as Azeri and 
Ukrainian146.  With Brzezinski caught up with the SALT-II negotiations at the time, Henze 
replied on his behalf in June, telling Reinhardt, “we find your recommendations for 
technical expansion of VOA during the 1980’s reasonable and justified in terms of basic 
foreign policy priorities.  We endorse them fully.  We would like to see you incorporate 
these plans in your budget projections for FY 1981 and beyond…On language priorities, we 
welcome your plans for further expansion of the Persian service which you have recently 
inaugurated.  Attention should be given to the need to adjust broadcasting hours to improve 
prospects of attracting an optimum audience in Afghanistan and Soviet Central Asia as well 
as in Iran itself.  In respect to new languages, we concur in the priority of Azeri”147.  In 
August, Henze followed up, the “priority is Azeri, but it is being put off until 1981 because 
of budgetary stringency.  Cost of adding Azeri (with impact in both Iran and USSR) is 
$250,000 per year…In light of what we know the Soviets are doing in the area immediately 
to the south of their borders, we seem to be going at expanding our own impact in a very 
leisurely way.  If all we need is $250,000 to start Azeri, it seems to me it would be very 
much in our national interest to do it… At some point, it seems to me, we need to make the 
effort to get a little more zip and pep into this whole effort”148.   
 
Henze also became embroiled in a Transatlantic furore, as he reacted furiously to news that 
the British planned to make stringent cuts to the BBC’s external broadcasting budget.  On 
election as Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher had earmarked a 10%-25% cut in British 
government expenditure across the board, which would potentially lead to a significant 
diminution in international broadcasting.  The BBC approached the US embassy in London 
for US government support against the cuts, and it was felt the US ambassador should make 
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it clear to the British how detrimental the cuts would affect Western public diplomacy 
efforts at counteracting Soviet propaganda in the Third World149.  Henze grumbled, “the 
issue is serious.  BBC’s prestige around the world is enormous and serves our common cause 
well, not simply British interests”.  He told David Aaron, the assistant national security 
adviser, that the BBC was counteracting Soviet radio broadcasting in sensitive regions, 
“there is a great cry being raised in many quarters” at the prospect of the cuts, he 
moaned150.  Henze had faced internal resistance for most of his time in the White House, 
his efforts to redirect US foreign policy towards the internal ethnic weaknesses of the USSR 
mired in bureaucratic and budgetary battles, and it was beginning to wear him down. 
 
The autumn of 1979 was a dark period for Jimmy Carter and his administration, as 52 
Americans were seized as hostages in Iran after the US embassy was breached by armed 
protesters, and the Soviet Union launched an invasion of Afghanistan which sent seismic 
shocks around the world.  In the lead up to the invasion, the Soviet Union had launched an 
internal policy review in December, with Ambassador Dobrynin returning to Moscow to assist 
in the analysis of the Soviet relationship with the US.  Vance’s special adviser on Soviet 
affairs Marshall Shulman informed the secretary of state, “the Soviets are concerned that 
US-Soviet relations are moving inexorably toward a continuing downslide, in which the whole 
range of our cooperative activities, including arms control, would come into question”151.   
A few weeks later, it became apparent that an entirely new dimension of the fraying US-
Soviet relationship was about to open up, as Moscow took the fateful decision to send the 
Soviet 40th Army into Afghanistan, with Marshall Brement of the NSC informing Aaron and 
Brzezinski, “it is hard to exaggerate the importance of what the Soviets are now poised to 
do in Afghanistan. Essentially, they seem to have made a decision to risk whatever is 
necessary, including major involvement in armed combat, to maintain a Communist 
government in Kabul”152.  The White House wished to remain firm in the face of this Soviet 
aggression, yet of initial concern to the administration was the ratification of SALT-II, which 
had been agreed with the Soviets earlier that year. Despite frostiness of US-Soviet relations 
and the almost complete collapse of détente, Carter believed it to be in the American 
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interest to defending the SALT-II Treaty even after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan153.  
This was one of Carter’s signature foreign policy achievements and he remained keen to 
preserve it.  
 
Over the course of December, the administration had actually bolstered its efforts to reach 
the Muslim nationalities of the Soviet Union.  At a high-level SCC meeting on December 11, 
proposals to improve broadcasting to Muslims were considered by those in attendance, and 
both the urgency of the matter and Carter’s own direct concern with the issue were 
highlighted.  There was an admission that over the previous year some serious deficiencies 
had held the program back, and efforts to correct these deficiencies had moved too slowly, 
especially with regards to including Azeri language broadcasts.  Brzezinski also stressed 
Radio Liberty’s “enormous potential for impact on the 50 million Soviet Muslims and 
the meagre resources which had been applied to this task to date”.  Indeed only 46 people, 
including secretaries and researchers, were working on RL’s project for reaching the Soviet 
nationalities, and providing for only three and a half hours per week of original programming 
in 7 languages.  Brzezinski conceded that an expansion of this project would not be as easy 
as it was for East European languages or for Russian but believed, “initial exploratory work 
left him confident that people for broadcasting staffs could be found, researchers hired and 
trained and available research materials much more effectively exploited”.  The group 
unanimously decided to take steps to improve the content of broadcasts to the Soviet 
Central Asian republics, with broadcasts in Uzbek, Tatar, Kazakh, Azeri, Tajik, Turkmen and 
Kirgiz all being endorsed154.   
 
Following this meeting, Brzezinski urged Reinhardt, “ICA should review all of its available 
assets—specialized publication material, speaker projects, library programs, and the Voice 
of America’s broadcast activity—with a view to adapting these to the objective of 
communicating the commonality of values, spiritual and secular, which link our society with 
those of the Moslem world… As I have stressed in previous memoranda, your efforts should 
include information about Soviet treatment of Islam and the situation of Muslims in the 
Soviet Union. Crude comparisons between Soviet and American practices should, of course, 
be avoided, since the two situations are not analogous.  It is the fundamental approach and 
attitude to Islamic values—as well as active Soviet oppression of them—which need to be 
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stressed”. 155 However, OMB continued to put the brakes on these efforts by withholding 
money from RFE/RL, with a frustrated Henze again bringing the matter to Brzezinski’s 
attention.  Henze believed all agencies were on board with the new outreach to the Muslims 
of the Soviet Union, but that OMB was “dragging its feet”156.  Brzezinski in turn appealed to 
Walter Mondale and urged him to personally intervene, believing the vice president to be a 
supporter of the broadcasting program and requesting money be released “to improve the 
content and depth of Radio Liberty broadcasts in Uzbek, Tatar, Kazakh, Azeri, Tajik, 
Turkmen and Kirgiz”, stating, “recent developments in Afghanistan have underscored the 
importance of moving rapidly” on this matter157.  
 
“Are we doing enough?” 
 
As the clock ticked down on Jimmy Carter’s time in the White House, US-Soviet relations 
were marked by a tension and hostility virtually unknown over the previous decade, and US 
foreign policy faced a diverse and volatile set of challenges as the new decade dawned.  
Carter didn’t shy away from these challenges, telling Congress, “we face some of the most 
serious challenges in the history of this nation”.  Carter identified the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan as a threat to global stability, and the ongoing hostage crisis in Iran as an 
“affront to civilised people everywhere”.  But the president continued to strike an idealistic 
tone, “it always has been the essence of America that we want to move on – we understand 
that prosperity, progress, and most of all peace cannot be had by standing still”158.  In 
response to the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan, the Carter administration had taken a 
series of measures directed at the Soviets, including a call for a boycott of the 1980 Moscow 
Olympics, a delay in the ratification of the SALT-II treaty in the Senate, the recall of US 
ambassador to the Soviet Union, a suspension of the opening of the new US consulate in 
Kiev, and an urgent stepping up of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty broadcasts into 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union159. Despite the apparent strength of the Soviet 
juggernaut, US intelligence continued to report a slowing of the Soviet economy, with 1980 
shaping up to be a “year of growth far short of rates envisioned in the original 1976-80 plan, 
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with fuel shortages and farm output hampering economic growth160.  While Carter and his 
administration remained hopeful of a second term, all the energy appeared to be on the 
right of the political spectrum, as Ronald Reagan launched his campaign to become 
president.  Reagan was relentless in his criticism of détente and the direction of US foreign 
policy under Carter, but during 1980 the administration continued on a path of stiffening 
resolve toward Soviet belligerence.  
 
Nevertheless, as the year wore on Paul Henze brooded, lamenting missed opportunities.  As 
the Carter administration moved through what proved to be its final year, the battle-weary 
Cold Warrior remained unbowed yet carrying a slight sense of despondency as he looked 
back upon the previous few years.  As the Soviet nationalities specialist on the NSC he had 
had the full backing of Carter’s national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, who shared 
Henze’s hawkish enthusiasm for exploiting ethnic tension inside the Soviet Union as part of 
US Cold War strategy.  Yet by mid 1980 he felt frustrated, his efforts bogged down in 
bureaucratic infighting, budgetary disputes, and strategic disagreements.  Henze had 
become a driving force within the administration for a more aggressive posture towards the 
Soviets, a posture which included paying closer attention to internal developments within 
the USSR and assessing whether there was scope for US policy to affect these developments 
in any way.  But as Carter moved towards the end of his presidency, and criticism of his 
foreign policy escalated, these ideas still remained largely outside the mainstream of 
foreign policy thinking and somewhat controversial inside the US policymaking 
establishment.  
 
Henze’s attempts to expand the American reach to the Soviet republics were also being 
stifled by budget battles and red tape.  Brzezinski’s pleas to Mondale for assistance had 
come to nothing, and Henze could feel his frustration building, “does the administration 
really mean what it says?”, he griped to Brzezinski in January 1980, “one month ago 
today the SCC endorsed proposals for expanding broadcasting to Muslims and the President 
approved these actions two days later.  Radio Liberty still hasn’t received a penny of the 
money needed to do the job.  OMB’s bookkeepers pinch pennies, question the intent of 
the SCC actions and think up reasons why the money shouldn’t be provided”.  For Henze, 
radio broadcasting lay at the heart of his plans for reaching the Soviet nationalities, for 
provoking them into increased demands for autonomy and thus agitate the Soviet 
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authorities.  He felt he had staked his entire time in the White House on making this a 
success, and he knew his direct boss on the NSC also believed in the validity of the project.  
Henze told Brzezinski that their credibility was suffering as a result of the ongoing funding 
debacle, and he was beginning to doubt the viability of the whole venture.   
 
In particular, efforts in Central Asia had reached a “pitifully limited output now because 
Soviet Muslim broadcasting has been kept on a starvation diet for years”, despite there 
being “enormous potential for expansion” with “RL’s motley team of (mostly aging) Tatars, 
Uzbeks, Azerbaijanis, Kazakhs, Tadzhiks, Turkmen and Kirgiz motivated as they have never 
been before”.  In a recent verbal spat, Henze had informed OMB “for the umpteenth 
time…that all radio broadcasting had been short-changed for years and everything needed 
to be expanded”.  Henze was now downcast at the entire direction of the administration, 
delivering a damning verdict to Brzezinski, “the Administration’s program for expanding 
radio broadcasting will soon be exposed as hollow rhetoric unless ample funds are assured… 
One of the most serious shortcomings of this Administration, when it is able to formulate 
good ideas and take decisions, has been its incapacity to perform, to implement, to carry 
out what it says it wants done.  We seem to have another striking instance of it in the 
broadcasting field”161.  
 
The ongoing hostage crisis in Iran was damaging morale inside the White House, and in the 
country at large.  The feeling of powerlessness only intensified when an attempt to rescue 
the hostages ended in disaster, a further example of the “collapse of US power and 
prestige”162.  Despite the chaotic international environment, the Carter administration was 
showing real assertiveness towards the Soviets by 1980, but the feeling of drift was even 
evident among the anti-Soviet hawks, and hard-liners like Henze were becoming 
exasperated. This feeling was encapsulated in a memo which Henze fired off to Brzezinski 
in April, entitled, “Dissidence in Eastern Europe and the USSR – Are We Doing Enough?”.  The 
memo served as an outline of their achievements in aiding and promoting dissidence in the 
Soviet sphere over the previous few years and offering suggestions on how they could move 
things forward.  Leading with the claim that, “on the demonstrative and declarative level 
the record of the Carter Administration is second to none in the past fifteen years”, Henze 
praised Carter for his public championing and identification with the cause of many high-
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profile dissidents inside the Soviet Union, his successful exchange of dissidents for Soviet 
spies, and the publicity Carter’s human rights policies had garnered for the dissidents 
languishing behind the Iron Curtain.  However, Henze highlighted the difficulties the 
administration had faced in transferring the rhetoric and public support of human rights into 
concrete policy, and the lack of funding which had aggravated this problem, telling 
Brzezinski the “allocation of resources—both manpower and money—to programs 
encouraging dissidence and serving the needs of dissidence has not been proportionate to 
the high level of attention the Administration has given this field in statements and 
demonstrative actions…No new operational instrumentalities have been created for 
implementing human rights policies, sustaining research effort and channelling and 
coordinating human rights initiatives on a self-propelled basis”.   
 
Henze turned to his own pet project, attempts to reach the Soviet nationalities and promote 
national self-determination within the Soviet Union.  He went on, “our most valuable 
instruments for communication with Eastern Europe and the USSR are the big radios.  New 
investment in transmitters has not been matched by comparable investment in 
programming…manpower rejuvenation and expansion of programming and research support 
have continued to be postponed.  The effect is evident in decline in Radio Liberty 
listenership in the USSR.  New investment for programming improvement is urgently needed.  
This has been strikingly demonstrated as we have taken up the question of broadcasting in 
Muslim languages, where Radio Liberty’s current level of performance is only a fraction of 
its potential”.  Henze reported that he was pleased with the increased funding and 
distribution of the book and periodical program in the Soviet Union, and he made the case 
that the US should always be looking for new opportunities to exploit Soviet weaknesses, as 
demonstrated by the, “realization of the importance of Islam, national self-assertion among 
the Muslim peoples of the USSR (as well as Christian peoples such as the Balts, Ukrainians 
and Georgians) and the ferment and feedback generated by events in Iran and the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan, are developments which have highlighted new opportunities.  
Existing resources are inadequate to meet these opportunities”.   
 
Henze believed that the programs for exploiting dissidence in Eastern Europe and the USSR 
were the most cost-effective activity undertaken by the US government, and he called for 
an annual budgetary increase of 3-5% in order to make them even more effective, as well 
as the expansion and refinement of radio broadcasting into the Soviet empire.  He also 
wished to see an expansion of publication and distribution operations, believing even a 
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modest increment of funding would “enable existing publication and distribution projects 
to perform at a much higher level of efficiency”.  Likewise, a “tape-cassette distribution 
program should be developed to augment existing book and magazine programs; there is 
increasing evidence that cassettes are popular and effective in the Communist world”.  He 
identified nationality groups and areas which were currently poorly served by these 
programs as, “the Baltic States, especially the Lithuanians, the Ukrainians, and the 
Caucasus, including the Georgians, Armenians and Muslim peoples”.  And he also asked for 
more focus on religious affairs in the Soviet republics, stating “religion, and not only Islam, 
should be given higher priority for planning new operations…the potential of persistent 
Orthodox tradition in the Ukraine and among Russians as a focal point for anti-Communist 
nationalism (or nationalism that regards Communism as irrelevant) needs to be examined”.  
Brzezinski informed Henze it was a “good memo” and instructed him to consider ways in 
which his suggestions could be implemented163.  
 
Despite Henze’s pessimism, hard-line groups within the administration maintained an 
interest in the internal nature of the Soviet regime right throughout 1980, with interest in 
the Muslim areas of the Soviet empire heightening after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.  
The Nationalities Working Group continued to meet during the final months of the Carter 
presidency, always probing for new ways to exploit Soviet vulnerabilities.  The Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan had provided the US with a stern test, but for Henze the 
development could lead to opportunity in the form of increased ferment among the Soviet 
Union’s own Muslim populations.  In April 1980, he told a meeting of the Nationalities 
Working Group that Brzezinski “obviously wants us to stir up what actions we can”164.  There 
was a growing belief that the nationalities were becoming an important front of resistance 
to the Soviet authorities.   
 
As relations between the US and the USSR became more strained over the course of 1980, 
the Kremlin moved to intensify its campaign against dissidents inside the Soviet Union.  The 
focus of this campaign was on the human rights activists of the Helsinki network, with 
famous dissident Andrei Sakharov being exiled to Gorky, removing one of the most outspoken 
leaders of the Soviet human rights movement, and dozens of other activists being arrested 
and imprisoned.  The US embassy reported that the dissidents were becoming disheartened 
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and less optimistic that the movement would be able to continue in its current form.  The 
embassy also reported “the current climate of cynicism and apathy among students has 
resulted in fewer young people being drawn to the dissidents.  Those who do become 
activists are attracted to the nationalist and religious dissident movements, which 
apparently have a broader base than does dissent over human rights…the human rights 
movement has lost much of its sense of purpose and is being forced into a period of relative 
inactivity”165.   
 
This growing nationalist dissidence continued to provide a relatively untapped source of 
instability for the Soviet government, one which the NWG was determined to explore 
further.  An in-depth report entitled “Muslims in the Soviet Union” had been produced by 
the FNAC that year, which examined the current status of the Muslim minorities in the USSR, 
demographic trends, and prospects for the future.  The report stated, “for decades Soviet 
leaders have tried with little success to foster the assimilation of the Muslims into the 
dominant Slavic culture.  Tension between Muslims and Slavs persists and may increase as 
Muslims, because of the growth in their numbers relative to Slavs, necessarily become more 
involved in industry and defense”.  However, “religious consciousness (as opposed to 
cultural consciousness) is relatively low among Soviet Muslims, and the tide of religious 
fundamentalism washing over the Muslim world has had little impact in the USSR”.   
 
The report went on, “Soviet officials have displayed little overt concern that the unrest 
among the Islamic nations along its southern border might spill over into the Soviet Union, 
however some Soviet diplomats have attempted to justify the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
by alluding to such concern.  Considering their self-serving nature, such comments have 
little credibility”.  The report admitted there was no evidence of a pan-Muslim movement 
or network of Muslim dissidents in the USSR, and that the “vast array of Soviet power stands 
ready to smite any Soviet Muslims who get too far out of line”.  Nevertheless, “Soviet 
nationalities’ policies have generally aimed at building a supranational socialist 
consciousness among all Soviet peoples”, but “have not worked anywhere as well as was 
hoped, and they have hardly made a dent in the ethnic consciousness of the Muslims…the 
large mass of unassimilated Muslims in the belly of the Soviet body politic is making Soviet 
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leaders increasingly uneasy. Like a large a growing but still benign tumour, it is not causing 
them any harm but neither, they fear, will it do them any good”166.   
 
Indeed, there was mounting evidence that Muslims in the Central Asian Soviet republics 
were picking up Iranian religious broadcasts, with the rise of Khomeini spurring an Islamic 
revival in Turkmenistan in particular.  RFE/RL reported on this spillover effect of Iranian 
broadcasting, claiming “a recent publication by the chief of propaganda and agitation in 
Central Asia’s republic of Turkmenistan reveals that…Iranian religious broadcasts were being 
heard by the population…and were helping to uphold Islamic traditions among the local 
population.  Moreover, tape recordings were made of these broadcasts by Turkmen mullahs 
and played before Muslims in other parts of the republic”167.  With this in mind, the 
Nationalities Working Group continued to look at options for exploiting these underlying 
tensions.  In June, Charles Walter, a member of the NWG, contacted Henze with information 
regarding efforts by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, an open source intelligence 
arm of the CIA, to improve its knowledge and expand its reach.  Walter informed Henze that 
the FBIS was expanding its “capability to exploit the media of the Muslim world and the 
nationality groups of the Soviet Union by recruiting additional personnel in the United States 
and abroad”.  The FBIS would be producing research files for monitoring statements by 
selected Muslim leaders, governments and parties.  These files would also include each of 
the Soviet republics and major topics related to nationalities issues168.  Even as the Carter 
presidency wound down, it is clear that a group of policymakers fully intended to keep the 





Over the summer 1980, the Carter administration began to watch events in Poland with 
increasing alarm as wide-spread strikes threatened to the destabilise the Polish communist 
regime, and the threat of Soviet military intervention grew stronger by the day. Poland was 
a key state in Eastern Europe and deserved close attention.  There was a feeling within the 
administration that the Soviets faced several various high-profile difficulties, curtailing their 
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options in Poland.  Steven Larrabee of the NSC informed Brzezinski, “the potential for unrest 
in Poland has always been fairly high, but it is accentuated now by the fact that the Soviets 
are particularly vulnerable”.  Larrabee believed Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, and the 
upcoming Olympic Games in Moscow and CSCE Conference in Madrid meant the Soviets hands 
were tied for now, but the administration should continue to “watch the situation 
closely”169.  Indeed, the growing unrest in Poland would become a bigger issue as 1980 wore 
on, and by December the administration genuinely feared that the Soviet tanks would roll 
into Warsaw.  The period also marked the 40th anniversary of the Soviet annexation of the 
Baltic states during World War II, and leaders of the Baltic American community were eager 
for Carter to clarify the US non-recognition policy towards these states, in light of US 
involvement in the Helsinki process which had ratified the existing borders of the post-war 
settlement170.  The Baltic situation agitated Henze, as did the continued lack of funding for 
his desired radio and propaganda programs, reporting to Brzezinski, “it is exactly six months 
today since the President approved the recommendations of the 11 December 1979 SCC on 
expanding broadcasting to Muslim audiences.  Not much has happened as a result.  VOA has 
expanded some of its broadcasts… With RFE/RL the picture is much worse. Not a penny has 
been allocated to expanding Muslim broadcasting staffs and no new transmitters have been 
leased or otherwise secured”.  Henze also revealed that the Board for International 
Broadcasting had ordered the relocation of all the Baltic services in Munich back to the US.  
Henze felt, “the Balts are going to be up in arms…A fine reward for the Balts in the 40th 
anniversary year of their takeover by the Soviets—move RL’s Baltic services back to the US”.   
 
For Henze, this all added up to even more frustration, “I despair of this Administration’s 
capacity to face up to these issues now.  We could hold another SCC—if you want to get out 
front.  Short of that, I plan simply to continue calling attention to the problem, pressing 
where we can to get something done, bit by bit.  But we can’t expect much from RFE/RL 
until they get some money and stop being harassed by BIB (Board for International 
Broadcasting) on tangential issues.  They have squeezed out what they can from presently 
available resources.  They have a whole list of good Central Asians, etc. ready to hire ... 
but instead they have to spend their time drawing up plans to move the Balts back to New 
York ...”171.  There was also more bad news regarding the CIA’s book and publication 
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program, with Henze telling Brzezinski his contacts at the CIA had informed him, “they had 
reached the end of the line in their efforts to persuade OMB to provide adequate funds to 
keep the book and publication program going in FY1981—OMB had simply turned them 
down… It is appalling—as we all know—that these excellent programs should have fallen into 
such jeopardy at a time like this”172.  
 
As the Carter administration entered its final months, there was reflection on the goals they 
had achieved, and plans made for a second term which would never transpire.  For 
hardliners such as Brzezinski, Odom and Henze there were mixed feelings.  In September 
1980, Odom crafted a meticulous appraisal of the administration’s foreign policy entitled, 
“East-West Relations: A Formula for U.S. Policy in 1981 and Beyond”.  Odom believed that 
East-West relations were moving from “Era I”, which consisted of “1945 to the mid-1970s 
(U.S. dominance and Pax Americana)” to “Era II”, which was still being defined and was 
dependent on how “Soviet power made itself felt”.  He believed US foreign policy was 
marked by three “fissures”; the political utility of military force, East-West versus North-
South primacy, and the growing incongruities between economic power and military security 
responsibilities.  For Odom, “these fissures prevent a foreign policy consensus on East-West 
relations and mean that in the 1970s, and perhaps into the 1980s, no U.S. policy toward 
the USSR can have broad and constant support…. The primary task for U.S. foreign and 
defence policy in the early 1980s, therefore, is to complete the transition to Era II peacefully 
and to give that era a definition and direction appropriate to changed realities”.   
 
Odom felt a return both to a period of US military preponderance or the détente era of the 
1970s were impossible, and the US must now “engage with the USSR competitively”.  Samuel 
Huntington had outlined four areas for this competitive engagement; the maintenance of 
military deterrence, the containment of Soviet expansion, offers of politically conditioned 
economic benefits, and the reduction of Soviet influence over client states, bloc states, and 
minority nationalities in the USSR.  For Odom, the nationalities problems of the Soviet Union 
were of the utmost importance moving forward, and he felt more work was needed in this 
area, telling Brzezinski, “it is time to reduce the spheres of Soviet influence, and the 
opportunities are large”, on nationalities and minorities inside the Soviet Union, “we can 
do more on the nationality question within the USSR.  The human rights policy is, of course, 
already a weapon in our arsenal.  In an age of nationalism, there is nothing permanent about 
Soviet “internationalism” and Soviet borders—something we can imply and encourage others 
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to say explicitly… “Resistance to Soviet internationalism” is encouraged wherever states 
and nations find it oppressive and unwanted”173.   
 
However, this was a blueprint which would have to be taken up by a different president.  
Carter lost his re-election bid in November 1980 against the conservative insurgent Ronald 
Reagan, who promised to deliver on all the promises Carter had made and not kept.  The 
incoming Reagan administration would adopt a highly confrontational posture towards the 
Soviet Union, with a determined focus on promoting internal change within the Soviet 
system itself.  Olaf Njolstad has expertly detailed the consistencies between the Carter and 
the Reagan administrations in their approach to the Soviet Union, arguing that in many 
respects the Reagan administration simply picked up where the Carter White House had left 
off, stating “in certain important policy areas - such as defence, containment of Soviet 
regional expansion, economic diplomacy and ideological warfare - the changes in US Cold 
War policy that were to characterise the first half of the 1980s really began, or had their 
roots, in the late Carter years”174.   
 
For Paul Henze, despite a frustrating end to his time on the NSC, along with Brzezinski he 
felt he had opened an avenue for US Cold War strategy which had been previously closed 
off to American policymakers; the exploitation of internal Soviet weaknesses, with a 
particular focus on the nationalities of the USSR.  In late 1980, he told Brzezinski that the 
most encouraging aspect of “this field during the past year has been the extent to which 
interest in nationalities in the USSR…has spread within and outside the government…Even if 
no further stimulus were given in the field from the NSC level, it is still difficult to envision 
a return to the condition of relative lethargy (and positive aversion in some quarters) that 
prevailed at the beginning of this administration”175.  This would prove to be an astute 
observation, as the incoming Reagan administration pushed US foreign policy further down 
the road of confrontation, intent on exploiting the internal weaknesses of the Soviet Union, 
and a new chapter of the Cold War began. 
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Promoting Change from Within 
 
 
Having initially been critical of the Helsinki accords and the human rights focus of Jimmy 
Carter’s presidency, Ronald Reagan began to see the importance of human rights to the 
moral renewal of American foreign policy as a method for clearly differentiating between 
the authoritarian nature of the Soviet bloc and the liberal democracy of the United States176.  
Reagan was a man of ideas, and at the heart of his foreign policy vision lay powerful beliefs 
about the importance of human freedom, and these ideas would form an important basis 
for the strategy his national security staff developed towards the Soviet system in the early 
days of the administration177.  His administration paid close attention to the internal nature 
of the Soviet regime and identified the oppression and resultant resentment of nationality 
groups as a weakness within the Soviet system.  If Jimmy Carter and Zbigniew Brzezinski 
had instigated a new phase in US Cold War strategy by shining the spotlight onto human 
rights abuses and the nationalities question inside the Soviet empire, then Reagan and his 
administration aimed not to merely continue these policies, but to amplify them further.   
 
Yet as the curtain fell on the 1970s and the decade drew to a close, the sense of US decline 
grew ever more palpable.  While the economy continued to stutter, a series of foreign policy 
disasters had left American standing on the world stage appearing ever more precarious, its 
self-assumed leadership role ever more uncertain.  The world watched as Soviet tanks rolled 
into Afghanistan in late 1979 while the US looked on helplessly, and as the Carter 
administration horrifically botched its attempt to end the Iran hostage crisis in 1980.  The 
United States was reeling and appeared rudderless, with the threat of an impending Soviet 
knockout blow appearing very real.  The malaise of the 1970s had assaulted the American 
character and damaged its international prestige and heightening Cold War tensions with 
the Soviet Union had thrust superpower rivalry back to the fore.  The American people had 
looked to Jimmy Carter for change in 1976 and now they turned to Ronald Reagan, drawn 
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to his sunny Californian conservatism and resolute belief that America’s best days were 
ahead of it.   
 
The former governor of California’s path to the White House was long and meandering, but 
along the way he had developed a deeply-felt set of core values and beliefs about the world, 
which he brought with him to Washington.  Foremost among these ideas was the simple 
belief that American fortunes would soon ascend, and it was actually the Soviet leadership 
in Moscow who should be more concerned about the direction of their country.  Reagan 
believed that communism was a spent force, that the weaknesses of the USSR’s economy 
were glaring, and that Soviet society was beset with a deep spiritual malady.  After sweeping 
Carter aside in the 1980 election, Reagan assembled a team of policymakers around him 
who shared these views, policymakers who looked across the Iron Curtain and saw an 
adversary which was struggling to contain the powerful and conflicting forces within its 
society; economic problems were emerging, the nationalities of the USSR were restless, 
dissidence was growing, and calls for greater autonomy within the Soviet republics were 
mounting.  Reagan officials immediately set about crafting policies to explore and exploit 
these weaknesses and promote changes inside the Soviet Union which would serve US 




Ronald Reagan instinctively believed that the Soviet Union wasn’t long for this world.  His 
confidence lay in his convictions about communism, which he had labelled a “disease” which 
mankind must survive.  “Communism is neither an economic or political system” Reagan 
said in 1975, “it is a form of insanity – a temporary aberration which will one day disappear 
from the earth because it is contrary to human nature”178.   Reagan had developed his views 
of communism over the course of many decades, as his life took various twists and turns.   
Originally an FDR and Truman Democrat and firm supporter of the New Deal, Reagan began 
to move to the right over the course of the early Cold War years.  As an actor in Hollywood 
during the 1940’s and 1950’s he first encountered communism, and while serving as the 
president of the Screen Actors Guild he was horrified by the growing influence of communist 
radicals in the movie industry.  As his acting work dried up, he gained employment with 
General Electric (GE), for whom he travelled across America giving motivational speeches 
to thousands of the company’s employees.  During these lengthy journeys, Reagan embarked 
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on a period of deep reading, reflection, and self-education, which helped crystallise his 
ideas on the virtues of free market economics and limited government, and the abject evils 
of communism179.  As the embodiment of this ideology, Reagan viewed the Soviet Union as 
an anomaly in human history, and a very dangerous anomaly.  As far back as 1962, Reagan 
described Soviet communism as “a single world-wide force dedicated to the destruction of 
our free enterprise system and the creation of a world socialist state”.  On assuming the 
presidency, these views remained in place, and indeed had only hardened over the decades.  
At his first press conference as president Reagan declared, “I know of no leader of the Soviet 
Union since the revolution, and including the present leadership, that has not repeated… 
their determination that their goal must be the promotion of world revolution and a one-
world socialist or communist state”180. 
 
Allied to his aversion to communism and suspicion of Soviet intentions, Reagan also held a 
profound belief in the American future and the eventual triumph of its values, which he 
deemed to be universal.  His belief in the inherent goodness and potential of America was 
utterly unshakeable.  He believed in a system of government which enshrined individual 
freedom, human dignity, and the creativity of the free market.  He was also deeply religious, 
having been raised in his mother’s Disciples of Christ church in Illinois and embraced 
evangelicalism in adulthood, all of which implanted within him a missionary impulse and 
the penchant for seeing the world in terms of “good” and “evil”181.  For Ronald Reagan, the 
Cold War was a spiritual conflict.  Behind the simmering geopolitical tensions, the escalating 
arms race, and the Third World flashpoints, there lay a deeper battle between good and 
evil, God and the godless.  For Reagan, there was absolutely no doubt about which side 
would eventually triumph in this epic struggle.  Reagan had identified the atheism of the 
Soviet Union as a key weakness in the communist system, going as far as to declare religion 
the ‘Achilles heel’ of the Soviet Union, much as Brzezinski had characterised internal ethnic 
nationalism in the same way182.  This religious faith fused with a deeply held conviction that 
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America had a special mission in the world, to spread democracy and free market 
capitalism, and to liberate oppressed people everywhere183.  These ideas shaped Reagan’s 
worldview.  As David Foglesong states, these beliefs “would underpin his approach to the 
Soviet Union, including faith that God had a plan for him and for the world, a belief in the 
ultimate triumph of good over evil, and a conviction that America was preordained to carry 
the torch of freedom in the world”184.  It was a potent set of beliefs.  
 
Despite his eternal optimism, Reagan believed America had lost its way in recent times and 
was currently suffering from an infirmity which was doing much harm to the nation’s 
standing in the world, allowing the USSR to steal a march on them.  He was eager for a 
course correction.  Reagan believed the US had been negotiating with the Soviets from a 
position of weakness, allowing their rival to bully America during arms control negotiations 
and embark on a more adventurist approach in the Third World.  Nevertheless, alongside 
these views Reagan also held a genuine proclivity for a more peaceful word, he had no desire 
for military confrontation and utterly abhorred nuclear weapons and longed for their 
complete elimination.  Reagan resolved his conflicting impulses through the doctrine of 
“peace through strength”, the belief that America needed to rejuvenate its military and 
diplomacy in order to foster and guarantee a more peaceful world order.  As James Graham 
Wilson explains, “Reagan was torn between a “crusade for freedom” and “peace through 
strength”.  A “crusade for freedom” aimed to cast the Cold War struggle in terms of moral 
clarity… “Peace through strength”, for its part, meant restoring America’s strength, 
irrespective of changes to the Soviet system”185.   
 
Reagan wished to see the end of communism and the spread of American values, but 
regardless of his sharp criticism of the Soviets Union and his acerbic rhetoric, he remained 
very reluctant to actually employ military force and remained in favour of arms reductions 
as a way of de-escalating tensions. He was eager to reach out to Soviet leaders such as 
Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko, keen to establish a rapport from the very earliest days 
of his administration, despite the hardliners around him being aghast at these overtures186.  
Reagan aimed not for the overthrow of the Soviet Union, but for the peaceful evolution of 
its system into something less menacing, and his administration was guided by this 
principle187.  When asked by an aide in 1980 why he was running for president Reagan 
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replied, “to end the Cold War.” I am not sure how, he declared, “but there has to be a 
way”. 188   
 
Reagan was a complicated man: upbeat, immensely likeable, congenial and warm, yet 
somewhat guarded, remote, and reluctant to allow anyone into his inner world189.  His 
managerial style was decidedly hands-off, and his staff were often only given vague 
instructions.  He has also been criticised, both then and now, for lacking strategic insights 
and a sophisticated view of the outside world.  Indeed, at the beginning of the 1980s, many 
in America’s foreign policy establishment viewed him as something of an intellectual 
lightweight.  This image has been challenged by historians such as John Lewis Gaddis, Will 
Inboden and Hal Brands, who have recently pushed back against this view, arguing that 
Reagan possessed sharp strategic instincts and a coherent agenda for implementing them190.   
While Reagan was clearly disinterested in the minutiae of policymaking, Hal Brands claims, 
“Reagan was actually well-equipped for the challenges he faced.  The president had good 
strategic instincts, in that he possessed an intuitive ability to get to the heart of difficult 
issues, and a keen sense of how individual policies related to broader designs… He also had 
the confidence to think big – to challenge prevailing orthodoxies and chart potentially 
ground-breaking courses of action”191.   No less than Henry Kissinger, who had a strained 
relationship with the president following Reagan’s withering critiques of détente during the 
1970s, asserted “Reagan put forward a foreign policy doctrine of great coherence and 
considerable intellectual power.  He possessed an extraordinary intuitive rapport with the 
wellsprings of American motivation.  At the same time, he understood the essential 
brittleness of the Soviet system, a perception which ran contrary to most expert opinion, 
even in his own conservative camp”192.  Years later, Gorbachev himself described Reagan as 
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“a man of real insight, sound political judgement, and courage”193.  Reagan came into office 
armed with a deeply-rooted worldview and an ambitious and sweeping vision for world 
order.  He wished to see the USSR move in directions that were more amenable to 
democratic and pluralistic governance, more committed to human freedom, and much more 
open to the self-determination of its national minorities.   
 
Part two of this thesis will explore the Reagan administration’s policies towards the 
nationalities within the USSR, and examine the part they played, if any, in its overall grand 
strategy towards the Soviet Union.  Not only did Reagan aim to recalibrate the balance of 
power of world politics in America’s favour, he also came into office with a very powerful 
set of ideas about the world and about human freedom, and his administration would 
attempt to craft policies which articulated this vision.  The purpose of this section is not to 
explore every facet of Reagan’s policies towards the Soviet Union, but it will examine the 
ways in which policymakers inside his administration considered the character of the 
nationalities problem facing the Soviet leadership as the Cold War moved into what would 
prove to be its final decade.  This work will explore the evolution of policy in this area from 
the Carter to the Reagan administrations, highlighting the continuities and differences in 
Reagan-era strategic thinking towards the nationalities and republics of the Soviet Union. It 
will study the manner in which Reagan officials attempted to increase their knowledge of 
the Soviet nationalities, discussed the policy options open to the United States to use its 
limited leverage for the purpose of moving nationalist currents within the USSR in directions 
more pliable to US interests, and if any consideration was given to the second and third 




There has been much debate since the USSR collapsed as to whether Reagan and his team 
wished to actually bring down the entire Soviet Union from within, exploiting internal Soviet 
difficulties to this end, or whether they merely wished to see the gradual reform of the 
USSR into a more pluralistic and less restrictive system. This section will also reveal the 
administration’s focus on Ukraine, which Reagan strategists identified as the key non-
Russian republic inside the Soviet Union. It will examine the ways in which they hoped to 
penetrate this huge territory in order to gain an enhanced understanding of societal inner 
workings within the autonomous regions of the USSR.  Over the course of the 1980s, spurred 
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on by the Helsinki-inspired human rights revolution of the previous decade, increased 
attention was being paid by Western human rights activists and the United States Congress 
to the persecution of dissidents and suppression of national consciousness in Eastern Europe 
and within the Soviet Union.  Long a niche interest of ethnic interest groups, Americans of 
all stripes were now taking notice of the growing nationalist sentiment inside the USSR, and 
the Reagan administration embarked on a high-profile public diplomacy campaign designed 
to further pressurise the Soviets in this area.  
 
Reagan viewed the détente era as having emboldened the Soviet Union and undercut 
American power.  While he was open to negotiating with the Soviet leadership, indeed he 
understood the importance of gaining their trust, Reagan wanted to do so from a position 
of strength.  In the late 1970s, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Carter 
administration had embarked on a huge military build-up, and in early 1981 the Reagan 
White House expanded this build-up dramatically, eventually spending a whopping $1.5 
trillion on military hardware and technology over the next five years194.  Reagan wanted to 
see the US take a more forward-leaning and proactive attitude towards the US-Soviet 
relationship, challenging Soviet encroachments in the Third World, and embarking on a 
massive military build-up which he hoped would leave the USSR overextended, while 
exposing the entrenched contradictions in the Soviet system.   
 
However, for Reagan, the Cold War was about more than just hard military power.  It was 
a war of ideas, between two competing systems and two completely incompatible views of 
world order.  Thus, at the heart of Reagan’s foreign policy was a desire to see a victory for 
the ideas he held dear, ideas about human flourishing and open societies, and he felt these 
ideas were a vital part of America’s Cold War arsenal. He wanted the US to challenge the 
legitimacy of the Soviet system itself, taking actions which would intensify the internal 
problems facing the Kremlin, such as publicly supporting dissidents in the Eastern bloc and 
championing the rights of national determination within the Soviet Union.  For Reagan and 
many of his advisers, ideals and regime types mattered, and his policies towards the Soviet 
Union would reflect this.  
 
The early months of the incoming administration were utterly chaotic; not only was Reagan 
the victim of an assassination attempt in March 1981, which saw the president come very 
close to losing his life, the West Wing was torn asunder with bitter infighting and intrigue.  
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Although the bulk of Reagan’s foreign policy advisers favoured taking a tougher line on 
Moscow, some were more pugnacious than others, and these hard-liners would eventually 
clash with more moderate members of the administration.  Reagan’s first Secretary of State 
was Alexander Haig, former Chief of Staff in the Nixon and Ford administrations and NATO’s 
Supreme Allied Commander in Europe.  Haig was a realist, a protégé of Henry Kissinger, and 
wanted to get tough on the Soviets.  Yet he remained open to negotiations with them, with 
his focus being the pursuit of interests and great power politics195.  However, Haig was also 
rude, bullying and domineering, considering himself the final authority on US foreign policy 
and alienating almost everyone else around him196.  Within the NSC there were Edwin Meese 
and William Clark, uncompromising hardliners on Soviet issues yet holding almost no foreign 
policy experience, they found themselves in such lofty positions because they were two old 
friends and advisers of Reagan from his days as the governor California.  Nevertheless, the 
president trusted their instincts and Clark in particular played an outsized role in crafting 
foreign policy during his first two years in the White House.  Richard Allen, Reagan’s first 
National Security Adviser would leave under a cloud after a year in the role, when Clark 
officially succeeded him and imposed more disciple on the NSC, before in turn moving on 
after 20 months to be replaced by Robert ‘Bud” McFarlane.  Hardliners also headed up the 
Department of Defense and the CIA, with Harvard graduate Caspar ‘Cap” Weinberger 
overseeing the Pentagon’s huge arms build-up, and another of Reagan’s old chums William 
Casey replacing the outgoing Stan Turner at Langley, from where he planned to wage 
subversive war on the Soviet Union197.   
 
As with the Carter administration, the State Department was perceived to be the home of 
the more moderate elements within the national security apparatus.  While almost every 
White House staff experiences a degree of turf war, leaks and backstabbing, the early years 
of the Reagan presidency are often portrayed as among the worst, with Reagan’s aloof 
approach to managing internal conflict merely lending itself to abounding confusion198.  This 
element of Reagan’s White House would remain a feature rather than a bug over the first 
year and a half of his first term in office, although the departure of several of the more 
abrasive personalities, the appointment of George Shultz as Secretary of State in 1982, and 
the arrival of Soviet expert Jack Matlock to the NSC in mid 1983, would go a long way 
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towards smoothing the policymaking process and settling the factious and often acrimonious 
environment.  
 
Despite the frenzied environment of the West Wing, the Reagan NSC hoped to begin the 
process of articulating a clear and coherent strategy towards the Soviet Union which would 
reflect the president’s instincts and desire to heighten the tensions within the Eastern bloc.  
As part of this process, and aside from engaging in economic and military competition, 
policymakers began to think about the internal strains on the Soviet system and whether it 
would be possible to craft policies which would make use of them.  Elements within the 
Carter administration, driven by Brzezinski and Henze, had started the process of assessing 
and analysing the Soviet nationalities, evaluating the extent of the difficulty they posed for 
Moscow’s rule, and establishing a new wave of covert activity designed to reach the ethnic 
groups of the inner Soviet empire with radio broadcasts and dissident literature.  Now 
members of the Reagan NSC began to explore the possibility of carrying these programs 
forward, tying them to Reagan’s encompassing vision of promoting reform and self-
determination within the Soviet Union. Indeed, Colonel Odom’s February 1980 memo to 
Brzezinski in which he called for more work to be done on the Soviet nationalities in the 
years ahead, was also circulated among the incoming Reagan NSC199.   
 
Richard Pipes, nationalism, and the Soviet regime 
 
Leading the way on these efforts was Richard Pipes, a well-known professor of imperial 
Russian history who arrived on secondment at the White House from his academic position 
at Harvard.  Pipes was markedly anti-communist, the son of Jewish immigrants from Poland, 
deeply antagonistic towards Russian chauvinism.  Although a registered Democrat, Pipes was 
among the group of hawkish Democrats who were appalled at the influence of the New Left 
and the direction their party was taking towards Cold War policy and began gravitating 
towards the Republicans towards the end of the 1970s.  These “neoconservatives” included 
public intellectuals such as Irving Kristol and Norman Podhoretz, the Cold War liberal 
senator Henry ‘Scoop’ Jackson, and Jeanne Kirkpatrick, who the president tapped to 
become his ambassador to the United Nations after admiring her work from afar during the 
campaign200.  Like Brzezinski, Pipes also possessed a long-standing interest in the Soviet 
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nationalities, having published a seminal work on the topic in 1964.  His book ‘The Formation 
of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism 1917-1923’ explored the collapse of the 
tsarist regime and the emergence of a multinational communist state from the ruins, 
focussing on the Bolsheviks exploitation of nationalist sentiment in Ukraine, Belorussia, the 
Caucuses and Central Asia to seize power and then expand into the frontier regions of the 
former Russian empire201.   
 
Despite labouring at the heart of America’s elite academic establishment, Pipes considered 
himself an outsider: for his background, for his views on the Soviet Union, and for his 
increasingly conservative political stance.  In particular, he swam against the tides of 
conventional wisdom within the field of Sovietology, believing most Soviet experts in the 
West were fundamentally misreading the nature of the Soviet system and the existing threat 
from expansionism202.  He rooted these views in his reading of Russian history and believed 
the Soviet Union was driven by the same Russian nationalism as the empire it had replaced. 
Furthermore, he judged the Russian national character to be fundamentally irreconcilable 
with a Western outlook, believing the Russians to be tougher, more battle hardened, and 
even willing to endure nuclear war should that catastrophic outcome ever arise203.   
 
During his research at Harvard, where he interviewed dozens of Soviet emigres, Pipes came 
to regard the non-Russian nationalities of the Soviet Union as an “explosive force” within 
Soviet society, a force that detested the regime and sought “separation from everything 
Russian”204.  Pipes was drawn to Reagan’s robust foreign policy vision, he believed the 
president “held a few strong convictions and they guided all his policies”, and he was 
excited at the prospect of crafting concrete proposals towards the Soviet nationalities 
during his two-year secondment in the White House205.  Indeed, one of his first tasks on the 
NSC was to draw attention to the 6oth anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Georgia in 
February 1981, sending a memo to Richard Allen calling for a presidential statement to 
commemorate the occasion.  Pipes stated the, “invasion and incorporation of Georgia into 
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the USSR marks one of the earliest instances of communist imperialism, the beginning of 
the process of expansion by military conquest”, he believed a presidential statement would 
“send a powerful signal to all the national minorities of the Soviet Union … that we have 
not forgotten them and put Moscow on notice that ‘national liberation’ is a double-edged 
sword”206. 
 
Despite Reagan’s strong impulses, and the enthusiasm of Pipes and other hardliners, during 
the first six months of 1981 the administration was slow to construct a coherent long-term 
policy towards the USSR, distracted by the ongoing Polish crisis and fear of Soviet 
intervention there, American economic problems, and the ongoing in-fighting within the 
White House.  Progress had been made in other areas of Soviet policy, with the CIA stepping 
up funding and arms supplies to anti-communist guerrillas in Third World countries, most 
notably Afghanistan.  These moves were designed to deter further Soviet encroachment in 
the developing world, making the Soviets pay a higher price for their involvement in places 
like Nicaragua and Angola, and forming the backbone of what came to be known as the 
‘Reagan Doctrine’207.  Reagan’s rhetorical onslaught also served as a prong in the 
administration’s emerging Soviet strategy, alerting the Soviets that Reagan was an American 
president in a different mould from previous occupants of the White House.  In May 1981 
Reagan, like his predecessor Carter, delivered the commencement address at Notre Dame, 
where he told the students, “the years ahead are great ones for this country, for the cause 
of freedom and the spread of civilization.  The West won't contain communism, it will 
transcend communism.  It won't bother to dismiss or denounce it, it will dismiss it as some 
bizarre chapter in human history whose last pages are even now being written”208.   
 
These withering verbal assaults continued, notably with his speech to the British parliament 
in June 1982 when he told parliamentarians that “the march of freedom and democracy 
which will leave Marxism-Leninism on the ash-heap of history”209 and culminating in his well-
known “Evil Empire” speech, which was delivered to the National Association of Evangelicals 
in March 1983210.  In February 1981, at the beginning of Reagan’s presidency, the Soviet 
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leadership doesn’t appear to have taken Reagan’s rhetorical bashings too seriously, with 
Pipes telling Allen, “confusion and disarray in Moscow over the harsh tones emanating from 
Washington … The Soviet Government seems to have decided to treat the anti-Soviet 
statements of President Reagan … as political rhetoric which will soon give way to a 
“realistic” recognition of the need for superpower cooperation”211.  Nevertheless, as the 
verbal barrage continued, by the middle of the year Soviet leaders were becoming 
concerned that Reagan’s rhetoric was penetrating Soviet society and inciting demands for 
reform, with Chernenko telling his Politburo colleagues, “especially strong anti-Soviet 
agitation is performed by the Reagan administration”, which he felt was shining the 
spotlight on issues such as Jewish emigration and leading to increased calls for more tolerant 
practices from inside the Soviet Union212.  While Moscow wasn’t unduly concerned yet their 
irritation was rising, and the Reagan administration was indeed playing by different rules.  
As Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Lawrence Eagleburger outlined to his 
colleagues during an Interagency Coordinating Committee for US-Soviet Affairs Meeting in 
March 1981, “this Administration’s approach to the Soviets will not be business as usual; 
there will be changes”213. 
 
Despite the behind the scenes chaos, there was evidence that a multi-front strategy was 
emerging within the Reagan administration; the CIA continued its covert operations against 
Soviet interests in the Third World, Reagan ramped up economic pressure through the use 
of sanctions and by forbidding US firms to work on a new pipeline project in Siberia, and 
the administration was now growing ever-aware of the need to turn its attention to the 
political and ideological aspects of its new strategy; exploiting and amplifying the internal 
pressures of the Soviet Union214.  Impetus for this objective initially came from the State 
Department, where officials had been exploring options for promoting change within the 
Soviet Union since the earliest days of the Reagan administration.  Keen to see the 
promotion of reform inside the Soviet Union placed alongside more traditional military 
objectives, Paul Wolfowitz, the Director-Designate of the Policy Planning Staff and future 
architect of the Iraq War in the George W. Bush administration, carefully analysed a draft 
study on East-West relations prepared by the Policy Planning Staff.  The study set out a term 
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of reference for crafting policy towards the USSR, with an emphasis being placed on the 
Soviet internal scene, specifically the “Soviet nationalities problem and dissident 
movement”215.  Although the State Department remained more moderate in their general 
disposition towards the USSR, individuals inside the Policy Planning Staff such as Wolfowitz 
were more hard-line and eager to see the State Department take the lead on Soviet strategy, 
earnestly pushing on with the task of crafting a coherent strategy designed to pressurise the 
Soviet Union in key areas, while liaising with similarly-minded colleagues on the NSC.   
 
In June, Wolfowitz and Eagleburger asked Haig to sign off their finalised ‘East-West Policy 
Study’, which they had been working on over the previous few months, they were keen to 
“circulate the full study so that we can move ahead promptly to the SIG (Senior 
Interdepartmental Group) and the NSC”.  They pressed Haig, “having passed the 4-month 
mark, the Administration now needs to pull together the various strands of its East-West 
policy into one coherent strategic approach.  This is important for sustaining a consistent 
posture toward East-West relations over the next few years … The attached study provides 
the essential elements of a strategy to guide our East-West relations”.  Wolfowitz and 
Eagleburger laid out their vision for what US-Soviet relations would look like in the coming 
years, painting a dark image of Soviet foreign policy activism and bellicosity which would 
threaten the US-led international order.  “The Soviet-American relationship will be entering 
a new and dangerous phase during the coming decade, independent of any major US policy 
changes”, the report declared, “increased Soviet power threatens the free and open 
international order the US has sought to maintain throughout the post-war period”216.  
 
Wolfowitz and the Policy Planning Staff believed America needed a full-spectrum strategy 
for the new and dangerous period into which the world was entering, telling Haig, “in this 
setting, our East-West policy will be based on the following premises: (1) that the East-West 
competition reflects fundamental and enduring conflicts of interests, purpose and outlook; 
(2) that the US should move beyond its passive post-Vietnam foreign policy and provide 
greater leadership to enable the West to compete more effectively; (3) that over the near 
term, given the legacy we have inherited, we often will have to compete with 
the USSR under unfavourable circumstance; and (4) some degree of cooperation with 
Moscow is possible and desirable and can help to sustain a consensus both at home and 
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abroad in favour of a more competitive posture”.  It was a stark vision of an enduring conflict 
of interests, requiring renewed American leadership, yet also accepting that some 
negotiation with the Soviets would have to be inevitable.  Wolfowitz and Eagleburger saw 
this as a long-term struggle for dominance which necessitated American, “willingness to 
assume higher risks in defending our interests … we must make use of our existing assets 
more efficiently by taking advantage of special areas of American and Western 
strength, while exploiting Soviet weaknesses and vulnerabilities”.   
 
The PPS recognised that the Soviet Union would undoubtedly push back against this assertive 
American foreign policy approach, and that there must also be a recognition of vital Soviet 
interests which Moscow would legitimately defend, yet while avoiding “mindless 
confrontations” the US should “compete forcefully” with the USSR because the costs of 
accepting Soviet aggression were “simply too high”.  The document is a snapshot into the 
mindset of certain section of hawkish policymakers inside the US government as the 1980s 
began; the international system was a dark and dangerous arena of competing interests 
which was utterly permeated with Soviet aggression, requiring the United States to exercise 
leadership and carry the awesome burden of confronting and challenging the USSR in 
multiple arenas.  Wolfowitz and his associates in the PPS believed Reagan’s victory in the 
1980 election had given them a mandate to implement a more muscular US Cold War 
strategy, and they believed the tide would turn if only America would embrace its strengths 
and be ruthless in its exploitation of Soviet weaknesses.  They explained to Secretary Haig 
that despite holding some short-term strengths, the USSR was also facing a series of long-
term weaknesses, such as economic stagnation, imperial overextension, and the bankruptcy 
of their ideology.  Nevertheless, the US could not afford to remain passive, it must 
proactively seek ways to undermine Soviet authority both at home and abroad217.   
 
Wolfowitz identified a number of goals which he would like to see the US pursue; restoring 
a satisfactory military balance, defending Western interests in areas of instability, 
improving relationships with allies, and developing new alliances in Asia.  In terms of directly 
challenging Soviet authority in its Eastern European sphere of influence, Wolfowitz called 
for the US to continue its long standing ‘differentiation’ policy of promoting liberalising 
trends within the Soviet bloc, encouraging a degree of foreign policy autonomy among the 
East European client states of the USSR, while also seeking to discourage intervention by 
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Moscow218.  He also identified the promotion of reformist trends, nationalist dissidence, and 
human rights activism within the USSR itself as crucial areas to exploit, urging the US to 
recover “the ideological initiative by spotlighting the deficiencies of the Soviet system”219.   
 
Of major concern was the USSR’s activity and assertiveness in the Third World, and it was 
becoming apparent to some US policymakers that encouraging democratic trends in these 
areas, rather than supporting authoritarian dictatorships, was important for fending off 
communist insurgencies220. And promoting democratic forces inside the Soviet Union was 
now a key interest of the United States, which would hopefully blunt this Soviet activism 
abroad. The document specifically identified the Soviet nationalities problem as an area 
which the US should focus on, exploiting the simmering tensions through increased radio 
broadcasting and propaganda.  Quite simply, he believed, “the long-term weaknesses of the 
Soviet system can be encouraged in part simply by telling the truth about the USSR.  The 
Soviet Union faces nascent problems among its nationalities (particularly in the Baltic states 
and among Muslim groups in Central Asia).  The United States should provide the 
ICA (International Communication Agency) with increased resources to step up broadcasting 
activities to the Soviet Union, the satellites and Soviet Third World clients, highlighting the 
economic and moral failings of Moscow and its allies”221.  The CIA had also continued to 
support the radio broadcasting, covert book smuggling program, and dissident publishing 
activities developed by Brzezinski and Henze during the Carter presidency, and this would 
continue to play a key role moving forward222.  Wolfowitz concluded, “the expansionist 
international behaviour of the Soviet Union and its repressive, stagnant internal system 
make it vulnerable to a moral counter-attack.   
 
Yet the US must also offer a positive vision of the future.  By promoting peaceful democratic 
change, US policy will be able to give substance to this positive view and prevent the 
emergence of Soviet opportunities”.  The PPS policy paper laid out a clear set of priorities, 
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offered a succinct analysis of the relative strengths and weaknesses of America and its 
communist foe, and although the bulk of the paper focused on military issues and curtailing 
Soviet adventurism around the world, it also challenged the United States to take a more 
proactive approach with regards to exploiting the internal problems of the USSR, specifically 
its restive ethnic nationalities.  The paper was the first US government endeavour of the 
Reagan years geared towards creating a coherent framework for guiding policy toward the 
Soviet Union, and it caught the eye of the White House.  On June 4, McFarlane sent the 
memo to Haig declaring, “this is one of the finest pieces of analysis I have ever seen.  In my 
judgment it warrants a careful reading.  Further it can form the basis for an early speech 
by yourself or the President”.  Haig replied, “tell the boys to move out.  I want a 
speech ASAP”223.  While the State Department were content with the paper, there remained 
some elements within the White House who believed it should have actually gone even 
further, requiring even more emphasis on the internal nature and weakness of the Soviet 




By the end of 1981, the White House became more assertive in exploring the themes which 
would animate Reagan’s foreign policy.  The NSC started to produce papers designed around 
the concept of promoting change within the Soviet Union and articulating policy options 
with regards to the exploitation of the Soviet Union’s nationality problems.  In November, 
Pipes drafted the first in-depth paper of his time in the administration which he hoped 
would form the backbone of the administration’s Soviet policy, submitting it to Allen who 
in turn passed it to President Reagan.  Pipes anticipated his observations about the internal 
problems facing the Soviet Union, notably its growing nationalist sentiments, would guide 
US statecraft moving forward and he laid out his vision of US-Soviet relations.  Key to his 
thinking was the belief that communism was inherently expansionist, and that its 
expansionism would only subside when the Soviet system either collapsed or was thoroughly 
reformed.  He believed the Stalinist model on which Soviet communism was based was 
entering a state of profound crisis, brought about by crippling economic problems and 
imperial overextension.  Furthermore, Pipes speculated as to the future direction of Soviet 
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leadership once Brezhnev had departed from the scene, with ‘reformist’ factions perhaps 
pressing for modest democratisation.   
 
As far as US policy was concerned, Pipes believed “it is in the interest of the United States 
to promote the reformist tendencies in the USSR by a double-pronged strategy: encouraging 
pro-reform forces inside the USSR and raising for the Soviet Union the costs of its 
imperialism”.  Pipes thought US Soviet policy required something of an overhaul, 
recommending that the administration train its focus on the problems within the USSR in an 
attempt to blunt Soviet adventurism, an approach which should now form an important part 
of American strategic thinking. “For all the dramatic swings which have characterised our 
policies towards the Soviet Union throughout the last six decades”, Pipes told Allen, “they 
had one feature in common: to moderate the external behaviour of the Soviet regime by 
external means.  This objective was pursued by toughness and punishments, now by 
gentleness and rewards.  What has not been attempted so far is modification of the Soviet 
government’s external behaviour from within by encouragement and/or identification with 
forces and processes present inside the Soviet state that are inherently anti-expansionist 
and reform-minded”224.  This was an explicit call for the United States government to 
undertake policies aimed at altering the very nature of the Soviet Union itself.   
 
Pipes believed the Soviet Union existed in a condition of permanent tension with its own 
citizenry, something which American foreign policy had neglected for too long, telling Allen 
that it made sound strategic sense to exert maximum possible internal pressure on the 
Soviet regime from now on.  He felt the policy of containment had served the US well during 
an earlier period of the Cold War, but its success had been based on overwhelming American 
military dominance over the USSR, something which was no longer guaranteed in light of 
the recent Soviet arms build-up.  The US should move beyond the policy of containment and 
devise a new strategy “which exploits not so much our own strengths as our adversary’s 
weaknesses”.  For Pipes, the Soviet Union’s expansionist foreign policy was firmly rooted in 
the internal condition of its society and political culture, “there exists an intimate 
relationship between the internal condition of the Soviet Union – its economy and its 
political system – and its foreign policy.  It is not possible to effectively cope with the latter 
while ignoring the former”. Not only did Pipes view communism as an intrinsically 
expansionist and revolutionary ideology, he felt the domestic problems within the 
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communist system were also important influences on Soviet activism abroad225.  Thus, Pipes 
was making the case for an entirely new approach to American Cold War policy, based not 
only on material factors and the balance of power, but on regime type and the internal 
dynamics of adversarial states226.   
 
American values had long undergirded and influenced the US approach to the world, yet as 
the bipolarity of the Cold War stalemate became entrenched, policymakers had realised 
that the USSR would not be swept away so easily. As a result, they began to view the struggle 
with the Soviet Union in terms of long-term great power politics, with hard power 
dominating strategic thinking, and the developing world serving as a proxy arena for the 
superpowers to test each other’s resolve without provoking all-out nuclear war227.  Now 
Pipes was calling for something different; an all-out ideological crusade to assault the very 
nature of the Soviet Union.  Zbigniew Brzezinski had tried to move US foreign policy in this 
direction in the Carter administration, his beliefs about Soviet internal problems and his 
intent to “stir” up the nationalities demonstrating the return of the power of ideas to foreign 
policymaking.  Now Pipes, and like-minded strategists in the White House, were eager to 
push further and explore the internal weaknesses of their communist rival as a central 
platform of American grand strategy.  
 
The question was, which areas of Soviet society should the American government look to 
exploit?  Pipes saw the USSR as entering a real crisis period of instability due to the intrinsic 
contradictions of its political system, advanced economic decay, and growing dissent within 
its borders.  He believed there to be two strands of dissent within the Russian lands of the 
Soviet empire; a liberal and Western-looking branch centred around famous dissidents such 
as Andrei Sakharov and Yuri Orlov, and a conservative Russian nationalist branch which 
looked to the arch-traditionalist Alexander Solzhenitsyn for inspiration.  Nevertheless, Pipes 
viewed dissent as pervading the entirety of the Soviet population, silent dissatisfaction at 
specific grievances for different groups, the most important of which he believed were the 
industrial workers, peasants, and ethnic minorities.  For the purposes of this study, Pipes 
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identification of the Soviet nationalities as an important fountain of dissent for the Soviets 
government and an area which was ripe for exploitation by the Americans, is instructive.   
 
Pipes informed Allen that the, “so-called “nationality” question in the Soviet Union derives 
from the dissatisfaction of the nearly one-half of its non-Russian citizens with a regime 
which gives them virtually no say in the manner their regions are administered”.  The 
strength of these nationalist sentiments varied from region to region, with many 
determining factors in the mix, such as population density, education levels, historic 
traditions, and relations with both Russians and other non-Russian nationalities in the area.  
“As a rule,” Pipes went on, “the sense of nationalism is strongest among those nationalities 
which have the least in common with the Russians linguistically and historically and/or 
possess the largest intelligentsia”228.  Pipes was articulating ideas he had been thinking 
deeply about for a long time.  Back in 1955, Pipes had taken a trip through the Soviet 
republics of Central Asia and came home with a lasting impression of the failure of 
Sovietisation to penetrate these avowedly traditional lands.  He held onto those 
impressions, believing the latent power of nationalism, particularly in the Muslim republics 
of the Soviet periphery, were a ticking time bomb and it was only a matter of time before 
nationalities grievances became an explosive issue for Moscow to contend with229.  
 
Richard Pipes now had an opportunity to advance his ideas, and to have a real influence on 
the shaping of Reagan’s strategy towards the Soviet Union.  He felt that the very notion of 
the USSR as a ‘superpower’ was a lie, fed by Soviet propaganda, and should be repudiated 
completely by the United States because it led to a false impression of a bipolar world, and 
thus a false choice between the Soviet version of peace and progress, and an alternative of 
US-instigated reactionary politics and war.  Other than the massive stockpiles of nuclear 
and conventional weapons it possessed, Pipes felt the Soviet Union was no more than a 
second-ranked power on a par with the likes of Japan or the nations of Western Europe, and 
the only true superpower on earth was the United States.  He longed to see a US foreign 
policy based on the American principles of economic and political liberty, limited 
government, in harmony with the “spirit and values of the American people”.  While 
recognising the difficulties of promoting these values abroad, and counselling that the US 
had neither the right nor the ability to impose liberal democracy on foreign lands, Pipes 
stressed the vital importance of domestic support for American statecraft, which would only 
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be possible by implementing policies based on values which were in tune with the US 
populace.   
 
Pipes saw three main areas of Soviet weakness which this values-laden US foreign policy 
should look to exploit; economic, political, and ideological. In the economic sphere, he 
believed that offering concessions to communist regimes simply didn’t work, which is why 
he rejected détente, and only the spread of democracy and free enterprise would really 
place Moscow’s control over its empire at risk.  He called for a restriction on the sale of 
technology to the USSR and wanted to use the West’s economic leverage not to prop up 
communism, but to encourage moves towards market reforms.  Pipes turned to the political 
issue of nationalism, human rights dissidence and ethnic unrest within the Soviet Union, 
pinpointing them as crucial weak-spots for the Kremlin, which America should exploit 
further.  Pipes had been arguing since the mid 1970s that both the Russification policies of 
the Kremlin and the sharp Russian demographic decline were accelerating the consolidation 
of non-Russian national identities and consciousness within the Soviet Union230.  He remained 
wary of xenophobic Russian nationalism, and worried about a future post-Brezhnev 
‘conservative’ turn which would lead to further expansionism.  But he hoped for the triumph 
of a more benign, Western-orientated Russian nationalism in a future Kremlin leadership 
contest.  Nevertheless, “it should be our objective to encourage the forces of dissent active 
within the USSR, especially those that strive for greater democracy and human rights”, Pipes 
urged, “we ought to express open support for all overt dissenting groups, save for those of 
the extreme (nationalist) right”.  
 
Pipes believed the non-Russian nationalities of the Soviet Union were of central importance 
to this strategy, calling on the US to “express strong support for the cause of national self-
determination for all ethnic groups under Russian domination”.  The academic remarked, 
“our task is not to work for the disintegration of the Soviet Union (any more than it is to 
ensure its integrity), but we are committed to supporting the principle of national self-
determination231”.  This last line is of note, because by April 1982 Pipes would claim, “the 
bottom line is that we are helping to encourage the dissolution of the Soviet empire”, during 
an NSC meeting232.  In order to reach these disaffected national minorities within the Soviet 
Union, Pipes called for an ideological campaign with radio broadcasting at its heart.  
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Throughout the Cold War the US had made use of Voice of America and Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty to reach beyond the Iron Curtain, and these efforts had been ramped 
up during the Carter years at the directive of Brzezinski.  Pipes told Allen, “almost everyone 
agrees that propaganda, especially through short-wave broadcasts, is of the greatest 
importance… a good case can be made that in the decade directly ahead propaganda will 
move to the forefront and become the single most effective instrument in our struggle to 
contain Soviet expansionism”.  Pipes stressed the importance of continuing radio broadcasts 
into the republics of the USSR as part of the administration’s developing nationalities policy, 
“in broadcasts beamed to the minority areas we should explicitly affirm their grievances 
(Russification, unequal distribution of capital investments, maltreatment of minority 
soldiers in the Red Army etc), and express sympathy for their right to national self-
determination”.   
 
Pipes had positioned the Soviet nationalities at the heart of his vision for Reagan’s grand 
strategy towards the Soviet Union, calling for an ideological and propaganda campaign which 
would specifically target the grievances of ethnic groups in the Soviet regions.  He believed 
it was absolutely vital for the US government to inform the various ethnic groups within 
Soviet society about the nature of the communist regime, and in closing his policy proposal 
to Allen he quoted the Soviet émigré writer Alexander Zinoviev, who said “I have discovered 
one of the most vulnerable points of this society… and this vulnerable point must be struck, 
and struck, and struck again”233.  On sending his report to the president’s national security 
adviser on November 4, Pipes informed Allen that he had shared the original draft of the 
paper with fellow anti-communist hardliner Jeanne Kirkpatrick, who had told him she felt 
it was, “the best analysis of the subject she had ever read”234.  Allen submitted the report 
to Reagan later that month235, with the president telling him it was “very sound”236.  
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Clark brings coherence 
 
As 1982 dawned, the eyes of the world remained on Poland.  While the threat of Soviet 
invasion had receded, the imposition of martial law had sent shockwaves through Eastern 
Europe and the Reagan White House was watching and considering US options in the region.  
Meanwhile, the ongoing war in Afghanistan continued to dominate the headlines as it slowly 
turned into a deadly quagmire for the invading Soviet forces.  And a year into Reagan’s 
presidency, pressure was mounting on the administration to produce a complete and 
comprehensive strategy towards the USSR.  Despite maintaining a very public hard-line, and 
ramping up anti-Soviet covert activity around the world, the administration was yet to 
deliver a strategy document which would act as a guiding light for its policy towards the 
Soviets.  Reagan’s rhetoric was continuing to alarm the Soviet leadership, with the Soviet 
foreign minister Andrei Gromyko confronting Haig about the issue during arms reduction 
talks in Geneva.  Gromyko believed that not a single day passed without some sort of 
inflammatory statement from Washington towards Moscow, which had “seriously poisoned 
Soviet-US relations”237.  However, behind these bombastic public utterances, Reagan was 
already pondering the right time to build a more fruitful dialogue with the Soviets.   
 
Despite his stinging criticism of communism, from his earliest days in office Reagan had 
been eager to engage with Soviet leaders. Most famously he reached out to Brezhnev while 
convalescing in hospital following the assassination attempt in early 1981, much to the 
chagrin of the unsentimental advisers around him238.  There was still a feeling that the time 
was not right for talks to commence, with Clark advising the president, “the current 
economic and imperial crisis of the Soviet regime, acute though it is, does not offer good 
opportunities for negotiations.  The Soviet regime has never made political concessions out 
of economic considerations: it has made political concessions only to meet its political 
needs”.  But with Brezhnev’s health failing, Clark went on, “the death or removal of a 
leader unsettles the whole system of administration and requires a breathing spell in foreign 
relations” and he felt the US should be ready to engage in such a moment239. Pipes was well-
aware of Reagan’s growing desire to engage constructively with Moscow, telling Clark his 
advice to Reagan on the matter, “addresses itself to the question raised by the President 
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back at the NSC meeting of March 25 and at the DIA briefing on the Soviet economy the 
following day: ‛When is the time to sit down and negotiate with the Soviets?’”240.  
Nevertheless, for now the focus of the hardliners remained on applying pressure to the USSR 
and attempting to influence the internal dynamics of the Soviet state, and soon there would 
be tangible policy documents aimed at guiding those impulses and transmitting them into 
an overarching strategy.  
 
In January 1982, William P. Clark, Reagan’s old friend from California, had replaced Allen 
as national security adviser.  ‘Judge’ Clark set about bringing some much-needed order and 
discipline to the NSC, smoothing the process and setting his sights on orchestrating a clearly-
defined strategy towards the USSR.  A devout Catholic and fiercely committed anti-
communist, Clark felt he had a clear understanding of the president’s foreign policy vision, 
benefiting both from their long-standing friendship and the increased access to the Oval 
Office which came with his new position241.  Clark was enthusiastic about the tough line his 
boss was taking with Moscow, and he was eager to surround the president with like-minded 
advisers.  As a result of Clark’s promotion Richard Pipes position was also elevated within 
the White House, he now personally briefed Reagan on Soviet affairs, and had regular access 
to the president.  Clark tasked Pipes with drafting an official presidential directive on 
national security which would reflect the president’s views and offer a foundation to build 
on moving forward. This was something Pipes had been keen to set in motion for some time, 
he was growing concerned about the reaction of America’s allies to the new tough stance 
on Moscow, telling Clark that the Europeans were, “demanding to know what the long-term 
purpose of our hard-line actions toward the Communist Bloc is.  Do we intend to provoke a 
confrontation?  Do we want to isolate the Soviet Bloc?  Do we have some other purpose in 
mind?  Or are we being merely impulsive?”.   
 
Pipes was troubled by the fact that the administration still hadn’t articulated a clear Soviet 
policy yet, something which he felt the Carter administration deserved criticism for never 
having done, “it seems to me, therefore, quite imperative that a decision be made on what 
our long-term policy toward the Communist Bloc is (i.e., what we expect to result from our 
hard-line policies) and then to make the broad outlines of these objectives public.  The first 
and most critical step can be accomplished through an NSDD on the Soviet Union (there is 
                                                        
240 Footnotes in Memo Clark to Reagan, “When to Negotiate with the Soviet Union”, April 5, 1982, 
Executive Secretariat, NSC, Country File USSR, January 1981–January 1983; Volume III, Soviet 
Union, FRUS, 1981-1988. 
241 Paul Kengor and Patricia Clark Doerner, The Judge: William P. Clark, Ronald Reagan’s Top Hand 
(San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2007), p144-146 
104 
 
no PD on the subject to revise, strange as it may seem)”242.  This was an opportunity for 
Pipes to cement his ideas in concrete policy terms and to formalize concepts of the Reagan 
foreign policy vision into coherent guidance, the result of which was NSDD-32, a document 
outlining US national security policy which Reagan signed in May 1982.  The directive 
declared that US national security policy would deter military attacks by the USSR and its 
allies, strengthen the influence of the US throughout the world, and contain and reverse 
the expansion of Soviet control and military presence globally.  Notably, it also called for 
an approach which would foster change within the Soviet Union itself, stating US policy 
should “encourage long-term liberalizing and nationalist tendencies within the Soviet Union 
and allied countries”243.  The document has been described as a “triumph” for the hardliners 
in the administration244.  Pipes ideas were now embedded in official national security policy. 
 
With NSDD-32 formalising a broad outline for US foreign policy, attention within the 
administration now turned towards creating a more in-depth strategy towards the Soviet 
Union.  Pipes would again be at the centre of the process, though he had to battle through 
bureaucratic infighting to do so.  The State Department felt there was no need for another 
official document directing American national security affairs following the approval of the 
aforementioned “East-West Policy Study”, drafted by Wolfowitz and the State Department’s 
Policy Planning Staff the previous year.  Pipes was not enamoured with this document, 
feeling it was too long, too focused on military aspects of the US-Soviet relationship, and 
wasn’t clear in identifying ultimate US objectives in dealing with the Soviet Union.  He also 
sensed brewing conflict between the State Department and the Department of Defence, 
telling Clark that the NSC alone should have final arbitration over producing future policy245. 
Pipes continued to have disagreements with the State Department over the next few months 
as he worked out the contours of his strategy paper.  He felt the document produced by the 
diplomats at Foggy Bottom were “unwieldy” and “did not tackle the problem boldly 
enough”.   
 
As Brzezinski and Henze had discovered during the Carter presidency, the State Department 
remained wary of interfering in the internal problems of the Soviet Union.  This was not to 
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Pipes liking.  He wished to see America pursue audacious goals, he wanted to infuse 
American statecraft with a renewed missionary impulse, to craft an unabashedly ideological 
foreign policy aimed at transforming the very nature of the Soviet Union itself.  “The basic 
problem between State and myself is philosophical”, he told Clark in June 1982, “State 
believes that we should be content with an attempt to influence Soviet behaviour by 
proffering rewards when it is peaceful and punishments when it is not”.  To Pipes, this was 
a holdover from the outdated thinking of the détente era.  He also believed his ideas and 
vision to be in tune with Reagan’s beliefs, an impression which was fraught because of 
Reagan’s often noncommittal and guarded managerial style.  But in this instance, Pipes was 
correct in his instincts when he told Clark, “following what I sense to be the President’s 
belief, I, by contrast, argue that behaviour is the consequence of the system and that our 
policies… aim at modifying the system as a prerequisite of changed behaviour”.   
 
Pipes believed the most controversial idea which he hoped to integrate into the policy 
directive was the “premise that Soviet international behaviour is a response not only to 
external threats and opportunities but also to the internal imperatives of the Soviet 
political, economic, social and ideological system”.  Pipes expected the State Department 
to fight this proposition “tooth and nail”, although to him it seemed to “express the 
quintessence of the President’s approach”246. The administration worked to create an 
updated strategy document to guide its relations with the Soviet Union, and which would 
go further than NSDD-32.  A particular focus would be on the internal nature of the Soviet 
regime and developing ways in which American policy could affect the inner dynamics of 
the USSR, most notably towards the Soviet nationalities.  In Pipes’s view, this updated 
strategy should “analyse the determinants of Soviet foreign policy and domestic policies of 
concern to the U.S. and other outside powers, assess Soviet strengths and weaknesses, 
identify key elements of likely continuity and change in the Soviet system and Soviet 
policies, and determine the political, economic, military and ideological means at our 
disposal for achieving favourable changes in Soviet international behaviour, including 
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George Schultz asserts himself 
 
In mid 1982, changes were afoot within the administration.  The ever-brusque Haig 
overstepped the mark one final time and was replaced as secretary of state by George P. 
Shultz, who would go on to form a close bond with Mikhail Gorbachev and become one of 
the key figures in ending the Cold War.  His appointment would prove to be a transformative 
point in the trajectory of Reagan’s Soviet policies.  Shultz has been described as the “critical 
agent of US foreign policy” during this period, perhaps the most consequential secretary of 
state in American history248.  As Reagan struggled with his conflicting impulses, oscillating 
between his natural loathing of the Soviet system and his personal desire to build bridges 
with the Soviet leadership, Shultz nurtured the president’s disposition towards engagement 
and soon earned his trust.  He was a moderating influence in an administration stacked with 
hardliners: open to diplomatic engagement with the Soviets, committed to the cause of 
human rights within the communist bloc, and fully focused on transforming the 
confrontational nature of America’s current relations with the USSR249.  Shultz gained 
experience of negotiating with the Soviets during the Nixon administration, coming to 
respect them both as negotiators and as people. Nevertheless, he believed certain 
conditions had to be met before the relationship would improve, and Shultz was in no doubt 
as to the nature of the adversary they faced, telling Gromyko in their very first meeting 
that the deterioration in relations was solely the fault of the Soviet Union250.  Shultz was 
tough, and he was sharp.  He was also of the opinion that smart US policies could move the 
USSR in favourable directions, telling Reagan, “we must not rule out the possibilities that 
firm US policies could help induce the kind of changes in Soviet behaviour that would make 
an improvement in relations possible”251.   
Shultz believed the only way to make progress with the Soviets was to offer them a degree 
of legitimacy, he was not personally dispositioned to the tough talk of the early Reagan 
years, and he appreciated the important role that trust plays in any negotiation.  Most 
importantly, Shultz thought the Soviet Union actually had the capacity to reform itself into 
a less menacing regime, this cause was not hopeless, and there was no need for the US to 
tear the USSR down to achieve its goals.  This stood Shultz in stark contrast to the hardliners 
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within the administration such as Clark and Pipes, not to mention Bill Casey at the CIA, and 
the likes of Kirkpatrick and Wolfowitz.  As Shultz began to exert influence on Reagan and 
his policies, the hardliners continued to press ahead with their own broad agenda.  Now 
entering the final 6 months of his government service before he had to return to academia, 
Pipes remained eager to push a policy program which would target the internal weaknesses 
of the Soviet Union, such as human rights dissidence and the growing resentment of the 
nationalities. At stake was the question of America’s final objective vis a vis the Soviet 
Union.  The debate inside the administration regarding the ultimate goal of America’s Soviet 
policies continued to rumble over the summer of 1982, and it was a debate of direct 
implications for the administration’s Soviet nationalities policy. 
 
In August 1982, Shultz brought together a group of outside Soviet experts and 
representatives from the competing schools of thought within the administration to discuss 
the future course of Reagan’s strategy towards the USSR.  Ahead of the meeting, Wolfowitz 
set an agenda which would revolve around four broad areas of discussion; Soviet assets and 
vulnerabilities, current Soviet policy, US leverage and priorities, and building public support 
for their approach.  Within each area he suggested deeper topics of discussion, covering 
areas such as; the Soviet Union’s methods for handling their economic problems while also 
managing the burden of carrying the Eastern bloc, an exploration of current Soviet foreign 
policy objectives, the Soviet view of the Reagan administration, US leverage and priorities 
in its relations with the USSR, human rights policy, and methods for easing the fears of 
nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union which were now rising among the US people.   
 
A week before the seminar, Wolfowitz shared with Shultz some of his concerns about the 
competing influences on Soviet policy within the administration, “our strengths lie in the 
enduring power of the human rights issue, in our openness to negotiation, and our diplomatic 
activism in resolving conflicts” he said.  Yet in trying to convey “consistency, firmness, and 
balance”, he felt the US faced a dilemma. “Harsh and ideological rhetoric, particularly when 
directed at the Soviet system rather than at Soviet behaviour, may seem likely only to 
increase tensions… emphasizing the need to overturn Communism may in fact set a standard 
by which we will be seen to fail”.  Wolfowitz wrestled with the role of ideology in American 
foreign policy, keen to chart a prudent course yet believing the “failure to emphasize our 
ideological differences… may signal business-as-usual and make it harder to defend costly 
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policies”252. It was the classic challenge facing all American foreign policy practitioners; the 
eternal debate over the appropriate role of values and interests.   
 
When the group convened a week later, their number included former Secretaries of 
Defence Don Rumsfeld and Harold Brown, the neoconservative intellectual and anti-
communist ideologue Norman Podhoretz, former Nixon and Ford Soviet experts Brent 
Scowcroft and Hal Sonnenfeldt, with those attending from inside the administration 
including Shultz, Weinberger, Wolfowitz and Clark.  The discussion immediately settled 
around the issue of whether the US should promote change within the Soviet Union through 
support for internal reformist and nationalist movements or continue to take a more hard-
headed approach focused on external threats and containment.  Clark posed the question, 
“what should our goals be - to concentrate on changing the internal structure and objectives 
of the Soviet system or, to concern ourselves pragmatically with the external manifestations 
of the Soviet policy which threaten Western interests”.  The former position was 
characterised as “Dick Pipes approach” while the latter as “State’s approach”.  Clark went 
on, “in short, should we be motivated by ideological concerns and try to change the Soviet 
Union, or should we accept it as a fact of life subject to only evolutionary change and 
concern ourselves with its containment?”253.  After six hours of rich discussion the meeting 
ended with a desire to explore the matter further.  The debate would continue. 
 
While these issues remained unresolved and the source of profound discussion within the US 
government, Pipes pushed ahead with his mission to influence and transform Soviet internal 
dynamics. The clock was ticking on his time in the administration, with Harvard expecting 
him back at the end of 1982.  He didn’t have long left to influence policy from his position 
inside the White House, and with the arrival of Shultz the hardliners in the administration 
had a moderating voice in the president’s ear with which they now needed to compete.  He 
had identified the Soviet nationalities problem as an issue he wished to see American foreign 
policy increase its focus on. After grabbing Reagan’s attention since the beginning of 1982, 
Pipes now aimed to build on his earlier work on the Soviet nationalities question and thought 
about how best to direct US policy in ways which could exploit these age-old tensions, 
promote change within the Soviet Union, and best serve America’s Cold War interest.  Pipes 
remained an important voice within the administration for policies geared towards 
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encouraging internal change within the Soviet Union, and in order to expand on these 
themes the Nationalities Working Group of the Carter era was resurrected in late 1982 and 
given renewed impetus.   
 
The return of the Nationalities Working Group 
 
Along with Pipes, certain individuals at the State Department and other government 
agencies were also keen to see the US take a more proactive approach toward the 
nationalities of the Soviet Union.  During the Carter years, Paul Henze had pressed hard for 
the creation of such a forum, and the Reagan era NWG would now serve a very similar 
function to the original group which had been founded in 1978.  As Henze had believed, 
while not quite managing to make Soviet ethnic tensions a focal point of US strategy, his 
efforts had definitely sparked an interest in the Soviet nationalities within the upper 
echelons of the US government, with the reformed group attracting officials from across the 
US foreign policymaking world.  Another key figure in the revival of the NWG was Mark 
Palmer, a career foreign service officer who would go onto become ambassador to Hungary 
in 1986.  Palmer also held a deep interest in the Soviet nationalities question and gathered 
like-minded individuals to meet on a regular basis in order to probe the issue further, with 
as many as 45-50 officials attending group meetings.  As Palmer describes, “the purpose of 
the working group was to really try to get into detail about the nationalities issues and to 
develop policy relating to the Soviet Union.  I thought it was the core issue there and that 
we needed as a nation to understand what the hell was going on among the nationalities 
and to develop policies.  It involved things like budgets for RFE and RL.  Budgets for VOA.  
There were practical issues.  Language training in the less usual languages.  Opening posts 
in Ukraine and elsewhere”.  Palmer believed there was a group of specialists across various 
agencies of the US government who viewed the Soviet Union as an empire, and an empire 
which could very well become “unglued”.  However, despite Haig, and later Shultz, being 
supportive of the group, there were elements within the White House who were nervous 
about the return of the NWG and less than enthralled at the group’s activities; even within 
a hard-line administration the enterprise was viewed with suspicion254. 
 
The first meeting of the Reagan era NWG was in October 1982 at the State Department, 
with representatives from the CIA, Department of Defence, State Department and the 
United States Information Agency (USIA) present, all individuals who were interested in the 
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issue of the Soviet nationalities.  Pipes, Paula Dobriansky, Walter Raymond and Carey Lord 
represented the NSC255. Ahead of the group’s October 29 meeting, a draft Soviet 
Nationalities policy paper was circulated among the attendees by Executive Secretary of 
the Department of State L Paul Bremer, which set out an expansive set of discussion points 
with the goal of establishing an agenda for the newly revived NWG to work towards256.  The 
Soviet Nationalities paper would form the bedrock of the Reagan NWG’s early activities, 
offering a revealing insight into the administration’s strategic thinking and goals with 
regards to the Soviet nationalities, and how this would feed into the overall US strategy 
toward the Soviet Union.  This was not an ideology-heavy document, but a clear-eyed and 
hard-headed assessment of the nature of the Soviet nationalities problem which asked 
whether it would even be to America’s benefit to exploit these problems.   
 
The paper began by identifying the problem facing US policymakers who were interested in 
this issue, and categorising four basic questions to consider while defining US policy towards 
the Soviet nationalities.  The strategy paper felt it pertinent to ask, “what is the nature of 
the current nationalities problems within the Soviet Union, do they pose a threat to Soviet 
power, and on what timescale?  Should the United States attempt to influence the 
development of ethnic and nationality problems within the Soviet Union?  Assuming the 
answer is affirmative, should our influence be directed at long-term evolutionary change, 
at short-term troublemaking, or at both together?  And what tools does the United States 
have at its disposal to achieve its policy objectives, and what should it be doing with them?”.  
These questions largely formed the outline of US government thinking on the Soviet 
nationalities257.   
 
It was noted that during the prior work of the Nationalities Working Group between 1978 
and 1980, when Brzezinski and Henze were beginning to explore the exploitation of internal 
Soviet problems to serve US interests, these four questions had been addressed by the Carter 
administration.  While there had never been a formal policy document produced on this 
matter by the Carter White House, there was broad agreement across the agencies that the 
Soviet nationalities were a matter of interest, but that the scope for influence was limited.  
The previous NWG ascertained that the Soviet nationalities issue was potentially a 
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significant problem for the Soviet leadership it did not currently pose a direct threat to their 
power, but the US government should closely monitor the development of the Soviet 
nationalities problem and look for opportunities to influence them in a way that might be 
beneficial to US interests.  Although it was noted that it was important that no actions 
should be taken that may be construed by the Kremlin as direct attempt to weaken their 
hold over non-Russian minority areas.  There was also the belief that the United States 
desperately needed to expand its cadre of private and government experts on the Soviet 
nationalities in order to understand the issue better.  
The proposed policy paper of the new Nationalities Working Group stated, “with the advent 
of the Reagan administration, and the continuing deterioration in US-Soviet relations, it is 
fair to ask whether the general assumptions made on nationalities matters by the prior 
Nationalities Working Group still hold their validity, or whether they have been outpaced 
by changes in the US-Soviet relationship”.  The new NWG believed that while the nationalist 
activities in Ukraine, Georgia, Lithuania and Estonia were a cause for concern for Moscow, 
there was no immediate prospect of these issues spiralling out of control owing to the 
Kremlin’s adept awareness of this dimension of internal dissent and their determination to 
keep it under control.  Nevertheless, there were “important nationalities problems which 
could present a growing force for decentralisation and could preoccupy the Soviet 
authorities in the not too-distant future”.   
The issues of military manpower and labour shortages could become more acute, and like 
the Carter administration, the Reagan NWG also identified Central Asia as a brewing 
hotspot. The large proportion of Muslim troops within the ethnic makeup of the Soviet armed 
forces, and the explosive growth of the Soviet Muslim population in the Central Asian 
republics combined with the drop in the percentage of the Russian nationalities, could pose 
real difficulties for the Soviets in the future.  The NWG report stated that these problems 
would only grow worse for Moscow over the coming decades, although acknowledged that 
the central authorities had significant power to deal with these emerging problems.  
Nevertheless, the policy paper stated, “therefore nationalities problems, while they will 
almost certainly not threaten a fatal weakening of the Soviet system, will turn into an even 
more obvious vulnerability of the Soviet system, and one which might be useful to us”258.  
The ethnic composition of the Soviet army became an issue of interest to US policymakers 
particularly after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, propelled by the defection of 
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large numbers of Central Asian Soviet troops, an issue which Taras Kuzio believed, 
“galvanized nationality problems in the Soviet armed forces and more broadly in the non-
Russian republics”259.  
The NWG policy paper then turned its focus on the US strategy, and whether America should 
look to influence the development of nationality problems inside the Soviet Union to its 
advantage.  While recognising that the disintegration of the Soviet empire would be in the 
US interest, the USSR was not currently on the verge of collapse through internal causes and 
could not be brought to that point by outside intervention.  Regardless, the paper described 
the Soviet policy on their nationalities issue as “beset with contradictions” and “at a 
minimum, US policy should not help shield the Soviet leadership from the costs of these 
contradictions.  Carefully handled, they could be used to advance US interests, since a 
Soviet leadership which is not fundamentally sure of the loyalty of its national minorities… 
is not likely to be as effective a competitor for influence in other parts of the world”.  The 
NWG linked the strong support of the Reagan administration for the Helsinki Accords with 
their emerging nationalities policy.  Thus, actions aimed at supporting the Helsinki goal of 
increasing the rights and freedoms of all groups within the Soviet Union, including the 
majority Russians themselves, were a perfectly legitimate objective of US foreign policy, 
while also serving Washington’s interests by “sharpening the contradictions” inherent in the 
Soviet Union’s policies towards its national minority groups.  It was also in the interest of 
the United States to “engender within the Soviet leadership some uncertainty about the 
ultimate loyalty of the regime’s national minorities, a factor which could inhibit Soviet 
foreign policy behaviour if played correctly”.   
 
Policymakers within the Reagan administration viewed the Soviet nationalities issue as a 
foreign policy question because internal nationalist upheaval could act as a dangerous 
distraction for the Kremlin and have a direct bearing on the Soviet Union’s ability to conduct 
an activist foreign policy in places the US deemed important to its national interest. The 
report was careful to stress that any US actions in this area must be thoroughly calculated 
and based on accurate intelligence.  These actions must also be tied to Soviet constitutional 
guarantees and international agreements which the Soviet Union itself was a signatory to, 
utilising the Soviet’s own rhetoric to encourage pluralism and democracy within the USSR. 
Prudence was key, “we do not seek, as a matter of declaratory policy, explicitly the break-
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up of the Soviet Union”, the report advised260.  The NWG believed that progress had been 
made with regards to increasing US government knowledge and understanding of the Soviet 
nationalities issue, but “one of the primary objectives of the Nationalities Working Group 
should be to continue to seek methods to build up these capabilities”.  The increased 
modernization and funding of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty was of the utmost 
importance to these endeavours, as it had been when Paul Henze was fighting the budgetary 
battles of the late 1970s.  Radio broadcasts to the national minorities were seen as a way 
of countering the Kremlin’s narrative about the outside world and the nature of its rule in 
the USSR.  
 
The NWG also believed a fundamental way to improve knowledge of the non-Russian 
minorities was increased contacts with Soviet citizens through official and unofficial 
exchanges, and the establishment of additional US Missions across the USSR.  The NWG 
wanted to explore the question of whether US interests were best served by maintaining an 
Embassy and a Consulate General inside the USSR or by carefully planned expansion of 
American presence into other Soviet republics.  There was also a need to increase religious 
contacts and influence, as religion was identified as a vital dimension to many of the 
national identities.  The report called for more to be done in order to enhance Western 
awareness of the Soviet nationalities and the difficulties they faced living under Moscow 
rule, and so it was vital to host conferences and seminars with this goal in mind.  It also 
called for the US to work alongside groups such as Amnesty International, the CSCE and the 
American Psychiatric Association to ensure adequate attention was being paid to the plight 
of human rights activists who were being persecuted for trying to assert their national 
traditions.  The NWG was wary of lending support to unsavoury nationalist elements 
however, believing care should be taken “to avoid persons or support for persons who’s 
activities can only be construed as nationalist or separatist in character, and not human 
rights related”261.   
 
This report set out a broad approach for the development of US policies towards the non-
Russian minorities of the Soviet Union.  It was the first clear attempt from within the Reagan 
administration to craft a clear set of priorities and policies towards both enhancing US 
government understanding of the nationalist issues inside the USSR and considering ways in 
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which US foreign policy may be able to influence these issues in the service of American 
interests.  The policy paper did not call for a bold and idealistic crusade to free the captive 
nationalities of the USSR and topple the Soviet empire, it was a document which recognised 
the nationalities were a pressure point for the Soviet government, but they were not in 
danger of being overrun by nationalist fervour.  Furthermore, the NWG prudently accepted 
that the US possessed only limited leverage and ability to influence events inside the Soviet 
Union and to affect any changes from which it could benefit.  Nevertheless, within those 
parameters, there were clearly areas of interest to US policymakers and potential for 
further exploration, with the hope that a coherent nationalities policy could be integrated 
into broader US strategy towards the Soviet Union and may contribute to moving Soviet 
society in directions which were beneficial to American Cold War objectives. The report 
called for attention to be paid to these important issues, and concluded, “it is clear that 
more can be done”262. 
 
In November 1982, the Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev died of a heart attack, and the White 
House anxiously watched on while a successor was named.  When the former KGB boss and 
long-term Party operator Yuri Andropov was installed as General Secretary two days later, 
the Reagan administration pondered the implications for the US-Soviet relationship.  Clark 
briefed Reagan on the new Soviet leader, drawing from a CIA report which had been 
prepared by Bob Gates.  The CIA believed Andropov would be a formidable antagonist, with 
Clark informing Reagan that “the precedent of an extended period for a new Soviet leader 
to consolidate power does not apply.  Andropov is a “leader who has come to power with 
firm support in the Politburo at the outset, and who has a mandate to act in both domestic 
and foreign affairs”.  He is supported by the military, the security apparatus and powerful 
conservative elements of the Party”.  Furthermore, “given Andropov’s promotion and 
apparently unchallenged accession to power, he will move promptly to address and tackle 




Based on US intelligence reporting of Andropov, the Reagan administration was bracing itself 
for a formidable struggle with an experienced and wily Soviet operator.  Clark informed 
Reagan that the CIA’s conclusion was, “the Soviet Union is likely to pose an even greater 
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threat to U.S. security as we are faced with a more active, intelligent, adroit adversary”263.  
Yet the path forward for the USSR was unclear.  Despite its apparent strength, the CIA 
reported that the Soviet Union was facing “a wide array of social malaise, ethnic tensions, 
consumer frustrations, and political dissent.  Precisely how these internal problems will 
ultimately challenge and affect the regime, however, is open to debate and considerable 
uncertainty”.   At that time “ethnic discontent – rooted in cultural, demographic, and 
economic problems as well as political suppression – remains primarily a latent but 
potentially serious vulnerability”264.  The Reagan administration would continue to assess 
Andropov over the next few months, while also monitoring the internal Soviet dynamics 
which may influence his foreign policy decision-making. 
 
In a report which analysed what actions the US should expect from the Soviets in the coming 
6-24 months, the State Department attempted to assess Soviet objectives under Andropov 
stating, “nothing in Andropov’s background or character suggests that he would be 
predisposed to swing widely from Brezhnev’s course… this by no means implies passive 
continuity in foreign policy”.  The report went on “the Soviet leaders may see more 
sophisticated, innovative, agile, and diversified diplomacy as the best and cheapest way to 
undercut and pressure us, expand their influence, relieve internal pressures, and perhaps 
cut the political costs of some of their more exposed positions abroad… the new Soviet 
leadership, like the old, sees in Washington an Administration that refuses to respect Soviet 
status … they see us as having raised the costs and risks of military and international 
competition ... they doubt our willingness to respond positively to anything less than a broad 
Soviet retreat, which they will not contemplate”265.   
 
Meanwhile Reagan was also struggling.  The US economy remained sluggish, his approval 
rating had dipped dramatically, polling showed most Americans were fearful that his 
explosive rhetoric could provoke nuclear war with the Soviets, the House of Representatives 
had voted against his scheme for new MX missiles, and the USSR appeared to be regrouping 
under a new and more formidable leader266.  Clark and Reagan again discussed whether now 
might be the time to engage the Soviets in a serious effort to make progress in arms 
reduction talks and to put the relationship on a “more stable footing”.  Clark wondered if 
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the Soviet economic difficulties and “looming problems with their ethnically diverse 
nationalities” might make them more open to negotiating267.  Nonetheless, the hardliners 
within the administration remained dubious of any outreach to the Soviets, wary of anything 
which could be construed as a softening in the US approach.  
 
With the Nationalities Working Group revived and working on a new course of American 
action toward the Soviet nationalities, Pipes began to wind down his time in the Reagan 
administration.  Before he left there was time for one more tussle with the State 
Department over the future direction of US Soviet policy.  In December 1982, the State 
Department had conducted a review of US-Soviet relations and produced a study outlining 
how Foggy Bottom envisioned the contours of the Soviet relationship over the next two 
years.  The administration was currently working out the details of another presidential 
directive which would build on the previously issued NSDD-32, and it hoped to conclude and 
produce the document in early 1983.  The State Department study identified the sources of 
the Soviet challenge to US interests as rooted in both Russian history and its imperial 
tradition, and the nature of the Communist regime.  It identified the USSR’s concerns over 
its internal insecurity, its superpower ambitions, and its ideologically-mandated animosity 
toward the United States as the drivers of Soviet foreign policy.   
 
With Soviet aggressiveness stemming from the nature of the internal Soviet system, and 
concerns over human rights abuses in the USSR, the report acknowledged that US foreign 
policy should “take into account the nature of the Soviet system in formulation of policy 
toward the USSR”.  While accepting that the Unites States should develop long-term policies 
designed to encourage the gradual democratisation of the USSR, the State Department 
cautioned, “the U.S. almost certainly lacks the capability to bring about major beneficial 
changes in the Soviet internal order over the near to middle term.  Indeed, there is a real 
possibility that increased external pressure on the Soviet Union could, at least in the short 
run, give the ruling Communist elite greater incentive for internal repression and external 
aggressiveness”268.   
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Pipes was incensed at the findings of this report, telling Clark, “I find the paper utterly 
disappointing in almost every respect and quite useless for purposes of policy guidance”.  
He went on, “the State Department assumes—contrary to all evidence—that the primary 
concern of the current Soviet administration lies in the area of foreign policy whereas all 
the evidence indicates that its uppermost concerns are internal”.  Pipes believed the State 
Department were massively underestimating the threat posed by the Soviet Union under the 
new leadership of Andropov, he felt the report repeated tired talking points from an earlier 
period of the Cold War, when containment and military force were all that was required to 
quell Soviet adventurism.  The conflict was now ideological, and Pipes wanted to take the 
war directly to the Soviets, attacking the very nature of their system.  Instead Pipes was 
enraged by what he read, “there is no sense here of a Soviet global strategy and therefore 
no recommendation of a global U.S. response”, he told Clark, “in particular, there is no 
mention here of the need to apply internal pressure on the Soviet Union and its Empire 
through economic, political, and ideological instrumentalities which constitutes one of the 
three principal U.S. policy objectives”269.   
 
The matter was discussed during an NSC meeting the following day, chaired by the 
president, where the participants opined upon the new presidential decision directive on 
Soviet policy which was being prepared.  Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam remarked 
that, “all agree, he said, that U.S. policy should contribute to containing (and over time 
reversing) Soviet expansionism, should promote internal change in the Soviet system, and 
should involve negotiation where U.S. interest would be served by such an approach”, yet 
“there was disagreement on several issues”.  Much of the disagreement centred on whether 
the US should offer the USSR technical and agricultural assistance, with the hardliners 
pushing for the administration to refrain from assisting the Soviets in developing their 
natural resources in order to heighten the difficulties facing Moscow internally.  Reagan 
revealed he had already crossed out contentious lines on this subject in a draft of the new 
directive which he had recently reviewed.  He felt the lines were provocative, and Reagan 
was worried they would leak to the Soviets.  The provocative lines had actually been written 
by Pipes.  As his time on the NSC drew to a close, the tide was turning beginning to turn 
away from the hard-line policies he advocated270.  
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Pipes left the administration at the end of 1982 and returned to Harvard, where he 
continued to write articles pushing for a tougher stance on the Soviets, drawing attention 
to the brewing nationalities problems facing the Soviet government.  His two-year stint in 
the White House had been eventful, he had worked tirelessly to shape US policy towards 
the Soviet Union in ways he felt were more attuned to the realities of communism and the 
nature of the internal problems facing the USSR.  In particular, Pipes was adamant that any 
successful Soviet policy must consider the Soviet nationalities and the difficulties they posed 
for the Kremlin, he felt this was a vital weakness which the US should exploit in order 
promote decentralisation and pluralism within the Soviet Union, serving American strategic 
interests.  Along with others, Pipes oversaw the revival of the Nationalities Working Group, 
the forum created by members of the Carter administration which provided a platform for 
research and discussion on the Soviet nationalities and attempted to draft US policies in this 
area.  The hard-line ideas of Brzezinski and Henze were reanimated within the Reagan 
administration by Pipes, who shared their craving for US foreign policy to directly attack 
the internal legitimacy of the Soviet system and viewed the agitation of the Soviet 
nationalities as the ideal way to achieve this.   
 
Nevertheless, Pipes remained a curious figure, and his zealous anti-communism and near 
obsession with exploiting the internal weaknesses of the Soviet Union placed him at the 
extreme end of hawkish policy positions, even in a White House full of hardliners.  As James 
Wilson says, “Pipes stood out when his lack of political experience led him to make 
statements exemplifying what others around him probably thought but refrained from 
stating because they were politically toxic.271”  After his departure, Pipes ideas were taken 
forward within the administration by John Lenczowski, who was equally as hard-line in his 
stance towards the Soviet Union, and his belief that the internal composition of the USSR 
was something American foreign policy should be paying more attention to.  Earmarked by 
Clark as “a prospective replacement for Dr Pipes”, Lenczowksi was something of a protégé 
to his former boss on the NSC, both highly-educated men who were deeply interested in the 
Soviet nationalities and determined to wage ideological war on the Soviet Union.  
Lenczowski would become a key figure in the Nationalities Working Group over the next 
couple of years, urging the administration to focus more attention and resources on Soviet 
republics such as Ukraine.  
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NSDD-75 and Shultz’s competing four-part framework 
 
In January 1983, Lenczowski drafted an uncompromising memo to Reagan, which Clark 
passed to the president.  The young NSC staffer called on Reagan to continue his ideological 
campaign against the Soviet regime, for “the Soviet system depends for its survival on the 
systematic suppression of the truth.  This is done by imposing the ideological Party line to 
justify totalitarian rule and serve the internal security system by setting the standard 
against which deviationism is measured … As the Soviets see it, to tell the truth about 
the USSR is to risk igniting their internal security threat — the threat of mass popular 
resistance to the ideology”.  Lenczowski believed Reagan had hit a major Soviet weak spot, 
forcing the Kremlin to take him seriously, telling the president, “you showed the Soviets 
that we have the moral strength and political support to say that the emperor has no clothes 
and to withstand the protests of the Soviets and the “courtiers” in the media and elsewhere.  
Thus, by simply telling the truth, you incalculably strengthened the credibility of our 
military deterrent”272.  The general thinking within the administration expected Andropov 
to alter little in Soviet activities abroad, as Clark articulated in National Security Planning 
Group (NSPG) meeting on 10 January 1983, we expect “basically an unchanged centre-line 
of Soviet policy that falls between broad expansionism and broad retreat.  For now, we 
should stick to the line that US-Soviet relations will improve if, but only if, the Soviets 
behave more responsibly”273.  In fact, 1983 would see tensions between the US and the 
Soviet Union rise to some of the highest levels of the entire Cold War. 
 
Despite no longer being part of the White House staff, Richard Pipes’ greatest victory was 
yet to arrive.  On January 17, 1983, Reagan signed off on NSDD-75, the presidential directive 
which finally provided an all-encompassing framework for the administration’s Soviet policy, 
and one of the most important US government documents of the Cold War.  The directive 
stated; “U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union will consist of three elements: external 
resistance to Soviet imperialism; internal pressure on the USSR to weaken the sources of 
Soviet imperialism; and negotiations to eliminate, on the basis of strict reciprocity, 
outstanding disagreements”.  The three elements which which would guide US policy 
towards the Soviet Union were as follows; 
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1. To contain and over time reverse Soviet expansionism by competing 
effectively on a sustained basis with the Soviet Union in all international arenas —
particularly in the overall military balance and in geographical regions of priority 
concern to the United States.  This will remain the primary focus of U.S. policy 
toward the USSR. 
2.  To promote, within the narrow limits available to us, the process of change 
in the Soviet Union toward a more pluralistic political and economic system in which 
the power of the privileged ruling elite is gradually reduced.  The U.S. recognizes 
that Soviet aggressiveness has deep roots in the internal system, and that relations 
with the USSR should therefore take into account whether or not they help to 
strengthen this system and its capacity to engage in aggression. 
3.  To engage the Soviet Union in negotiations to attempt to reach 
agreements which protect and enhance U.S. interests and which are consistent with 
the principle of strict reciprocity and mutual interest.  This is important when the 
Soviet Union is in the midst of a process of political succession. 
 
The document stated that the US would make it clear to the Kremlin that unacceptable 
behaviour would incur costs, while a more restrained Soviet approach would lead to a 
fruitful relationship with the West, from which benefits would potentially flow.  NSDD-75 
called for US foreign policy to “focus on shaping the environment in which Soviet decisions 
are made both in a wide variety of functional and geopolitical arenas and in the U.S.-Soviet 
bilateral relationship”.  The document highlighted the need for sound military strategy and 
economic policy, but also called for political action which would expose the weaknesses and 
contradictions in the Soviet system. “U.S. policy must have an ideological thrust which 
clearly affirms the superiority of U.S. and Western values of individual dignity and freedom, 
a free press, free trade unions, free enterprise, and political democracy over the repressive 
features of Soviet Communism”.   
 
The new strategy also called for the strengthening of US instruments of political action such 
as democracy promotion, increased efforts to highlight human rights abuses, and a renewed 
focus on radio broadcasting into the USSR.  This would expose the double standards 
employed by the Soviet Union in its dealings with its internal problems, with Soviet policies 
toward its ethnic minorities specifically mentioned.  The US wanted to expand its knowledge 
of Soviet society through increased “cultural, educational, scientific and other cooperative 
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exchanges” which should be “seen in light of the U.S. intention to maintain a strong 
ideological component in relations with Moscow”274.  
 
With the adoption of NSDD 75, official US dialogue with their Soviet counterparts would no 
longer focus merely on geopolitical matters and arms control.  The US now viewed internal 
developments within the USSR as a key component of its negotiation strategy, stating “the 
U.S. should insist that Moscow address the full range of U.S. concerns about Soviet internal 
behaviour and human rights violations, and should continue to resist Soviet efforts to return 
to a U.S.-Soviet agenda focused primarily on arms control”275.  From now on, issues 
surrounding the plight of human rights activists, national minorities, and political dissidents 
would all become part of the US-Soviet relationship.  NSDD 75 was a profound document, 
and it would have a real impact on encouraging the development of further US policies 
toward the Soviet nationalities.  NSDD-75 enshrined the policy prescriptions of the White 
House hardliners in official US government policy.  The document recognised the political 
and ideological foundations of the Cold War struggle and was notable for its attention to 
the internal dynamics of the Soviet Union, tying these directly to negotiations between the 
superpowers.  For those interested in the Soviet nationalities, this presidential directive 
was a real boon.  However, even as this utterly uncompromising document was being issued, 
there were already stirrings from behind the scenes which revealed Reagan was moving in 
a different direction, and this victory for hard-line thinking within the administration may 
be short-lived. 
 
Not only was the NSDD-75 a milestone in US policy towards the Soviet Union, it also sparked 
an intense period of in-fighting within the administration.  In January, Clark had offered his 
resignation to Reagan.  The president’s old friend, who had proven himself as a capable 
national security adviser, was worn out by the constant White House intrigue and relentless 
turf wars.  Reagan refused to accept his resignation but allowed Clark to return home to 
California for a month to rest276.  It was at this point George Shultz approached the president 
with an alternative set of policy prescriptions, sending a memo to Reagan outlining his own 
thinking on how to move the US-Soviet relationship forward, one which was shorn of the 
hard-line rhetoric of NSDD-75 and differed substantially from the document Reagan had just 
signed off on.  While recognising “the US-Soviet competition has deep roots in the 
fundamentally different nature of the two societies and in Moscow readiness to use its 
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growing military power in ways that threaten our security”, in stark contrast to NSDD-75, 
Shultz’s proposal called for negotiation and engagement with the Soviet leadership.  Shultz 
conceded there had been increased Soviet activism since Andropov assumed power, yet 
proposed, “this memo sets forth a strategy for countering this new Soviet activism by using 
an intensified dialogue with Moscow to test whether an improvement in the US-Soviet 
relationship is possible”.  Shultz went on, “as we proceed, we must keep in mind that our 
challenge is not to launch a bold, new initiative but to build on the good beginning we have 
made in the patient, steady, yet creative management of a long-term adversarial 
relationship with the Soviet Union”.   
 
The secretary of state believed that following a policy of intensified dialogue with the 
Soviets would best serve US interests and suggested following a framework based around 
matters of mutual concern such as arms control, economic, and regional issues, while 
continuing to press the Soviets on human rights abuses.  Shultz concluded by telling Reagan, 
“1983 will be a year of new challenges and opportunities in our relations with the Soviet 
Union.  We have in place a sound policy, which gives us the foundation for an intensified 
dialogue with Moscow … Such a dialogue would protect our security interests while giving 
the Soviets incentives to address our concerns”277.  This was not a call to promote sweeping 
internal change within the Soviet system, but for the US to pursue a strategy based on 
realism, engagement and mutual interests, while still allowing for Western values and a 
commitment to human rights to form a key part of the approach.  Needless to say, Clark 
was apoplectic when he found out and held heated meetings with both Reagan and Shultz 
on his return from California.  The internal debate would rumble on for months278.  
 
Unperturbed, Shultz appealed again to the presidents budding desire to engage with the 
Soviets, arranging a secretive meeting between Reagan and the Soviet ambassador to the 
US, Anatoly Dobrynin.  This would be Reagan’s first meeting with a high-ranking Soviet 
official, and in the outgoing and cosmopolitan Dobrynin he found the perfect partner.  The 
two men discussed exit visas for the family of Pentecostals who were sheltered in the 
basement of the US embassy in Moscow, with Reagan promising not to grandstand if the 
Soviets would quietly allow them to leave the USSR.  A promise which was kept on both 
sides, building trust.  After the meeting, Reagan wrote in his diary, “George tells me that 
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after they left the Ambassador said ‘this could be a historic moment’”279.  In March, Shultz 
sent the president a follow-up briefing to his January memo entitled, “USG-Soviet Relations 
– Where do we want to be and how do we get there?”.  Once again Shultz described a path 
forward for US-Soviet relations which focused on negotiation and shared interests, striking 
a tone very different to the confrontational nature of NSDD-75.  He advocated the continual 
improvement of America’s economic, diplomatic and military prowess in order to negotiate 
from a position of strength.  He placed priority on arms control issues and believed resisting 
Soviet military power remained the basis for US strategy, yet he hoped this would develop 
into a more stable and constructive US-Soviet relationship.   
 
In order to pursue these objectives, Shultz suggested a four-part framework for guiding 
negotiations with the Soviet Union; arms control, regional issues, human rights, and 
economic relations.  Indeed, the framework would go on to guide US negotiations with the 
Soviets over the following years, providing a realistic roadmap for the administration.  On 
the issue of human rights, Shultz did not advocate applying large-scale pressure in order to 
affect change within the internal Soviet system as Pipes had called for, but advocated 
“private diplomacy, leading to results, not counter-productive public embarrassment of 
Moscow”280.  Clark and Lenczowski hit back, telling Reagan the new memo was “an almost 
identical repetition” of Shultz’s January message to the president.  They believed the memo 
contained “several questionable assumptions” and the reasons given by Shultz for 
intensified dialogue with the Soviets were “weak, and unconvincing as they reflect a 
wishful-thinking perception about the nature of the Soviet system”.  Lenczowski questioned 
the purpose of increasing dialogue, along with the prospects for Soviet concessions.  He was 
troubled by Shultz’s lack of focus on the internal nature of the Soviet system, and the 
absence of any moral or ideological component to the policy framework, which he felt was 
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As 1983 progressed, tensions with the Soviets began to reach fever pitch and Reagan faced 
foreign policy challenges across the board, with violence in the Middle East escalating in 
particular worrying fashion.  He continued to push for an American military build-up, while 
also becoming fascinated with the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), or ‘Star Wars’.  This 
controversial and untested concept would potentially make the threat of nuclear war a thing 
of the past through the use of lasers to target incoming ICBM’s.  Reagan was even willing to 
share details of this project with the Soviets, who viewed the matter with suspicion282.  
Reagan believed the logic of Mutually Assured Destruction to be utterly abhorrent and 
thought there had to be a better way to secure peace which didn’t involve threatening the 
world with nuclear Armageddon.  The Soviets had broken off negotiations with the US in 
May, in response to the deployment of American Pershing missiles to Europe, and alarm had 
now taken hold in Moscow, with the Central Committee of the CPSU announcing, “by placing 
American missiles on the European continent (in addition to those medium-range nuclear 
weapons already possessed by NATO), the US and NATO on the whole would like 
fundamentally to change the existing balance of forces in Europe in their favour, which 
would worsen the over-all military-strategic situation and would increase the danger of 
nuclear war”283.   
 
The hardliners in the Reagan administration still remained committed to following an 
uncompromising approach towards the Soviets, but the growing influence of Shultz was now 
clear.  Having initially been caught off guard by Reagan’s public endorsement of SDI, Shultz 
saw it as an opportunity to continue to foster the president’s instincts towards improving 
bilateral relations with the Soviets.  Reagan was clearly beginning to change direction, 
writing “some of the NSC staff are too hard-line and don’t think any approach should be 
made to the Soviets … I think I’m hard-line and will never appease but I want to try and let 
them see there is a better world if they’ll show by deed that they want to get along with 
the free world”284.  
In June 1983, Shultz gained an important partner inside the White House, as Jack Matlock 
joined the NSC as the president’s new Soviet expert.  Matlock was a career diplomat who 
had recently served as US ambassador to Czechoslovakia.  He was deeply knowledgeable of 
Russian history and culture, spoke several East European languages, and although 
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fundamentally opposed to the communist system he was non-adversarial and believed the 
Soviet Union was capable of peaceful reform.  Matlock was also interested in the Soviet 
nationalities and was eager to see the US government expand its knowledge of the ethnic 
currents within the USSR, although not in order to ferment instability but to better 
understand the internal forces within Soviet society.  Matlock would bring some much-
needed experience and sobriety to the Soviet affairs team on the NSC, currently being 
marshalled by the youthful Lenczowski and Paula Dobriansky, the daughter of the famous 
Ukrainian émigré activist Lev Dobriansky285.  With Matlock allying with Shultz’s position, 
bringing his experience and keen insights to the NSC, the president began to move in a more 
restrained direction, with Shultz’s four-part framework largely forming the basis of the US 
approach to the USSR moving forward, much to the dismay of the administration’s 
hardliners.  As Shultz recalls, “the efforts of the staff at the NSC to keep him (Reagan) out 
were beginning to break down”286. 
The Nationalities Working Group expands its activities 
Despite the tempering of Reagan’s thinking towards Moscow, the jockeying for position 
between Shultz and Clark, and Shultz’s proposed four-part framework for dialogue with the 
Soviets growing in importance, it was NSDD-75 which continued to provide impetus for the 
goal of promoting political change inside the USSR.  And targeting the Soviet nationalities 
persisted on the minds of some policymakers within the Reagan administration as an 
effective way to do this.  In March, the director of the USIA wrote to Reagan suggesting a 
raft of initiatives aimed at influencing the internal dynamics of the USSR, and alongside 
radio broadcasting the USIA advocated for increased exchanges and an exhibits program 
which would allow for greater penetration of Soviet society and were in line with NSDD 75 
and the basic task of US policy which was the “promotion of political change within the 
USSR”287.  Likewise, the Nationalities Working Group was also enthusiastic about building on 
the president’s directive, and in early 1983 NWG members at the Soviet Bureau of 
Intelligence and Research (INR) in the State Department launched ‘Soviet Nationalities 
Survey’, which was to become a quarterly published journal which explored internal Soviet 
developments with regards to its national minorities, with the aim of raising the profile of 
Soviet nationalities problems within US government circles288.  
                                                        
285 “Reagan Getting a Soviet Expert as New Adviser”, New York Times, June 5, 1983 
286 Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p162 
287 Memo Director USIA to Reagan, “Promoting Political Change in the USSR”, March 16, 1983, Box 
41, US-USSR 1983 (March), Series II: USSR Subject File, Jack Matlock Files, RRPL. 
288 Kuzio, U.S. support for Ukraine’s liberation during the Cold War, p10 
126 
 
The first edition of ‘Soviet Nationalities Survey’ was published in March 1983, and covered 
developments during the period January to March 1983.  There was commentary on 
Andropov’s initial remarks about his nationalities policy at the 60th anniversary celebration 
of the Soviet Union in December 1982, and again at the Supreme Soviet Presidium meeting 
in January 1983.  The journal suggested that Andropov viewed nationality issues as delicate 
and potentially explosive, and would pursue a cautious, pragmatic policy based on economic 
imperatives and sociological research, rather than an ideologically-based leaning toward 
either Russian or non-Russian nationalities.  However, the Survey suggested that his “plan 
to increase economic integration and regional specialization throughout the USSR, however, 
may in fact exacerbate nationality problems” while suggesting Andropov had conceded the, 
“problems of relations among nations have not been removed from the agenda.  He also 
implied that much current Soviet thinking in this area was inadequate”.  The first edition 
also included commentary on the role of non-Russian languages in the Soviet military, 
changes in the leadership structure of the Muslim republics of Central Asia, and details of 
arrests in the Baltics for nationalist agitation289.  The Survey was edited and written by 
Special Assistant for Soviet Nationalities Alvin Kapusta and INR staffer Paul Goble, who were 
experts on the Soviet nationalities at the INR and heavily involved with the NWG.  Despite 
being published by an arm of the State Department, the initiative mainly had the support 
of the NSC in the White House as the State Department remained cautious on the question 
of Soviet nationalities.  The publication ran from 1983 to 1989, when Goble left to join Radio 
Liberty290. 
Emboldened by the US government’s newly mandated focus on the internal structure of the 
Soviet Union, the NWG began to draft a set of prescriptions for US policy towards the Soviet 
nationalities which they hoped would form an entirely separate, yet complimentary, policy 
program to run alongside NSDD-75.  This would be a key document and members of the NWG 
laboured hard to produce a detailed and realistic proposal to place before the president.  
The NWG took NSDD-75 as inspiration for their proposals, tying their platform explicitly to 
the ideological thrust and focus on the internal nature of the Soviet regime outlined in the 
administration’s official Soviet strategy.  Lenczowski was a driving force behind this project 
and took on a lot of the responsibility for drafting the proposals, which the group worked 
on over the course of early 1983.  Also involved was Jack Matlock, who while not sharing 
the more hard-line anti-Soviet views of some of the group’s members, had long advocated 
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for expanding US government knowledge of the Soviet nationalities and saw the NWG as the 
ideal forum for accomplishing this291.    
In July 1983, after consultation across various agencies, the NWG had produced a draft 
document which explored the basic premise and rationale behind the need for a specific 
NSDD on the subject of the Soviet nationalities, over and above that of NSDD-75.  On July 
5, after the Department of Defense had made some alterations, the group held an important 
meeting at the State Department to discuss the progress of the proposed NSDD, with the 
meeting being smaller and more focused than usual in order to reach a consensus292.  The 
draft proposal for an NSDD on the Soviet nationalities began by immediately tying their 
efforts to the Reagan’s recent directive on US policy towards the Soviet Union, stating “as 
set forth in NSDD-75, US policy toward the USSR is to aim at: containing and over time 
reversing Soviet expansionism, promoting change within the Soviet Union toward a more 
pluralistic system, and reaching agreements with the Soviet Union that protect and enhance 
US interests and are consistent with the principles of strict reciprocity and mutual interest.  
As part of that policy, the USG shall pursue a rejuvenated effort to understand and to 
influence ethnic and national developments within the Soviet Union”.  NSDD 75 had called 
for more focus on the internal nature of the Soviet regime and had expressly mentioned 
ethnic groups within the Soviet Union as an area of interest for the US government.  In light 
of this, the document suggested four objectives in this area, which aligned with overall 
American policy towards the USSR; 
1 To encourage changes within the Soviet Union that foster diversity, pluralism, 
decentralization, democracy and conformity with internationally-accepted norms of 
justice and morality.  
2 To promote a more accurate understanding of the nature and actions of the Soviet 
Union by drawing attention to its colonial and expansionist characteristics, and by 
undermining the notion that the expansion of communist rule is an irreversible 
phenomenon.  
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3 To create an institutional structure within the USG, and more broadly in the U.S., 
to strengthen and sustain our capabilities for understanding and influencing Soviet 
ethnic and national developments.  
4 Consistent with NSDD-75, to increase our presence and activities in the Soviet 
Union while ensuring that the resulting benefits are not counterbalanced by 
drawbacks of any increased presence and activities the Soviets may demand in 
return. ·  
These objectives facilitate a clear view of the role US policymakers believed the Soviet 
nationalities could play in American grand strategy and it offers a glimpse into the way 
Reagan administration officials thought about this subject.  US government interest in the 
Soviet nationalities stemmed from the desire to foster moves towards greater pluralism and 
decentralisation within the USSR, with self-determination among the national groups clearly 
a cause in line with this goal.  They felt it was absolutely necessary for the US government 
to gain a better grasp of ethnic issues inside the Soviet Union in order to understand the 
drivers of its international activities and wanted to see institutionalised efforts within the 
government to comprehend and attempt to influence developments among the Soviet 
nationalities.  An increased presence in the USSR would play an important role in this, but 
they must remain prudent about the potential trade-offs involved in the Soviets demanding 
reciprocity.   
The document went on to consider the implementation of these policies and called for an 
“action program” which would be based on “the reaffirmation of our commitment to the 
rights and proper interests of the various ethnic and national groups within the Soviet Union, 
including (as appropriate) their rights to practice their religions, to provide traditional 
education to their children, to emigrate and to enjoy national independence”.  This action 
program involved a series of measures which the US government should take moving 
forward; increase its capabilities for understanding and influencing developments within 
the Soviet Union affecting ethnic and national groups, increase its ability to broadcast radio 
programs to Soviet ethnic and national groups and otherwise increase the flow of 
information into the USSR, continue to recognize the independence of Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania, increase UN activities, work with the appropriate public bodies, such as the CSCE, 
Amnesty International, and other interested religious and political organizations, explore 
further the implications of the Afghan resistance movement for its policy toward Soviet 
Muslim minorities, establish a larger U.S. official presence in the USSR, initiate new cultural, 
informational, and educational exchanges, and increase public statements on Soviet abuse 
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of ethnic and national groups. It was an ambitious and expansive program to incorporate 
the national minorities of the Soviet Union more fully into US Cold War strategy293. 
US consulate in Kiev 
In line with these prescriptions, and the emphasis on increasing the presence of the US 
government on the territory of the USSR, the old idea of opening a US consulate in Kiev was 
revived and given serious consideration within the Reagan administration.  While the NWG 
pushed for a better understanding of, and capabilities to reach, the countless Soviet 
nationalities which were scattered across the empire, it was also important to make serious 
efforts to establish a footing in the non-Russian republics themselves.  Indeed, there was a 
recognition within the White House that Ukraine was the most important of the non-Russian 
Soviet republics, and it may be to America’s benefit to gain a foothold there.  Most 
policymakers in the West had given little thought to Ukraine since the end of World War II, 
knowing little about the territory.   
 
Nevertheless, Ukraine was absolutely vital to the structure of the Soviet Union.  The 
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was home to millions of Soviet citizens, a large 
percentage of the Soviet nuclear arsenal, and was an agricultural powerhouse.  Ukraine also 
played an almost mythical role in Russian consciousness as the spiritual birthplace of 
‘Russian civilization’ and Russian Orthodoxy.  In the aftermath of the brutal Russian Civil 
War which followed the Revolution, Ukraine had been incorporated into the USSR and 
suffered cultural repression and famine during the Stalinist years.  After a flirtation with a 
more nationalist-infused form of communism under Petro Shelest during the 1960’s, Ukraine 
became one of the more hard-line of the Soviet republics as the Cold War wore on.  The 
Ukrainian Communist Party boss Volodymyr Shcherbytsky was appointed during the Brezhnev 
era and held a tight grip on power right until late 1989, with Ukrainian religious believers, 
political dissidents, human rights activists and nationalists labouring under his rule.  
Standing guard at the crossroads of East and West, empires had fought over Ukraine’s 
territorial expanse for centuries, and the vastness of the Ukrainian steppe was difficult for 
Western minds to penetrate.  Within the West however, millions of Ukrainian emigres had 
found a home, and they had not forgotten their ancestral homeland or their compatriots 
who still suffered there under the Soviet yolk.    
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As the Cold War wore on, their plight began to attract the attention of human rights 
activists, and indeed of Western governments.  As nationalist sentiment began to rise across 
the USSR and the Soviet dissident movement came to prominence during the 1970s, Congress 
and elements of the US government began to pay more attention to the long-simmering 
‘Soviet nationalities question’, human rights, and religious freedom within the USSR294. 
Incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1922, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was the 
primary non-Russian republic of the USSR.  Home to over 50 million inhabitants, its fertile 
lands formed the centrepiece of Soviet agriculture and its industrial and mining 
infrastructure provided vital output for the economy.  The Soviet military bases located in 
Ukraine were home to one third of the USSR’s nuclear arsenal, and its historic role as a 
buffer between the Russian heartland and the rest of Europe was an integral part of Soviet 
territorial security.   
 
In this respect, the communist party leadership in the Kremlin viewed Ukraine in much the 
same way as their predecessors in Tsarist Russia had; it provided security along its borders 
and played a pivotal role in the maintenance of a favourable balance of power in Eurasia.  
By the late 1970’s, it also remained one of the most religious and nationally-conscious parts 
of the Soviet Union, despite enduring decades of Soviet anti-religious propaganda and waves 
of Russification at the hands of the old Tsarist regime and the communists who now oversaw 
its territory.  Ukrainian nationalism was never truly extinguished, with the west of Ukraine 
in particular remaining a hotbed of nationalist sentiment.  Historically more religiously 
diverse than other parts of Eastern Europe, Ukraine boasted an Orthodox majority with large 
Catholic and Protestant minorities, lending it the moniker ‘The Bible Belt of the Soviet 
Union’295.  It was also home to a lively political dissident scene, inspired by the Helsinki 
accords and connected to the growing transnational network of human rights activists.  
Ukraine was on the radar. 
 
Plans to open a US consulate in Ukraine had been mooted and seriously discussed with the 
Soviets since the mid-1970s, with the USSR gaining a consulate in New York in return as part 
of the deal.  There were always concerns around the issue of reciprocity and allowing the 
Soviets, and hence the KGB, further access to the United States.  It was quite simply a 
matter of balancing potential gains for the US in entering Ukraine with the negatives which 
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would come with an additional Soviet presence on American soil.  By the end of the 1970s 
the agreement looked likely to go ahead, until the Carter administration shelved plans to 
open the consulate in 1980, in a response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan296.  This was 
a move criticised by Matlock in his memoirs because it, “harmed US interests more than it 
hurt the Soviet Union, meaning there was no one in Ukraine to take care of American 
interests or follow political developments in this important non-Russian Soviet republic”297. 
Haig had also discussed the issue with Gromyko back in late 1981, when the Soviet foreign 
minister pushed him for an answer on the matter, claiming authorities in Kiev were keen to 
use the building originally set aside for the US consulate should the Americans decide against 
taking it over298.   
 
A year later the State Department drafted a report on the matter, which Haig had shared 
with Reagan.  The State Department believed the project had merit but was probably not 
worth pursuing at that point in spring 1982, concluding, “there is a strong case for reversing 
a wrongheaded Carter sanction … and restarting the process leading to establishment of a 
U.S. official presence in the heart of the Ukraine. The Soviets are pressing us to fish or cut 
bait on a fine Kiev consulate building they have prepared for us, but we have neither 
occupied nor made payments on.  But there is a downside.  The intelligence community is 
lukewarm in its support for our establishing in Kiev.  The FBI was resigned to opening in New 
York before, but now is opposed to an additional Soviet presence there.  We will draw some 
political heat in any event by a decision to move forward … After considering the pros and 
cons, I would propose to risk the building by telling the Soviets we would like to keep it but 
are not in a position to move forward to negotiations on reopening now”299.  
Officials within the Reagan White House now believed the reopening of a US consulate in 
Kiev could provide the United States with an important opening in this strategically 
important Soviet republic, and a driving force for this development was actually the 
secretary of state George Shultz, who by now was a figure of disdain for many of the 
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hardliners in the White House during Reagan’s first term300.  In March 1983, Shultz had raised 
the issue with Reagan during the period when he was beginning to suggest an alternative 
path forward for dealing with the Soviets, one which differed completely in tone and 
emphasis from NSDD-75.  Shultz believed it was important to negotiate a new US-Soviet 
cultural agreement and push for the opening of an American consulate in Ukraine, suggesting 
to Reagan, “the negotiation of a new cultural agreement to enforce reciprocity and enhance 
US ideological penetration of the Soviet Union itself” and the “opening of a US consulate in 
Kiev to establish a new US presence in the Ukraine”301.  For Shultz, this was perfectly in line 
with the goals of NSDD-75, and in his memoirs he describes how he highlighted this point to 
the president302.   
Shultz argued that a formal framework of cultural exchanges was the only way to truly 
penetrate the USSR with American values and ideals.  Shultz affirmed, the “opening of US 
and Soviet consulates in Kiev and New York would have the advantage of getting us onto 
new Soviet terrain while increasing the Soviet presence here only marginally…. Our new 
consulate would be the first Western mission in the capital of the Ukraine … a US presence 
there (Ukraine) would also help us broaden our access to and ideological penetration of 
Soviet society”303.  This suggestion provoked the ire of Clark, who remained deeply 
suspicious of both Shultz’s recent manoeuvrings and the prospect of an increased Soviet 
presence in the US.  In response to Shultz’s suggestions, he told Reagan, “I have strong 
reservations about State’s two proposals for bilateral relations.  The first, a new cultural 
agreement, seems innocuous enough.  But the issue is part of a whole complex of questions 
that relate to reciprocity and controlling the KGB presence in our country … for now we 
should not yet authorise any negotiations until the issue has been thoroughly aired at an 
NSC meeting.  The second proposal is equally problematical: opening a US consulate in Kiev 
and a Soviet consulate in New York.  This also needs further study”304.   
                                                        
300 David Foglesong, The American Mission and the ‘Evil Empire’: The Crusade for a ‘Free Russia’ 
Since 1881, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p182 
301 Memo Shultz to Reagan, “Next Steps in US-Soviet Relations”, March 16, 1983, Box 41, US-USSR 
(1983 March), Jack Matlock Files, RRPL. 
302 George Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph Diplomacy, Power, and the Victory of the American Deal, 
(Prentice and Hall, 1993), p276.  Shultz explains that Vice President Bush had warned him that his 
memos to Reagan on Soviet policy were being countered by “absolutely vicious” memos to the 
president from the NSC staff.  
303 Ibid, p276 
304 Memo Clark to Reagan (drafted by Lenczowski), “State’s Latest Memorandum on US-Soviet 
Relations/ Next Steps in US-Soviet Relations”, March 22, 1983, Box 41, US-USSR (1983 March), Jack 
Matlock Files, RRPL. 
133 
 
Clark, the hardliner who favoured attacking and weakening the internal nature of the Soviet 
system in line with the objectives set out by NSDD-75, seemed to be baulking when 
presented with a concrete proposal for doing so.  Clark’s hostility to communism and 
trepidation at the prospect of an additional Soviet footprint in the US were giving him pause, 
his ongoing feud with Shultz perhaps also on his mind.  Shultz, the moderate, now seemed 
to be pushing for an ideological incursion into Soviet territory, calling upon the provisions 
of NSDD-75 to do so.  Shultz was eager to build a degree of trust with the Soviet leadership, 
and to promote understanding of each other’s societies through cultural exchanges.  
Nevertheless, this episode, along with Matlock’s involvement with the NWG, should serve 
as reminders that it may be too easy to cast officials as ‘hardliners’ and ‘moderates’, ‘hawks 
and ‘doves’.  Quite often there is plenty of overlap between the positions.  Shultz may have 
favoured taking a more measured and less ideological approach toward the Soviets, but he 
was fully committed to seeing American democratic values take root around the world.  As 
Ambassador Palmer recalled in his dealings with Shultz, “George Shultz believes that 
America is a great country.  He believes that democracy is a universal system and that all 
people should some day be free.  He is very clear headed about that.  In that respect, he is 
very unusual in the American foreign policy establishment”305. Shultz stood firmly in the 
tradition of Republican realism; prudent in approach, yet internationalist in mindset. 
NSDD-75 had set the standard for US policy towards the Soviet Union, and now the task of 
crafting tangible and realistic policies around its framework had begun in earnest.  Despite 
the fears around reciprocity, support was growing for the need to agree a structure for 
cultural exchanges with the USSR and to explore the opening of further US consulates in the 
Soviet Union.  NSDD-75 was the perfect vehicle for moving this goal forward.  In June 1983, 
the NSC organised an Interdepartmental Group meeting to consider steps to implement the 
provisions of NSDD 75, featuring representatives across all the main governmental and 
intelligence agencies. Noting that NSDD 75 had called for building and sustaining a major 
ideological/political offensive with the goal of bring about evolutionary change within the 
USSR as a priority near-term objective of for US policy, the meeting would formally discuss 
concrete steps which could be taken to translate that mandate into specific moves geared 
to the general objective.  With the increased focus on promoting internal pressure inside 
the USSR, penetrating Soviet territory with US ideology and exploiting vulnerabilities inside 
the Soviet empire, the opening of an American consulate in Ukraine could be one such step.  
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There was a view that this would be entirely consistent with Reagan’s broad strategy and 
would constitute a “prudent and effective” step towards actually implementing it306.   
If the US was willing to explore an endeavour which would both serve its interests while 
being to the mutual advantage of the Soviets, it was also hoped would this would project 
an image of America effectively managing the US-Soviet relationship, which in turn would 
sustain support from Congress and the American people for the “new, tougher approach to 
the USSR”.  While aware that these steps may be perceived as a weakening of the sanctions 
imposed on the Soviets as a result of their excursion into Afghanistan, there was no desire 
to return to “business as usual”.  There was a belief that, like the grain embargo, the 
decision by the Carter administration to shelve the Kiev consulate plans in response to the 
war in Afghanistan, after years of negotiations, had actually hurt US interests more than it 
had the Soviets.  
Along with Kiev, the Nationalities Working Group had also suggested the opening of another 
US consulate in Tashkent, deep in Soviet Uzbekistan307.  Consulates in Tashkent and Kiev 
would be considered feasible means of increasing US contact with the USSR’s largest non-
Russian nationalities, as Congress and the highly mobilised Ukrainian American community 
pushed the administration for recognition of human rights violations in Ukraine308.  While 
there was a recognition that a potential consulate in Kiev would be closely monitored by 
the Soviets, the rationale for pressing ahead was strong, it would create “an official US 
presence in the Ukraine (and Central Asia) … would contribute to building internal pressure 
to weaken the sources of Soviet imperialism and promoting change within the Soviet Union 
… by its activities in a sensitive region (or regions) of the USSR.  It would provide a new base 
or bases for contacts with nationality, religious and dissident groups in a period when 
nationalism is arguably the strongest internal pressure on the Soviet regime, as well as 
developing US government expertise in these areas” and the “establishment of new 
consulates in these areas would demonstrate our concerns over human rights and 
nationalities in the Soviet Union in tangible form”.  
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This was a very real way of turning the policy prescriptions of the Nationalities Working 
Group into actionable measures towards the Soviet nationalities.  With regards to the new 
suggestion by the NWG of opening a consulate in Tashkent, it was believed “over the next 
years and decades, nationalities tensions are likely to be even more severe in Soviet Central 
Asia then in the Ukraine, and a consulate in Tashkent would be even more useful to us as a 
source of American influence then a mission in Kiev … If the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan 
continues, having people in Tashkent would put us “behind the lines” of a major theatre of 
Soviet expansionism”, although there was also a recognition that the Soviets would be less 
inclined to be open to this proposal, and it would cost more money309.  
In July 1983 the State Department drafted a Terms of Reference to guide negotiations with 
the Soviets over cultural exchanges and future consulates, carried out at the request of 
Clark, who wished to explore the matter further.  He had asked State to organise a series 
of interagency meetings to generate a strategy paper for negotiating with the Soviets on 
the establishment of Consulates in Kiev and New York310.  The Terms of Reference stated 
that, “the President has approved offering the Soviets negotiation of a cultural exchanges 
agreement”, and had, “approved in principle the desirability of establishing new Consulates 
in Kiev and New York”, while Shultz had informed the Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin 
of this development on June 18.  Again, drawing on the provisions of NSDD-75, which 
provided the policy basis for seeking an agreement "to promote the process of change in the 
Soviet Union toward a more pluralistic political and economic system", and, ". . . to reach 
agreements which protect and enhance US interests and are consistent with the principle 
of strict reciprocity and mutual interest”, the State Department outlined the need for a 
formal agreement with the Soviets to achieve these goals, stating “in the absence of an 
agreement the Soviets are able to do things in the cultural, informational, and ideological 
areas for which we cannot enforce reciprocity.  An agreement would enhance our ability to 
require reciprocity and add to our means of ideologically penetrating Soviet society”.   
The report also noted, “at the time of the suspension in January 1980, we were 
approximately six months away from completion of the work on the Consulate office building 
and officially opening our Consulate in Kiev.  The absence of a Consulate has deprived us of 
an important source of intelligence collection and of continuing contacts with important 
nationality and religious groups in the area.  Establishing the Consulate will mark a major 
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new U.S. penetration into this geographically key area which contains the second largest 
Soviet nationality group”.  An interagency group was formed to develop a negotiating 
strategy and produce the first draft of a strategy paper which would form the basis of 
negotiations with the Soviets, while also exploring the logistical requirements for sending 
an Advance Team to Kiev in the near future311.  On agreement, State planned to forward 
the strategy to the NSC.  Matlock passed the Terms of Reference onto Clark, telling him 
that, “we do not yet have an official reply from the Soviets on our proposal for negotiations, 
but State anticipates that they will accept our proposal and Soviet Embassy officials have 
indicated that they may have an official reply on July 15”.  Matlock went on, “the terms of 
reference, while general, appear to be sound pending elaboration of detailed negotiating 
position”312.  
When the State Department officially submitted the strategy paper for the prospective Kiev 
consulate to Clark in August, it noted that some clarification was required from the Soviets 
as to whether the building which was originally earmarked for the consulate was still 
available, and highlighted some of the internal disagreement which still existed among 
government agencies, with Hill telling the national security adviser, “there are still some 
differences of view among agencies, and these are set forth in the  paper transmitted 
herewith, which has been cleared by the FBI, NSA, CIA and USIA”313.  “State and NSA agree 
that if the Soviets tell us they have kept the building available, we should accept it.  We 
have already invested $1.5 million in renovation, which would be lost if we refused the 
building.  Moreover, the negotiations for a more desirable site would be long and the end 
result would not necessarily be a site preferable to the one we now have.  If the current 
site remains available, State and NSA believe that we should send a team to Kiev as soon as 
possible for an inspection and evaluation of the work and time that will be required to put 
it into suitable condition.  The FBI, on the other hand, would prefer that we seek new 
facilities whether or not the Soviets are willing to make the previously designated office 
site available”.   
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The report also discussed practical issues of funding, staffing levels and then laid out the 
policy objectives of the new consulate, identifying why a US presence in Ukraine would 
benefit American policy, stating, “in noting that the USG should seek to reach agreements 
which "protect and enhance US interests and are consistent with the principle of strict 
reciprocity", NSDD-75 provides the fundamental policy framework for establishing the new 
Consulates.  A Consulate in Kiev … will give us a unique vantage point for economic 
reporting, a base in the Soviet agricultural heartland for crop monitoring, a facility to 
provide on-the-spot consular protection and assistance to American visitors in the area, and 
the opportunity to initiate new cultural, informational, and educational exchanges, thereby 
heightening awareness of US values and goals in the region”.  Ideally, the State Department 
wanted to open the new consulate in summer 1985314. There was now a recognition within 
the US government that increased penetration of the non-Russian Soviet republics was a 
desirable objective for US policy towards the USSR, as laid out by NSDD-75.  Ukraine had 
been identified as a key Soviet republic for its geostrategic, historical, economic and 
cultural position within the USSR, and the opening of a consulate in Kiev, which had been 
described by Richard Nixon in 1972 as the “mother of all Russian cities” would provide an 
excellent opening to gather information on non-Russian Soviet society and to create a crack 
for American ideology to drip through315. 
Matlock discussed State’s strategy paper with Clark a few days later, telling him “the Soviets 
had long resisted an American office in Kiev, offering instead less advantageous locations, 
but finally agreed to Kiev under the pressure of reaching agreements for the 1974 summit”.  
He told Clark that the background to the plan was murky and the status of the building was 
unclear.  Having spent well over a million dollars in preparing the building for use during 
the 1970s, since being ordered to abandon the project by President Carter the American 
government had not paid any rent on the building whatsoever, and the Soviets were now, 
understandably, using it for their own needs.  In turn, the Soviet Union had already 
identified and purchased a building in New York, which they planned to use as a new Soviet 
consulate in the event an agreement could be reached.   
Thus, Matlock informed Clark, “this complicated background is relevant to some of the 
questions raised in the strategy paper.  Broadly speaking, our options are to aim for an 
opening as quickly as possible, and thus establish our presence in the capital of the largest 
non-Russian republic, or to attempt to improve on the arrangements already negotiated, 
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which could entail considerable delay with little prospect of significant improvement”316.  
Matlock was eager to bring the plans to fruition, feeling it would be hugely beneficial for 
the US to have an increased presence among the Soviet nationalities through the opening of 
the consulate in Ukraine, and he was comfortable using the existing building which had been 
secured a few years previously.  There was also growing support for the project in Congress, 
with 42 members of the House of Representatives and one Senator signing a letter to 
President Reagan urging him to press ahead with the opening of a consulate in Kiev, and 
increased demands for the US to officially mark the 50th anniversary of the Ukrainian 
famine317. 
With regards to staffing levels, Matlock wanted to set the number at the level required for 
running the new consulate in Kiev without taking staff away from the US embassy in Moscow, 
and thus impairing its ability to function.  He believed the proposed number of 16 was 
adequate, meaning the Soviets would be permitted the same level for their new consulate 
in New York, telling Clark “this would preserve reciprocity, and while the FBI's task in New 
York would be increased, its additional problems would be no greater than those faced by 
the KGB in Kiev”.  Matlock conceded that a compromise was required, but he felt the 
advantage of having an American consulate in a vital non-Russian republic was worth it, 
“although it is unfortunate that the Soviets were allowed to purchase their consulate 
building in New York, it will be most difficult to turn the clock back on this arrangement.  
In the interest of moving as rapidly as possible to establish our presence in Kiev (a net gain 
for us, since we have no one there now) in return for a small incremental gain for the Soviets 
(they already have hundreds of officials in New York), I would recommend using the Soviet 
ownership of their building in New York as leverage to insist upon favourable long-term 
rental arrangements in Kiev”.  Matlock was perturbed by the absence of support for the 
project being shown by the CIA, “the apparent lack of interest of the CIA in establishing a 
base in Kiev when it opens seems questionable in view of the objective set forth in NSDD-
75 to increase our presence in the USSR, particularly in minority areas318”.  
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Nevertheless, the terms of engagement had been set, and negotiations aimed at securing a 
new entry point to reach the Soviet nationalities were now underway.  And then, before 
talks could really get going, US-Soviet relations dipped dramatically when the Soviets shot 
down a Korean passenger plane which had accidently entered the USSR’s airspace in 
September, killing all on board and sparking international outrage.  The Reagan 
administration, and the president in particular, reacted with righteous fury to the downing 
of KAL 007 and Soviet attempts to cover up their role in the tragedy.  The hard-liners in the 
White House sensed an opening.  Lenczowski told Clark, “the only possible motive for this 
crime was to commit an act of terrorism to instil ever more fear in the hearts of the people 
of the free world”.  And he blamed the softening stance of the administration as 
emboldening the Soviets, saying “US policy as it now stands attempts to be a formula for 
perpetual (at best) coexistence with the USSR … Secretary’s Shultz’s arguments that the 
Administration’s efforts to renew American strength have addressed the balance of power 
enough that we can have “intensified dialogue” with the Soviets are either inaccurate or 
premature.  The Soviets are not convinced that the current attempt to revive American 
strength is any more than a transitionary phenomenon … the net result of this Soviet 
assessment was that they felt they could take this opportunity not just to intimidate the 
world, but to test the president and the United States”319.   
The Soviets were edgy, especially after the US and NATO decision to deploy more medium 
range missiles to Europe, with the Soviet Minister of Defence Marshal Dmitri Ustinov telling 
Warsaw Pact member states in October, “the source for the growing danger of war is evident 
… the source consists of the openly aggressive policy from the United States and NATO 
against the USSR and the other countries of the socialist community, and against all 
progressive forces in the world … the “crusade” against communism and in fact against the 
USSR and the other countries of the socialist community, announced 1 and a half years ago 
by U.S. President Reagan, has not just stayed a slogan but became a program of action and 
basis for U.S. and NATO policy.  Its main goal consists in its determination to “destroy 
socialism as a social-political system”.  Nothing more, and nothing less”320.  Only weeks 
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later, in November, NATO undertook a military exercise which simulated an all-out nuclear 
strike on the Warsaw Pact, which the KGB believed may in fact be a cover for a genuine 
nuclear assault.  The now-infamous Able Archer 83 incident proved to be one of the hottest 
flashpoints of the Cold War, with the Soviets genuinely in fear of an American-led nuclear 
first strike321.   
In these frenzied conditions, talks on the new Kiev embassy and cultural exchanges simply 
stalled, with Shultz telling Gromyko that the agreement in principle which they made the 
previous summer still stood, but the timing needed to be right and it was very difficult to 
move forward in the atmosphere of recent months322.  However, while tensions with the 
Soviets continued to rise, Reagan’s domestic position had improved markedly, with the 
economy performing well and his poll numbers ahead of the 1984 election looking good.  
There was a feeling that the US had gained an edge in the Cold War struggle and it was now 
the Soviets who were on the back foot, with the administration believing, “that we have 
the opportunity to deal with the Soviet Union from more of a position of strength than in 
previous years.  This is due to the progress that we have made over the last three years in 
a number of areas”323.   
Reagan concluded the time for dialogue with the Soviets had arrived, and the mounting 
tensions of recent months had served to underscore the presidents fear of nuclear war and 
the sheer stakes involved.  The end of 1983 and early 1984 marked a period of modulation 
in the US approach to the Soviet Union, with Reagan now recognising the genuine fear the 
Soviet leadership had of potential nuclear attack.  Matlock and Shultz advised the President 
that he needed to garner the trust of the Soviets if he wanted to make progress, and policies 
geared towards “forcing the collapse of the Soviet system” were not the way to achieve 
this324.  With Judge Clark stepping down as national security adviser at the end of 1983, 
being replaced by Bud McFarlane, another important hard-line voice had disappeared from 
the West Wing’s corridors.  Reagan had also never considered that the Soviet leadership 
may genuinely fear America, that they may truly worry about a potential US nuclear first 
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strike on the USSR.  Reagan had wanted America to compete against the Soviets more 
vigorously, but he had believed that, “the Russians ... considered it unthinkable that the 
United States would launch a first strike against them”325.  Yet despite these doubts, there 
still remained a constituency within the US government dedicated to attacking the internal 
legitimacy of the Soviet system, most notably through exploitation of ethnic tensions. 
Elements within the State Department and NSC were still exploring other methods to reach 
the ethnic groups of the USSR and draw attention to their cause326.  The State Department 
was looking at ways to boost the public diplomacy campaign against the Soviet Union, which 
was viewed as an important component in the ideological war of ideas.  At the heart of US 
public diplomacy towards the USSR was “a clear recognition of the fundamental differences 
between our system and the Soviet system”, but the State Department was concerned at 
the “growing acceptance of the concept of the moral equivalence of the superpowers” and 
sought to reverse this trend.  Another important theme was the need to “stress our 
preparedness for a more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union if the Soviets are 
willing to demonstrate restraint … it is Soviet behaviour, not US unwillingness for genuine 
dialogue, which is responsible for the current state of relations”.  This was the broad and 
overarching purpose of US public diplomacy, the underlying thrust was to draw a sharp line 
of distinction between the American system, and the Soviet one.   
The State Department thought it important to emphasise certain areas in particular, and a 
public diplomacy action plan for US-Soviet relations was sent for Matlock’s approval in 
September 1983.  There was a recognition that the ongoing tension between the US and the 
USSR reflected the fundamentally adversarial nature of the relationship between the two 
nations, and in order for US public diplomacy to be successful, “the target audiences should 
be made aware of aspects of Soviet behaviour which accurately reflect this fundamental 
relationship”.  Attention should be drawn to the hostile nature of Marxism-Leninism and the 
incompatibility of the Soviet system with US values and ideals.  It was important to highlight 
human rights abuses and the poor treatment of the nationalities inside the USSR in such a 
way as to contrast this repression with the individual liberty and political democracy of the 
US.   
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By showcasing the “repressiveness and moral bankruptcy of communism”, US public 
diplomacy would emphasise the “moral superiority” of American ideas.  Along with Soviet 
attempts to stifle free thought and the limitations on personal freedoms, US public 
diplomacy should specifically shine the spotlight on the denial of national rights to the 
ethnic groups within the Soviet empire.  In particular, public diplomacy should highlight the 
“fictional right of secession for Union republics in the Soviet constitution, the suppression 
of national traditions and cultures, suppression of minority languages, history of 
incorporation of various areas into the USSR, acts of repression against entire nationalities 
such as the Crimean Tartars, and the calculated exploitation and exacerbation of social 
divisions”327.  It was important to identify the target audience however.  The US domestic 
media and national press were an important part of this plan, and “special efforts should 
be made to use media outlets which … serve broad and representative segments of American 
public opinion …. The ethnic press will be a useful channel to the US émigré and ethnic 
communities, although it scarcely needs to be pressed to support our Soviet policies”.  There 
should also be efforts made to target Congress and the plethora of interest groups which 
focused on specific aspects of US-Soviet relations, notably the ethnic interest groups 
representing Ukrainian, Baltic, Armenian and Jewish interests inside the USSR, while 
academia, trade unions, and audiences and leaders in Europe were also to be targeted.   
The report concluded with an appeal to “take advantage of opportunities to convey our 
views on US-Soviet relations to publics and leaders in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union 
… We must ensure that VOA and RFE/RL have the resources needed to explain US policy 
directly to the peoples of the area.  Our public diplomacy must take into account the 
aspirations and views of the peoples involved”328.  The State Department wanted to reach 
people across the Soviet Union, and in order to influence foreign target audiences a 
combination of active US diplomatic dialogue with the Soviet Union and effective public 
presentation of America’s positions were required, along with greater access to the Soviet 
media.  There was a perception that US-Soviet relations had narrowed to focus on arms 
control, and it was important to emphasise issues of human rights as a major element in US 
public diplomacy. 
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Draft NSDD on Soviet nationalities 
As 1983 neared its end, the NWG was putting the finishing touches to its draft NSDD proposal, 
with the aim of submitting it for executive approval before the close of the year.  In 
October, a Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) meeting was convened by Charles Hill at 
the State Department to take the project forward.  The draft paper had now been 
extensively reviewed at the working level by all agencies and had been approved by all.  It 
was now nearing completion.  Chaired by Larry Eagleburger, the meeting included Robert 
Kimmitt of the NSC, Col John Stanford of the Department of Defence, representatives from 
the CIA, USIA, Department of Commerce and Joint Chiefs of Staff were all present, as was 
Donald Gregg, Vice President Bush’s chief foreign policy adviser.  The purpose of the 
meeting was to endorse the draft and transmit it to the NSC, where the paper would then 
be escalated to Reagan via his new national security adviser, Bud McFarlane329.  The paper 
was approved, and the next step was to put it before the president.  The final proposed 
NSDD on Soviet Ethnic and Minority Groups of Autumn 1983 contained a detailed policy 
agenda for steering American policy towards the nationality groups inside the USSR, fleshing 
out the framework of previous drafts.  In line with NSDD 75’s focus on encouraging change 
within the Soviet system, the proposed directive suggested, “as part of that policy, and in 
addition to steps we will be taking with regard to other elements of Soviet society, the 
United States Government shall pursue a rejuvenated effort to understand and to encourage 
ethnic and national freedoms within the Soviet Union”.   
The final proposal identified the three main objectives of US policy in this area to be: to 
encourage changes within the Soviet Union that fostered diversity, pluralism, 
decentralization and democracy; to promote a more accurate understanding of the nature 
and actions of the Soviet Union by drawing attention to its colonial and expansionist 
characteristics and by undermining the notion that the expansion of communist rule is an 
irreversible phenomenon; and to create an institutional structure to strengthen and sustain 
our capabilities for understanding and influencing Soviet ethnic and national developments.  
The writers of the new NSDD believed these objectives could be met by increasing US 
government presence on Soviet territory, as had previously been debated earlier in the year 
with regards to the opening of a consulate in Kiev.   
                                                        
329 Memo Hill to Gregg, Kimmitt, Robbins, Stanford, Stanley, Collins and unidentified CIA 
representative, “SIG on Soviet Nationalities Policy”, October 21, 1983, US Department of State, 




There remained a prudent awareness of the trade-offs associated with such a scenario, the 
draftees remained cognisant of the Soviet need for reciprocity, stating “such an increase”, 
in US government presence inside the Soviet Union, “could entail a detrimental increase in 
Soviet presence and activities in the U.S.  Consistent with NSDD-75 and our overall foreign 
policy, we should work to increase our presence and activities in the USSR if it is determined 
that the benefits are not exceeded by the drawbacks”.  Perhaps appealing to Reagan’s 
sentimental side, the proposal would be based on US commitment to the “rights and 
legitimate interests of the various ethnic and national groups under the administration of 
the Soviet Union, including their rights to practice their religions, to provide traditional 
education to their children, to emigrate and, as appropriate, to enjoy national 
independence”330.  
The proposed NSDD laid out an exhaustive list of policy suggestions, beginning with an 
admission that the US government required better information on the subject.  There 
remained an acceptance that the US government simply didn’t possess a satisfactory 
knowledge of current Soviet nationality issues, which hampered their ability to fully 
ameliorate developments inside the Soviet Union which were adversely affecting ethnic and 
national groups.  Thus, the highest priority would be given to increasing US government 
understanding of this issue through the establishment of a permanent Soviet Nationalities 
Interagency Group, which would be chaired by the State Department.  This new steering 
group would be given a broad portfolio which included the responsibility for the allocation 
of sufficient financial and institutional resources to studying Soviet ethnic and national 
group developments, with the purpose of improving the US government’s patchy 
understanding of the issue.   
There was a realisation that the dire need for more regional specialists with the requisite 
language skills within the government had led to a lack of expertise on this topic, and steps 
must be taken to rectify this shortage.  These steps included the establishment of an 
Interagency Career Management Committee for Soviet Nationality Specialists, whose 
purpose would be to “examine ways to overcome the critical shortage of US government 
analysts and linguists qualified in Russian and Soviet nationality languages”.  The proposed 
Soviet Nationalities Interagency Group would explore ways to increase US funding to 
enhance the international awareness of Soviet ethnic and national issues and would also 
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participate and inform the decision-making process affecting U.S. policy on Soviet ethnic 
and national groups through presentation of research and intelligence findings.  The Soviet 
Nationalities Interagency Group would study the desirability of creating a Centre for the 
Study of Soviet Nationalities, which would be privately run yet funded by the US 
government.  Finally, the Soviet Nationalities Interagency Group would examine the 
“possibility of cooperating with various private groups which were conducting research and 
activities in the Soviet Nationalities field”331.  
The proposed NSDD also placed high emphasis on the continuation of radio broadcasting into 
the regions of the USSR to reach the ethnic and national groups there, and actually called 
for an increase in capabilities for this endeavour.  Alongside a program to modernise and 
upgrade Voice of America, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, the paper called for the 
government to assign a high priority to enlarging the number of Soviet languages which the 
radios were able to broadcast.  High priority was already being given to improving radio 
broadcasting facilities, but any future budgetary allocations to existing operating agencies 
should reflect their status as a national security priority.  The proposed NSDD also called for 
a continuation to the books and publications program which had begun during the Carter 
administration, all geared towards increasing the general flow of Western information into 
the USSR, through networks for the distribution of newspapers, books, and cassette-tapes332.  
Reagan had already increased funding in this area, which was used for publications, finances 
and technology, including computers, printers, camera’s, video equipment, photocopiers, 
fax machines, tape recorders, and printing machines, in support of dissident groups inside 
the USSR333. 
The NSDD on Soviet Nationalities issued a call for increased activity in the international 
sphere in order to highlight the Soviet nationalities issue.  The US would maintain its long-
standing position of recognising the independence of the Baltic states and refusing to 
validate their incorporation into the USSR, while continuing to sustain efforts to cooperate 
with the diplomatic representatives of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and to draw attention 
to their cause.  The NSDD appealed for intensified activities at the United Nations in order 
to draw attention to the plight of Soviet ethnic and nationality groups, including liaising 
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with the UN Human Rights Commission and UN Decolonization Committee and taking steps 
that may include raising the issue of Soviet nationalities in statements and debate, 
especially highlighting the contradictions in the context of Soviet professions of support for 
self-determination and decolonization while refusing self-determination to their own 
national groups. It also suggested the US government work with public bodies such as the 
CSCE Commission, Amnesty International, and other relevant religious and political 
organizations which were involved in the human rights movement, to ensure that the voice 
of Soviet ethnic and national groups would be heard at the numerous human rights forums 
which these groups were involved in. 
The proposed NSDD on Soviet nationalities then turned its attention to increasing contact 
with Soviet society through an increased US physical presence within the USSR, and through 
regular exchanges with Soviet citizens.  The directive returned to the issue of establishing 
a US consulate in Kiev as an important means of increasing American capabilities regarding 
developments in the non-Russian areas of the Soviet Union, and totally consistent with 
NSDD-75.  Along with Ukraine, the document also raised the prospect of opening a consulate 
in the Muslim republics of the USSR, believing active consideration of this matter was 
required.  Soviet nationalities specialists within the US government had been interested in 
the Central Asian republics as a potential source of weakness to the Soviet Union since the 
Carter presidency.  Although again, the document highlighted the need to avoid worsening 
the existing disparity between the Soviet official representation in the US and the American 
official representation in the Soviet Union, which remained a cause for concern for many 
within the NSC.   Another aspect of this policy was cultural, informational, and educational 
exchanges, and as part of US government efforts to grow the number of U.S.-Soviet 
exchanges, the Soviet Nationalities Interagency Group would devote “particular attention 
to exchanges involving the non-Russian areas of the Soviet Union”.   
The final policy prescription called for increased public statements on the mistreatment of 
the various Soviet ethnic and national groups at the hands of the Soviet authorities, going 
so far as to suggest that these statements become a more frequent refrain in US government 
public announcements.  In order to again highlight the double-standards of professed Soviet 
support for rights of self-determination, these remarks should be couched in terms of 
universally accepted norms, “especially those norms incorporated in international 
agreements to which the Soviet Union is a party and those recognised in the Soviet 
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Constitution”334.  There should be particular emphasis placed on the “plight of the many 
Soviet human rights activists whose persecution by the Soviet authorities is directly 
attributable to the efforts of these persons to assert their national traditions; the colonial 
aspects of Soviet rule over non-Russian peoples; and the problems of religion in the Soviet 
Union”335.  The action plain detailed in the proposed NSDD was an all-encompassing appraisal 
of US policy towards the Soviet nationalities and offered a realistic set of policy suggestions 
which would act as guidelines for future activity.  There was a recognised need for more 
language specialists and experts in the non-Russian nationalities and a call for renewed 
focus on improvement in this area.   
With the suggested creation of a Soviet Nationalities Interagency Group through which all 
activities in this sphere would be directed, there was an attempt to institutionalise Soviet 
nationalities policy and embed it within a policy cluster of real influence.  There were also 
several recommendations which outlined the use of public diplomacy, radio broadcasting 
and covert book distribution, and engagement with multilateral organisations as further 
methods which the US could employ to advance the cause of the Soviet nationalities. This 
was not a radical document, it was not laced with provocative policy suggestions, nor 
pushing for the break-up of the Soviet Union.  If anything, the proposed NSDD recognised 
the limits of what the US government could expect to achieve in this area, and concentrated 
mainly on information gathering, the continuation of existing broadcasting programs, co-
operation with non-state and multilateral actors, and greater efforts in the realm of 
diplomacy, both public and private.  
Nevertheless, the Nationalities Working Group were now very close to cementing US 
government commitment to the Soviet nationalities in a comprehensive presidential 
directive.  The new NSDD was both tied directly to the objectives of NSDD-75, yet also went 
much further than that document in exploring and recommending policy towards the ethnic 
and national groups inside the USSR.  The long-held vision of Brzezinski, Henze and Pipes 
was about to be realised.  No more would US policy towards the Soviet nationalities lie 
outside of the mainstream, merely the terrain of eccentrics and zealous anti-communist 
hard-liners.  The Reagan administration now had a concrete framework for guiding US policy 
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towards the nationalities and ethnic groups of the USSR, and it was anchored firmly within 
the overall Soviet strategy articulated in NSDD-75.  On December 9, 1983, John Lenczowski 
officially forwarded the proposed NSDD on Soviet Nationalities Policy to McFarlane, 
including a memorandum for Reagan to sign it into effect336.  And then…nothing. 
A change of course 
By early 1984 George Shultz was beginning to emerge as Reagan’s most trusted and 
influential policy adviser, ably assisted by Soviet expert Jack Matlock of the NSC.  Despite 
hardliners such as Weinberger and Casey still heading up the DoD and CIA respectively, it 
was the voices counselling Reagan to engage with the Soviets which the president was now 
listening to.  This period, as Hal Brands writes, “has been described as a dramatic “Reagan 
reversal”.  It was really more of a calculated Reagan recalibration.  The president remained 
convinced that firmness and pressure were essential to making Moscow cooperate … 
Beginning in late 1983 and early 1984, however, he also made overtures designed to 
moderate the more aggressive aspects of his rhetoric, convince Kremlin leaders that he was 
genuinely interested in diplomacy, and thereby begin working towards an improved 
relationship”337.  To that end, Reagan had written to Andropov in December 1983, telling 
the Soviet leader, who was quite unwell, “I continue to believe that despite the profound 
differences between our two nations, there are opportunities - indeed a necessity - for us 
to work together to prevent conflicts, to expand our dialogue, and to place our relationship 
on a more stable and secure footing … We are ready to deal seriously and positively with 
you and your government in an effort to reach mutually acceptable and beneficial solutions 
to the problems in our relationship”338.  With the move away from the belligerent posturing 
of the early Reagan years now gaining traction, the intent to dismantle the Soviet system 
from within also began to wane.  This development would have direct ramifications for 
those inside the administration who were eager to push a harder US line towards the Soviet 
nationalities.   
 
Near the end of 1983, Shultz and Matlock had begun to organise informal Saturday morning 
breakfast meetings in a diplomatic reception room on the fabled 8th floor of the State 
Department.  Using Shultz’s four-part agenda for negotiations with the Soviets as a basis for 
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discussion, these meetings were regularly attended by Shultz, Matlock, McFarlane, 
Weinberger, Vice President Bush and several other top officials, and their purpose was to 
thrash out US Soviet policy away from the pressures of the White House.  There was an 
agreement among the group on the key goals of US Soviet policy; to reduce the use and 
threat of force in international disagreements, to work towards meaningful arms control, 
to establish a level of trust with the Soviets, and to make progress on human rights and 
areas of bilateral cooperation.  Despite occasionally vehement disagreements, Matlock says, 
“nobody argued that the United States should try to bring the Soviet Union down.  All 
recognised that the Soviet leaders faced mounting problems but understood that U.S. 
attempts to exploit them would strengthen Soviet resistance to change rather than diminish 
it.  President Reagan was in favour of bringing pressure to bear on the Soviet Union, but his 
objective was to induce the Soviet leaders to negotiate reasonable agreements, not to break 
up the country”.  Matlock states that the officials did not wish to force the collapse of the 
Soviet system, but merely to exert pressure on the Soviets to “live up to agreements and 
abide by civilised standards of behaviour”339.   
 
From now on the administration’s approach would be based on realism, strength and 
negotiation.  But this was not the detached realism of the academy; shorn of empathy and 
human emotion.  This was a clear-sighted and realistic appraisal of the US-Soviet 
relationship as it currently stood; acknowledging the need to respect the Soviet leadership’s 
fears and insecurities, negotiating from a position of strength yet identifying and building 
on areas of mutual cooperation, while still pursuing the promotion of human rights and 
religious freedom within the USSR.  As Robert D. Kaplan describes, “it was a realism that 
embraced both international responsibility and a hard, moral interest in peoples suffering 
under Communist tyranny … It knew that interests come before values, since values have 
greater traction when they emanate from interests”340.  And now, far from merely focusing 
on individual groups within the Soviet Union, Reagan wanted to reach all Soviet citizens.  
During his State of the Union address to the Joint Houses of Congress in January 1984, 
Reagan declared, “tonight, I want to speak to the people of the Soviet Union, to tell them 
it's true that our governments have had serious differences, but our sons and daughters have 
never fought each other in war.  And if we Americans have our way, they never will.  People 
of the Soviet Union, there is only one sane policy, for your country and mine, to preserve 
our civilization in this modern age:  A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought 
… Americans are people of peace.  If your government wants peace, there will be peace.  
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We can come together in faith and friendship to build a safer and far better world for our 
children and our children's children.  And the whole world will rejoice.  That is my message 
to you”341. 
The death of Andropov in early February 1984, and the appointment of Konstantin 
Chernenko as the new Soviet leader, appeared to signal a lacklustre return to hard-line and 
uncreative Soviet leadership in the Kremlin.  Yet Reagan remained undaunted, writing to 
Chernenko, “I have no higher goal than the establishment of a relationship between our two 
great nations characterised by constructive cooperation.  Differences in our political beliefs 
and in our perspectives on international problems should not be an obstacle to efforts aimed 
at strengthening peace and building a productive working relationship … In the months 
ahead, we will be ready to discuss with you the entire agenda of issues in which our two 
nations have an interest”342.  In February, McFarlane sketched a “framework for the future” 
of US-Soviet relations in a memo to Reagan in which he suggested Chernenko’s selection as 
General Secretary may help to put relations on “a more positive track”.   
McFarlane felt it was imperative that Reagan be re-elected in November, and thus the 
president should be careful in his public utterances in order not to cause either false hope 
or alarm among the US population. Nevertheless, McFarlane believed they should “move 
rapidly to put more content into the dialogue” with the Soviets, while also suggesting they 
should look beyond the current Soviet leadership and expand “opportunities for more broad 
and effective contacts with a wider public, particularly persons now in their forties and 
fifties (the successor generation)”343.  The dynamics of the US-Soviet relationship were 
changing and a fresh impulse for engagement emerging within the White House.  Despite his 
early bluster, Reagan never wished to tear the USSR down from the inside.  As Alan Dobson 
says, “Unlike his more ideological colleagues, Reagan was more pragmatic and never 
intended or expected to destroy the Soviet Union.  However, he was steadfast in his opinion 
that America’s strength had to be renewed and that negotiations with the Soviets conducted 
to reach a more stable relationship, one that would reduce the dangers from nuclear 
weapons and provide a context in which change could occur from within the Soviet Union … 
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Ideology and pragmatism were richly intermingled in Reagan’s make-up, evident in his Cold 
War grand strategy”344.  
The end of the Nationalities Working Group 
By spring 1984 the US-Soviet relationship was no longer at boiling point, having been reduced 
to a constant simmer.  The white-hot heat of ideological warfare was beginning to cool, and 
Reagan and his advisers were beginning to move in a new direction.  By April, there had still 
been no response from Reagan or his national security adviser Bud McFarlane regarding the 
NWG’s proposed NSDD on Soviet Nationalities, which had been submitted to the NSC by John 
Lenczowski in December of the previous year.  After months of interagency work to reach 
the point of submitting the NSDD for the president’s approval the trail had gone cold, and 
there is no record of McFarlane having ever even shown Reagan the document.  Members of 
the group which drafted the potential NSDD were growing restless, and of major concern 
was the continuing dearth of non-Russian Soviet nationalities specialists within the US 
government, a long-standing problem which had hampered the government’s ability to 
understand and attempt to influence ethnic issues within the USSR.  Robert Kimmitt of the 
NSC attempted to work around the delay, sending a memo to Charles Hill, the Executive 
Secretary of the Department of State, requesting permission to press ahead with item one 
on the NSDD’s action plan, saying “the draft NSDD on Soviet Nationalities Policy, submitted 
earlier by the Department, has not yet been approved.  However, while it remains under 
consideration, the Department is requested to proceed to organize an Interagency Career 
Management Committee for Soviet Nationality Specialists, which would examine ways to 
overcome the critical shortage of USG analysts and linguists qualified in Russian and Soviet 
nationality languages”345.   
At the same time, Matlock followed up with McFarlane, applying some pressure to the 
national security adviser, who appeared to be reluctant to action the proposed NSDD.  
Although keen to engage the Soviets in dialogue and highly indisposed towards stirring up 
trouble inside the Soviet Union, Matlock was sensitive to the lack of non-Russian expertise 
within the US government and felt the proposed NSDD provided an effective way to rectify 
this disparity.  “John Lenczowski sent you a memorandum on December 9, 1983, 
recommending approval of a draft NSDD on Soviet Nationalities Policy”, Matlock told 
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McFarlane, “if you consider it untimely or inappropriate to have the draft NSDD approved, 
I believe it would be useful in any event to have State go ahead and take one of the steps 
in the draft.  That is, to organize an Interagency Career Management Committee for Soviet 
Nationality Specialists, which would examine ways to overcome the critical shortage of USG 
analysts and linguists qualified in Russian and Soviet nationality languages.  We are sorely 
hampered in our understanding of what is happening in the non-Russian areas of the Soviet 
Union by a lack of specialists, and development of a cadre will be a lengthy process.  
Therefore, I believe we should move ahead promptly in this area, even if we decide to delay 
formal implementation of some of the other recommendations”.  Matlock was becoming 
concerned at the likelihood of the NSDD on Soviet Nationalities being approved in the near 
future346.  Indeed, he was right to be concerned, because the proposed NSDD was never to 
be approved.  And the entire Soviet nationalities project, including the regular meetings of 
the Nationalities Working Group, was soon to be abandoned.  
With the departure of hardliners such as Pipes and Clark, the increasing influence of Shultz 
and Matlock, the once dominant trend within the Reagan administration toward encouraging 
the reform of the communist system through the exploitation of internal Soviet weaknesses 
was waning.  The national security adviser Bud McFarlane, who by now was playing an 
influential role alongside Shultz and Matlock in shaping US policy towards the USSR, seemed 
particularly indisposed to these ideas. Despite having been involved in the drafting and 
affirming of NSDD 75, he had always remained uneasy about the document, believing it 
demonstrated, “no basis for believing that a framework for stability exists”, NSDD 75 only 
aimed to, “stress the Soviet system as best we can”347.  McFarlane was keen to see the US 
move past the ideological warfare which marked the first two years of the Reagan 
administration, and also hoped to create new procedures which would make it difficult for 
the hard-line elements within the US government to dream up strategies which would 
ultimately lead nowhere348.   
Plans were in place to reopen negotiations with the Soviets over the opening of a US 
consulate in Kiev, which had been postponed after the shooting down of the Korean airliner 
in late 1983.  The State Department believed the time was now ripe to begin talks again, 
and Matlock and McFarlane agreed349. But the hopes of hard-line groups across various 
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agencies, who wished to see the US government take a more proactive approach towards 
exploiting Soviet weaknesses specifically targeting the Soviet nationalities, seemed 
diminished.  The Nationalities Working Group appeared to have run its course, with the 
White House putting a halt to its regular meetings with no explanation given.  It appears 
the change in the direction of US strategy towards the USSR, combined with an upcoming 
election campaign in which the president’s advisers were eager not to allow the media and 
the Democrats to paint him as a dangerous ideologue, all played a part in this decision.   
Mark Palmer, one of the founding members of the Reagan-era NWG, believed officials 
around the president, “got nervous about it and stopped it … They never ordered me to 
disband it, but they refused to respond.  I would send them papers, you know 
recommendations.  I think that they thought that it was something that was going to explode 
in Ronald Reagan’s face politically.  I think they thought that it actually would get out that 
there was such an effort; and that this would look like we were trying to break up the Soviet 
Union.  This would be another charge that, “He’s crazy and he’s dangerous.  This is going 
to cause an even bigger war”.  Palmer lamented, “I loved this group.  We had wonderful 
meetings.  We had great people.  We had great people from USIA, from CIA.  I was very 
depressed that it just fell apart because the White House got nervous. it was a paradox 
actually.  I thought, “Here’s a political crowd that actually might be supportive of this sort 
of thing and get resources for it, get money, have exchanges, and all kinds of stuff.”  Partly, 
I think they were worried that they’d be tagged by the press and the centre - if you want, 
the establishment - as being crazy, as encouraging irresponsible and stupid, destabilizing 
stuff in a country that had nuclear weapons.  I think it was also partly just because they 
were conservative that they backed away from what was really a solid thing to do.  I was a 
career officer.  Maybe I wasn’t exactly mainstream, but I certainly thought this was a solid 
thing to do.  A lot of other people did too and we were very disappointed when we were 
told to stop doing it”350.   
There still remained a belief inside the administration that it would be in the United States 
interests to foster change within the Soviet Union using the limited leverage it possessed, 
but it was no longer an important plank of an ideologically-driven US Soviet strategy.  
Matlock explained to McFarlane in early 1984, “while we can have only a marginal effect on 
the outcome of this internal Soviet process, we should do what we can to strengthen the 
tendencies toward greater decentralization and openness, since this would produce a Soviet 
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Union with less commitment to the use of force and less willing to engage in costly foreign 
adventures.  Therefore, even if the rivalry of our systems did not end (it would not), the 
U.S.-USSR interaction would be safer and more manageable”351.   
Going forward however, focus on the Soviet nationalities would largely take place within 
Shultz’s four-part framework toward wider US-Soviet negotiations, raising issues of human 
rights abuses in various Soviet republics during talks, and pushing for cultural exchanges and 
consulate agreements which would appeal to the ethnic interest groups of the US352.  As for 
the proposed NSDD on Soviet Nationalities, in 1986 as Jack Matlock prepared to take up his 
new role as US ambassador to the Soviet Union, he revealed to NSC staffer Fritz Ermath 
that, “we worked this interagency, and then McFarlane sat on it and never approved it”353.  
The centrepiece policy directive of the Nationalities Working Group, which officials had 
laboured on for almost a year, and which offered a detailed strategy for the US government 
to implement towards the ethnic and nationality groups of the Soviet Union, never saw the 
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This thesis has explored the attempts by American policymakers to influence the internal 
dynamics of the Soviet system by agitating and exploiting the underlying tensions between 
the regime and the ethnic and linguistic minorities of the USSR.  This was an ambitious 
endeavour, largely driven by hard-line individuals within the Carter and Reagan 
administrations, and never fully embraced as an integral part of US Cold War strategy.  This 
dissertation has covered the period of 1977 to 1984, which was a transformational and 
transcendent time in the Cold War struggle, with the relative stability of détente giving way 
to a more confrontational atmosphere between the opposing superpowers.   
 
From the US point of view, the Soviet Union was the antagonist in these developments, as 
it ramped up both its military spending and its foreign policy adventurism in the Third World. 
There was a sense within the Carter administration that the USSR was testing American 
resolve by instigating a series of aggressive foreign policy moves which culminated in the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979.  In order to curtail this adventurism and promote 
internal unrest within the USSR, a group of policymakers centred around national security 
adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski began to agitate for an increased focus on the internal 
weaknesses of the Soviet regime, and to promote measures aimed at capitalising on the 
underlying ethnic tensions within the Soviet Union.   
 
For the Soviet leadership in the Kremlin, the view was very different. To them, the Carter 
administration had betrayed the fundamental law which upheld détente; the mutual non-
interference in each other’s internal affairs. The Soviets looked on with increasing horror 
as Carter and his team continuously drew attention to human rights abuses and the denial 
of self-determination within the USSR, policies very much in keeping with the aims of the 
growing transnational human rights network which emerged following the signing of the 
Helsinki accords in 1975.  This tension continued to simmer into the early 1980s as Ronald 
Reagan ascended to the White House and barraged the Soviets with hostile rhetoric, while 
his administration plotted a new and subversive strategy toward the USSR.   
 
The early Reagan administration was largely staffed by anti-communist hard-liners who were 
eager to promote internal change within the Soviet system, and very receptive to the 
prospect of using the Soviet nationalities to do so. This formed part of their overall strategy 
toward the Soviet Union, one geared towards encouraging pluralising and democratisation, 
and thus blunting Soviet expansionism.  The view from Moscow greatly differed, the Soviets 
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saw an incoming administration which was hellbent on racketing up tensions, attacking the 
legitimacy of their rule, and escalating the risk of nuclear war to unprecedented levels. 
 
The changing nature of the international system and the collapse of détente in the late 
1970s opened up new opportunities for policymakers to move US foreign policy in innovative 
directions, particularly with regards to the Soviet Union. The years of détente had been 
marked by a relative de-escalation in tensions between the United States and the USSR, 
although people in the developing world who often found themselves caught between the 
crosshairs of two rival superpowers would probably feel like tensions never dissipated at all.  
Nevertheless, the period witnessed greater negotiation, arms control talks, and mutual co-
operation between the rivals.  On the US side, the Nixon-Kissinger-Ford triumvirate were 
very keen to keep the focus on geopolitics and matters of great power diplomacy, and far 
less on the internal nature of the Soviet regime.  With the advent of the Carter presidency 
in 1977, the strain of realism found among US foreign policymakers which promoted a 
foreign policy based on maintaining a favourable balance of power in superpower relations 
had begun to lose its dominance. There was a growing appreciation of the domestic drivers 
of foreign policy, with policymakers taking a closer look at the inner workings of the Soviet 
regime in order to understand the USSR’s behaviour in the international arena.   
 
For officials such as Brzezinski and Paul Henze, the importance of the Soviet Union’s internal 
nationality problems was obvious.  These underlying and unresolved tensions remained just 
below the surface, occasionally erupting into ethnic protests in the various Soviet republics 
and hard-liners within the Carter administration began exploring the ways these tensions 
could be harnessed to serve US interests.  By agitating the Soviet nationalities, it was 
believed the ethnic unrest may impact Soviet activism abroad or even lead to greater self-
determination within the USSR, something which would be to the benefit of the United 
States.  Over and above these goals, there was also a feeling that a better understanding of 
ethnic issues inside the Soviet Union was desperately needed at the highest levels of the US 
government, with a lack of expertise on this subject proving detrimental to US foreign policy 
goals.  
 
These themes were echoed after the transition to the Reagan administration in 1981.  With 
a fiercely anti-communist president at the helm, and a White House full of hard-liners, the 
early years of the Reagan presidency saw a belligerence enter US Soviet strategy which had 
been absent for a long time. Whereas the policies crafted toward the Soviet nationalities 
by the Carter administration were largely the domain of zealous anti-communists, and never 
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fully embraced as a central plank of overall Soviet strategy, the Reagan White House was 
fully committed to the promotion of internal change within the Soviet Union, explicitly 
declaring it an objective of US foreign policy.  There was a growing desire within US 
policymaking circles to pay more attention to the internal nature of the Soviet regime, 
viewing it as an important driver of Soviet foreign policy, and potentially as a source of 
great weakness to their long-term communist adversary.   
 
Hard-liners such as Richard Pipes and others on the NSC, viewed the Soviet Union’s internal 
ethnic problems as an area ripe for exploitation by the United States, and in the early days 
of Reagan’s presidency these ideas figured prominently within the overall thrust of the 
administration’s strategy for dealing with the Soviet Union.  Nevertheless, by 1984 the 
dynamics of the US-Soviet relationship were changing, and new presidential advisers were 
coming to the fore.  No longer was the emphasis on attacking the internal legitimacy of the 
Soviet Union, but on engaging in dialogue which would move the relationship onto a surer 
footing, allowing concessions to be bought at the negotiating table, and not through 
ideological warfare. 
 
Part one of this thesis focuses on the years 1977 to 1980, when President Carter attempted 
to introduce a new sense of morality to American statecraft, and the US-Soviet relationship 
began to change quite dramatically.  Carter arrived in Washington as the consummate 
outsider, in every sense of the word.  In the wake of Vietnam and the Watergate scandal, 
Carter promised his presidency would be different; human rights would be front and centre, 
and the cynicism of previous administrations would be a thing of the past.  Carter was 
unknown to most Americans and journalists, and an image began to emerge of the president 
as a naïve moralist with an unsophisticated view of world affairs and overly optimistic hopes 
of transcending Cold War bipolarity.  However, Carter’s legacy is undergoing some scholarly 
revision, and while it is painfully obvious there were a number of high profile foreign policy 
setbacks on his watch, it is also becoming more apparent that Carter held a more nuanced 
understanding of Cold War rivalry than previously attributed to him.  Carter saw no 
distinction between values and interests, believing a moral foreign policy served America’s 
national interest, as well as being a good in itself.  And as Nancy Mitchell has demonstrated, 
Carter was under no illusions as to the true nature of the Cold War rivalry with the Soviet 
Union.  Carter was an “ardent but quiet Cold Warrior”, determined not to see Kremlin plots 
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everywhere, yet uncompromising in his continuation of containment and a new-found desire 
to expose the internal contradictions of the Soviet system354.   
 
His vision for a more activist approach to détente was shared and pursued vigorously by 
Brzezinski, with Carter assenting to his national security adviser’s plans to attack the 
internal cohesion of the USSR.  Brzezinski was a zealous anti-Soviet hawk and had long 
harboured a desire to exploit the inner weaknesses of the Soviet empire, since his days as a 
graduate student he had believed the nationalities of the Soviet Union were a potentially 
corrosive influence inside the Soviet system.  Part one of this thesis explored Brzezinski’s 
role in re-introducing the power of ideology into US statecraft.  He possessed powerful ideas 
about the ideological nature of the Cold War conflict, believing it was a struggle for 
dominance between two deeply antithetical visions of world order.  For Brzezinski, the 
Carter administration’s support for human rights and dissidents behind the Iron Curtain 
would act as a battering ram, and also afforded him the opportunity to shine a spotlight on 
the ethnic and nationality problems of the USSR.  By provoking and encouraging internal 
problems for the Soviets, the hope was that the Kremlin would restrain its foreign policy 
adventurism and focus on issues at home.  Brzezinski issued orders to craft policies which 
would target and exploit these tensions through radio broadcasting, covert book and 
publication programs, and improving US government knowledge of the issue.   
 
This thesis focuses on the individuals tasked with carrying these orders out, none more so 
than the NSC Soviet nationalities specialist Paul Henze, who approached the task with 
relentless energy and combative intensity.  The push to gain a better understanding of Soviet 
ethnic issues, and to translate this knowledge into policy options aimed at exploiting these 
tensions, became an almost obsessive mission for Henze.  He formed a Nationalities Working 
Group, which would become a multiagency forum for discussing the latest academic 
research on Soviet nationality problems, and a talking shop for drawing up concrete policy 
proposals.  Henze was at the heart of the administration’s efforts to expand radio 
broadcasting to the Soviet republics and liaised with the CIA over their covert operations 
behind the Iron Curtain.  Fellow hard-liners such as Colonel Odom and Sam Huntington 
shared the desire to make life difficult for the Soviet regime, but it was Henze who took 
Brzezinki’s ideas and spearheaded the effort to turn them into reality. In exploring these 
themes deeply, this thesis reveals that while powerful figures such as Brzezinski and Henze 
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were driving US efforts to engage the Soviet nationalities, these ideas never fully formed a 
central part of US strategy toward the USSR during the Carter era.  Anti-communist 
hardliners, such as Henze and his academic associates, remained somewhat out the 
mainstream of American foreign policy-thinking.  Constant battles over budgetary issues, 
and strong resistance to these ideas from within the State Department and the US foreign 
policy establishment, meant that Henze ultimately felt frustrated as Carter left the White 
House.   
 
Nevertheless, a new avenue for exploration had been opened.  The Carter administration 
may have wished to focus on issues other than merely the Cold War struggle, with human 
rights and the developing world deserving more attention in a fast-changing international 
system.  But at the behest of the president, the hawks within the administration also 
engaged in the continuing containment of Soviet power, and increasingly focused on 
assaulting the internal weaknesses of the USSR.  As Robert Gates has described, “Carter 
had, in fact, changed the long-standing rules of the Cold War.  Through his human rights 
policies, he became the first president since Truman to challenge directly the legitimacy of 
the Soviet government in the eyes of its own people.  And the Soviets immediately 
recognised this for the fundamental challenge that it was: they believed he sought to 
overthrow their system”355.  Carter, Brzezinski, and Henze laid the foundations for the 
destabilisation of the Soviet regime by exploiting its own weaknesses, specifically the human 
rights abuses and the denial of self-determination for its nationality groups.  Carter may 
have limped from office, but these powerful ideas were picked up and continued by the 
incoming Reagan administration in 1981. 
Part two of this thesis revealed the continued attempts by US policymakers to explore and 
exploit the ethnic problems of the USSR during the early Reagan years, highlighting the 
individuals involved and their policy proposals.  The beliefs of Brzezinski and Henze about 
the internal weaknesses of the Soviet system were also held by many hard-liners in the new 
administration, which was determined to strike a new tone in US-Soviet relations and 
proactively push back against Soviet expansionism in the Third World.  Reagan himself 
arrived in the White House with a set of unshakable core beliefs about the nature of 
communism and the moral superiority of the American system.  His own views on the Soviet 
Union had developed over the course of many decades, he believed the Soviet regime was 
rife with internal contradictions and he wished to see the end of communism both in Eastern 
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Europe and around the world.  Reagan was also a naturally amiable person, non-
confrontational, and valued the importance of trust and personal relationships.  Alongside 
his ardent anti-communism, he also believed he could reach out to the Soviet leadership as 
fellow human beings, hoping a mutual fear of nuclear war could lead to increased co-
operation.   
This thesis has described how these conflicting impulses were to plague the president over 
the first few years of his time in the White House, torn between taking an uncompromising 
posture toward the Soviet Union, yet also eager to reach out to Moscow and engage the 
Soviet leadership in productive dialogue.  These contradictions are important because they 
precluded the creation of any grand strategy towards the Soviet Union, at least in the early 
days of the administration, and they also allowed room for anti-Soviet hard-line positions to 
gain real currency within the administration.   
During 1981 and 1982, the anti-communist hawks in the White House held sway, and there 
was a palpable desire among these hard-liners to attack the internal cohesion of the Soviet 
Union and attempt to promote pluralistic tendencies within the Soviet system. This 
dissertation has shown that an important aspect of this enterprise was the creation of 
coherent policies that would exploit the Soviet nationalities issues as part of a wider assault 
on the internal legitimacy of the USSR.  At the forefront of these efforts was Richard Pipes, 
the Harvard professor of Russian history who, like Brzeznski, held a long-standing belief that 
the nationalities of the Soviet Union were a ticking time bomb for the Soviet authorities and 
that the US should exploit these ethnic problems as an official part of US Cold War strategy.   
Pipes was vociferously anti-communist, and his ideas were long considered outside of the 
mainstream within American academia.  Yet he gained a position of relative influence within 
the White House as the Soviet expert on the NSC, briefing the president personally during 
1982 after being championed by Reagan’s hard-line national security adviser William Clark.  
Pipes was tasked with crafting a concrete national security strategy and was eager to see 
the introduction of policies aimed at exploiting the internal weaknesses of the Soviet system 
during his time on the NSC, particularly towards the ethnic groups within the Soviet 
republics.   
Similarly, this thesis has detailed how Henze’s Nationalities Working Group was revived 
during the early part of Reagan’s first term and continued to perform the same role as it 
had during the Carter presidency; namely, as a forum for bringing together representatives 
of various agencies across the US government who shared an interest in the Soviet 
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nationalities and were interested in creating policies specifically aimed at exploiting Soviet 
ethnic tension included as part of US Cold War strategy.  The group met regularly at the 
State Department over the following few years, going even further than the Carter-era NWG 
by drafting an in-depth policy proposal towards the Soviet ethnic and minority groups which 
they hoped would be translated into an official presidential directive.   
This dissertation explored the ways the NWG hoped to engage with the problem of the Soviet 
nationalities, which included a blend of radio broadcasting, covert action, and public 
diplomacy.  Pipes and the members of the NWG also recognised the lack of expertise on 
Soviet nationality issues within the US government and called for the recruitment and 
training of area and linguistic specialists in order to fill this void.  In this endeavour they 
were supported by the more moderate-minded Jack Matlock, who replaced Pipes as 
Reagan’s Soviet expert on the NSC in 1983 and was eager to see the administration improve 
its understanding of ethnic issues inside the Soviet empire, although without sharing the 
same intention to stir up trouble for the Soviets as some of his more hard-line colleagues.   
Indeed, it was Matlock’s influence within the administration, alongside that of secretary of 
state George Shultz, that was to steer the president towards more fruitful engagement with 
the Soviet leadership.  This dissertation has shown that Shultz’s four-part framework for 
negotiations with the Soviets unofficially superseded the more abrasive NSDD-75 with its 
emphasis on promoting pluralism inside the USSR. By 1984 the administration was less 
focused on undermining the Soviet system from within and more open to promoting issues 
such as human rights and national self-determination through official dialogue with Moscow, 
even before Gorbachev arrived on the scene in 1985.  This thesis has revealed that efforts 
to exploit the ethnic tensions of the USSR had largely fallen by the wayside, especially with 
the departure of Pipes and Clark from the White House in late 1982, with the NWG ultimately 
being wound up in early 1984.  As Jack Matlock would say years later, Reagan “refused to 
play the “nationality card,” attempts to stir up the non-Russian populations of the Soviet 
Union … he did not set out to bring the Soviet Union down.  He tried to use U.S. strength to 
convince the Soviet leaders that they could not win an arms race and would not be allowed 
to dominate other countries by military force.  He tried to change Soviet behaviour, not to 
destroy the Soviet Union”356.  
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This thesis has opened up many avenues for potential future research on US policy towards 
the Soviet nationalities and the non-Russian republics of the USSR.  As the communist 
regimes of Eastern Europe began to fall one by one in 1989, the Soviet Union itself would 
soon topple into the abyss and vanish from history.  Nationalism raged from the Baltics, to 
Ukraine, to the Caucuses, as the non-Russian republics grew increasingly assertive in their 
demands for autonomy and Mikhail Gorbachev struggled to maintain Moscow’s grip on its 
empire.  Of course, along with nationalism there were many other reasons why the USSR 
would eventually collapse in 1991; economic stagnation, Gorbachev’s failed reforms, and 
communism’s loss of legitimacy in the eyes of the populace.  Yet nationalism proved to be 
the force which would finally tear the Soviet Union asunder, beginning in the Baltics and 
spreading like wild-fire until eventually the entire empire disintegrated under the intensity 
of its flames.  These long-simmering nationalist currents were finally unleashed when 
Gorbachev’s introduction of perestroika and glasnost removed the lid from the pressure 
cooker and emboldened the cries for self-determination within many of the Soviet republics.   
American policymakers such as Brzezinski, Henze and Pipes had long believed nationalism 
would finally prove to be the USSR’s undoing, and perhaps they were correct in urging the 
US government to explore the subject of the Soviet nationalities during the late 1970’s and 
early 1980’s.  By 1988, Reagan and Gorbachev had formed a close bond, and the US-Soviet 
relationship reached levels of co-operation previously unthinkable.  This dissertation has 
shown that the desire within the Reagan administration to exploit the ethnic tensions of the 
Soviet Union waned as the president neared the end of his first term in office.  Moderate 
voices were now in the ascendency within the White House, and the US-Soviet relationship 
was beginning to evolve in a slightly less confrontational direction, even before Gorbachev 
arrived on the scene.   
Yet more scholarship is required on policies enacted during Reagan’s second term, in order 
to discover the extent to which the administration monitored the nationality issues within 
the Soviet Union as they became more and more prevalent towards the end of the decade.  
This can only be achieved with the increased declassification of documents on the Soviet 
nationalities from the second Reagan term, yet future work on this subject could prove most 
insightful.  Additionally, after leaving office, Brzezinski and Pipes would continue to write 
on the subject of nationalism within the Soviet Union, and it would be illuminating to 
examine the ways in which they continually attempted to influence US Cold War policy from 





outside the White House.  More ambitious yet, perhaps archival work in some of the key 
former republics of the Soviet Union would reveal the extent to which US efforts to reach 
the Soviet nationalities were actually effective and highlight whether American covert 
activities and radio broadcasting to the republics had any impact at all among the people 
there. 
Moreover, a deeper study of George HW Bush and his administration’s approach to the Soviet 
nationalities and the fast-splintering republics of the USSR would be a welcome addition to 
the literature.  Historians such as Jeffrey Engel and Serhii Plokhy have done a wonderful job 
in detailing US policy during the period of the communist collapse, highlighting both Bush’s 
expertise in handling the situation yet also critiquing his administration for being slightly 
behind the curve as events in Eastern Europe and the USSR unfolded357.  Most research on 
this period has highlighted Bush’s reluctance to encourage the nationalist forces within the 
Soviet Union, for fear of provoking instability which would imperil Gorbachev’s control over 
the nation.   
Yet perhaps there was more going on.  Perhaps, as realists, the Bush administration were 
eager to squeeze every last concession from their declining adversary before the window of 
opportunity slammed shut, thus tempering their support for self-determination in the non-
Russian republics.  Had the work of the Nationalities Working Group been allowed to 
continue, perhaps the US would have found itself in a position to better understand the 
nationalism, personalities, and fast-moving events in the Soviet republics at the time of the 
Soviet collapse.  Thus, a truly in-depth study of the Bush administration’s policies toward 
the Soviet republics would be another welcome addition to scholarship on the period, and 
this dissertation paves the way for such an endeavour by opening a line of research into US 
policies in this area during a slightly earlier period of the Cold War.   
Furthermore, these issues are most pertinent to current scholarly debates around NATO 
expansion into Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics, debates which have 
engrossed scholars such as Josh Shifrinson and Marie Elise Sarrotte358.  By tracing the long-
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term trajectory of US policy towards the republics of the Soviet Union, future research will 
allow a clearer picture to emerge of the factors driving US policymakers who were tasked 
with crafting security policies toward the post-Soviet space.  This dissertation lays the 
foundation for a better understanding of US policy toward the former republics of the Soviet 
Union by provoking us to consider the attitude of policymakers inside the US government 
toward ethnic issues in the Soviet republics.  Ethnic unrest proved to be a problem which 
both the Bush and Clinton administrations were eventually forced to wrestle with in the 
aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse, as ethnic conflict erupted in Nagorno-Karabakh, 
tensions mounted between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the threat of instability persisted 
in the Baltics and Ukraine.  Future scholarship on American policies towards the former 
Soviet republics in the immediate years following the collapse of communist rule could prove 
highly instructive for our understanding of the region today. 
This thesis has highlighted an area of research which has largely remained unexplored by 
historians of the later period of the Cold War.  The attempts of US policymakers to exploit 
the nationality problems of the USSR during the period 1977 and 1984 have largely escaped 
serious historical study, and thus this dissertation fills this gap.  The motivations of these 
officials were clear; to increase the awareness and understanding of the Soviet nationalities 
within the United States government, to undermine the internal fabric and attack the 
legitimacy of the Soviet Union, and to promote calls for increased pluralism and autonomy 
within the USSR.  Largely driven by hard-line individuals across the Carter and Reagan 
administrations, these policies gained traction at a time of upheaval within the international 
system and the US-Soviet relationship itself.   
 
The collapse of détente and an increased focus on the internal nature of the Soviet regime 
encouraged policymakers to introduce powerful ideas into the foreign policy discourse and 
attempt to implement plans which would put these ideas into practice.  This thesis has 
shown that American attempts to harness the power of nationalism within the USSR to serve 
US Cold War objectives became possible at a particular moment in time, pushed by 
policymakers who had long dreamed of such an opening, but that these ideas would untimely 
pass from the scene as US-Soviet relations entered a phase of increased dialogue and 
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engagement by 1985. It is somewhat ironic that these efforts were commenced under 
Carter, often seen as more dovish, while they were wound down under Reagan, long viewed 
as the ardent Cold Warrior.  This thesis has shown that much work remains in disentangling 
and understanding US policy objectives during the final years of the Cold War. 
  
By drawing out these concepts, highlighting the power of individuals to drag hitherto 
unfashionable ideas about the Soviet nationalities from the periphery to the very centre of 
Cold War strategy, even briefly, this dissertation has contributed to our understanding of 
the period and the strategic thinking which was taking place within the US government as 
the Cold War passed through an important transitional phase, before beginning to move 
towards its end point with the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989.  The Soviet 
Union itself was soon to be ablaze with the fires of nationalism, as predicted by policymakers 
such as Brzezinski, Henze and Pipes, and these men were right to highlight the power of 
nationalism as a force for change within the USSR.   
 
Beginning in the late 1970s, US policymakers began to pay more attention to the potent 
centrifugal political forces which would eventually destroy the Soviet Union, with Njolstad 
declaring, “there were actually those within the Carter administration who were arguing 
that this was exactly how the Cold War might one day come to an end.  More than that: 
they had designed a strategy of ‘competitive engagement’”, which they believed would 
allow the US to press home its advantages in the early 1980s359.  These strategists had been 
given an opportunity to act on their long-standing beliefs, a platform to turn their ideas into 
practical policies, to take their ideological warfare to the very heart of the Soviet empire.  
Potent as these concepts were, however, more powerful ideas eventually triumphed.  Ideas 
which favoured a balanced and realistic approach to US Soviet relations and did not seek to 
bring the Soviet Union down from the inside.  And in the end, the Soviet nationalities were 
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